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ABSTRACT 
This thesis represents a series of investigations into the sociological study of symbolic forms. 
It seeks to address the question as to whether, in the informational or knowledge society of 
late modernity, all symbolic forms are necessarily isomorphic, or whether they will 
correspond with the new form of the division of labour and will therefore differ in form and 
social distribution. The symbolic forms examined here are those integrally involved in the 
production and reproduction of educational knowledge, that is, the curriculum, pedagogy, and 
educational research for policy. 
In each of the chapters of the thesis a debate is staged between the former and the latter 
position, and each chapter attempts to show that the former position, in order to make the 
argument, collapses certain distinctions which I argue are not only essential to make, but 
more importantly, whose collapse will have unfortunate and sometimes pernicious effects 
especially for learners of the working dass. This thesis is thus a series of explorations into the 
need for certain distinctions, into the nature of symbolic distinction; that is, into the nature 
and need of the boundary. 
The introductory chapter sets out the Bcope of the question to be examined in the thesis, and 
explains how the question will be addressed. 
Chapter 2 considers the claim that knowledge becomes central to innovation in information 
society by first examining the various accounts of the way the division of labour and 
competitiveness are said to be changilng and then by contrasting two competing models, a 
knowledge~driven and a social practice-driven model of innovation. Implications for both 
education and the state are briefly considered. 
Chapter 3 explores claims for how research is said to be changing in information society by 
examining the 'Mode 2' thesis about t;hanging forms of knowledge production, and some of 
its pedagogical implications. 
Chapter 4 examines the argument b€:hind using everyday knowledge as access to school 
knowledge, and explains what goes wrong when this is done in an unmediated way. 
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Chapter 5 uses theoretical resources from Durkheim and Bernstein to make a conceptual case 
for the sociological distinction between knowledge forms, and explores its robustness by 
means of a brief application to new literacy theory and an ethnography of a non-literate 
farmworker. 
Chapter 6 explores the National Qualifications Framework and its implicit pedagogy by 
means of Bernstein's distinction between performance and competence pedagogy. The 
pedagogy is shown to be a modular hybrid, and its implications discussed. 
Chapter 7 examines the curricular philosophy of progressivism, explores its curricular 
structure, and discusses the problems disadvantaged learners will have with such a 
curriculum. As in Chapter 4, the central issue turns on the relation presumed between the 
structure of everyday knowledge and the structure of school knowledge with a conceptual 
spine, like mathematics. 
By means of the historical example of the National Education Policy Investigation, Chapter 8 
explores the distinction between politics and academia, and discusses the distinction between 
forms of academic work that emerges when the socio-political field undergoes dramatic 
change. 
Chapters 9 and 10 explore the different styles of educational research. Chapter 9 examines 
the theory and practice of participatory research and its claims to be empowering, while 
Chapter 10 explores in detail the differences between realist and anti-realist styles of 
research, and their different relations to policy. 
Chapter 11 gathers the conclusions of the thesis together, and re-states the central claim that 
in an era of a complex division of labour, educational approaches that conflate or occlude 
distinctions between symbolic knowledge forms, however praiseworthy the intention, will 
hinder, not facilitate, the access of disadvantaged learners into knowledge acquisition and the 
higher reaches of the division oflabour. 
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PROLEGOMENON 
The work represented in this thesis spans a decade of writing and refining. Chapter 2 was 
originally part of a much longer report written for Peter Buckland and the Urban Foundation 
(now National Business Initiative) in the mid-nineties l . Chapter 3 began as part of a 
background report written for the National Commission of Higher Education2, and was 
extensively revised while I was on sabbatical at Cambridge University in 1997. A version 
was published in a book edited by Andre Kraak (2000)3. A different version of Chapter 4 
was first written with Nick Taylor for a conference in Minneapolis in 1994, appearing in 
Social Epistemology, 9, 3, 1995, and is extensively revised here by me. Chapter 5 was 
written for a conference in Berlin in 1995, and appears here in revised form. A version is 
published in a book edited by Morais, Neves, Davies, & Daniels (2001). Chapter 6 was 
written in 1996 for a conference in Moscow and an early version published in Comparative 
Education, 34, 2, 1998, in a special issue edited by Stephen Ball. Chapter 7 was written for 
a conference in Pretoria in 2000, and published in a book of the conference edited by Andre 
Kraak and Michael Young (2001). Chapter 8 was originally written for a seminar at the 
Maison des Sciences de I'Homme in Paris, and was published in a book edited by Thomas 
Popkewitz (2000). Chapter 9 was written for a conference in Bratislava in 1993, an early 
version was published by Saleem Badat for the Education Policy Unit at the University of 
the Western Cape, a later version by the Human Sciences Research Council in a book edited 
by Gasparikova et. aI., (1996), and is revised here. Chapter 10 was originally written for 
Nick Taylor and Penny Vinjevold of the Joint Education Trust, and a version published by 
them in 1999. 
All of the chapters, with the exception of Chapter 1, 7 and 11, appear in my book, 
Reclaiming Knowledge: Social Theory, Curriculum, and Education Policy published by 
RoutledgeFalmer in 2000. This thesis is thus unusual in the following senses: the 
component parts were written over a relatively long period of time; they were written for 
diverse purposes and audiences; they have almost all appeared in print; and they have only 
retrospectively been compiled into a consolidated body of work. This work does thus not 
have the usual form of a monograph constructed around a single research question and 
pursued in a sustained conceptual and empirical narrative. Nevertheless, it does have a 
central question, and argument, which is pursued in different ways in all the chapters. 
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This question in its most general form is the following: is the structure of all symbolic forms 
in principle the same? The answer to this question splits scholars of the disciplines studying 
symbolic forms down the middle, including or perhaps especially education. 
This thesis will defend a neo-Durkheimian view (Davies, 1994) that symbolic forms, 
especially knowledge forms, in a society with a complex division of labour must necessarily 
be differentially structured. This view is contrary to the current received commonsense 
which rests upon an essential isomorphism of symbolic form. This latter view collapses 
distinctions, leading to unfortunate unintended consequences. The thesis will try to show 
this by means of examples from each of the three major symbolic domains of education -
the curriculum, pedagogy, and educational research for policy - and will develop a 
theoretical rationale for re-asserting the importance of the collapsed distinctions. The 
general problematic of the thesis is then: what is lost when crucial distinctions are collapsed? 
My answer in each case is: an indispensable sense of the boundary. This thesis is thus an 
extended reflection on the importanc:e of the concept of boundary to understanding the 
dynamics of symbolic forms - here, curriculum, pedagogy, and research - and the 
unfortunate consequences, both social and conceptual, that attend its historical forgetting. 
The introductory Chapter 1 introduces the scope of the question to be examined in the thesis, 
and outlines the method or procedure J adopt to examine it. 
Chapter 2 sets the scene of a world where, it is everywhere said, 'knowledge' becomes more 
salient than ever before. AlthougJh this salience has important cultural and social 
dimensions, Chapter 2 focuses upon the claim that the economy is increasingly dependent on 
innovation, and goes on to examine the argument between knawledge-driven versus social 
practice-driven innovation. As will become clear throughout the rest of the thesis, this 
establishes the faultline along which all the debates in the remaining chapters will run. 
Chapter 3 continues to examine the question of a new 'knowledge salience' by critically 
examining claims for a new form of f€~search (knowledge production) called Mode 2, which 
is said to be supplanting the traditional form, Mode 1. It concludes by beginning to examine 
some implications for learning that might result from an enthusiastic embracing of the Mode 
2 account. 
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Chapter 4 examines the constructivist pedagogical response to the new global challenges for 
innovativeness, and points out some unintended consequences of this strategy for children 
from disadvantaged homes. 
Chapter 5 asks whether knowledge can ever exist without boundaries: can distinctions even 
be made where boundaries do not exist? Do distinctions survive intact across boundaries? 
Some implications of boundlessness are briefly examined through the case of new literacy 
studies, and the case of a non-literate farmworker near Cape Town. 
If we answer yes to these questions, as some plainly do, what kind of pedagogy would we 
get? Chapter 6 considers this question by examining the pedagogy implicit in the South 
African National Qualifications Framework, and asks further; can we stipulate conditions for 
its success? 
Chapter 7 extends the discussion by examining the curricular form and structure that fits 
such a pedagogy, and, by examining various kinds of progressive pedagogy again enquires 
into the conditions under which it might be successful. 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 focus on that body of knowledge called policy, and research for policy. 
How do the parameters of classificatory schemes facilitate and constrain policy thinking and 
research for policy? How do certain ways of doing policy come to recommend themselves 
to us? How, in an era of uncertainty and challenge, do we develop a responsible knowledge 
practice? 
The concluding chapter will re-visit the central question of the thesis, namely, the 
indispensability of the concept of boundary for grasping the social nature of knowledge, and 
in examining the lessons learnt from the various cases and sites explored, will re-state the 
central argument and indicate ways in which the arguments can be further explored and 
refined. 
Notes 
1 The Urban Foundation was a public policy think tank for a consortium of corporate 
clients. 
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2 The National Commission of Higher Education was a presidential commission into 
policy parameters for the South African higher education system. 
3 These sources all appear in my bibliography. 
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Chapter 1 
SPLITTING HAIRS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL 
QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
They went off together leisurely with the Sheik saying, 'One of the 
Sayings of the Prophet that has been handed down to us is: "The 
corruption of scholars is through heedlessness, and the corruption of 
priests is through injustice, and the corruption of the Sufis is through 
hypocrisy"'. 'How delightful are his words!' muttered Aladdin with joy. 
The Sheik said in a voice that was slightly raised in the calm of the night, 
'So be not one of the associates of devils'. Spurred on by feverish 
yearning, Aladdin asked, 'Who are the associates of devils?' 'A prince 
without learning, a scholar without virtue, a Sufi without trust in God, 
and the corruption of the world lies in their corruption'. 
Mahfouz, 1995, p. 161. 
A venerable headmaster once tried to explain to me what it was that students were unable to 
do when their learning had been interrupted, as it so often is in schools in the new South 
Africa, and I dare say elsewhere too. Searching for an apt phrase, he eventually said, 'They 
are unable to split hairs'. That struck me as vivid and right. Splitting hairs, making a 
distinction where before one was not made, is the basis of knowledge, and teaching our youth 
how these distinctions have been made and how to make them lies at the heart of education. 
Distinctions come in two forms, systematised and unsystematised. Durkheim established 
early on in the twentieth century that divisions and distinctions of ideas become knowledge 
only once they have become systematised or connected to each other, that is, once they 
become formed into schemes of classification (Joas, 1993, p. 81 fil. 1). This work, like all 
sociologies of knowledge, is centrally concerned with schemes of classification. 
This is not yet to say very much. Important branches of epistemology, philosophy of science 
and cognitive psychology have made schemes of classification their chosen domain for many 
decades. More recently, the classical disciplines of knowledge have run into a series of 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2 
difficulties, which have produced a crisis for both knowledge and the disciplines studying it. 
The literatures naming these difficulties are technical and complex, but the problem, or 
paradox, can be simply if abstractly described. Systematicity is necessary for distinctions to 
become knowledge. This is because non-systematic 'knowledge' - practical knowledge and 
local wisdom of all sorts refers to the effects and uses of knowledge but does not provide 
the basis for reflection upon its bases, and therefore upon the possibility of alternative bases: 
'the wise person observes himself, applies his wisdom to himself, and does not attempt to 
account for the perspectives of others or other possibilities of perspective' (Luhmann, 1998, 
p. 37) (this is explored in Chapters 5 and 9). Distinctions become knowledge when they 
become self-referential, when they attempt to deal with their internal inconsistencies (ibid.); in 
other words, when they become reflexive1. And when they become self-referential and 
reflexive then the distinctions and their connections become repeatable, transcribable and 
therefore revisable by the competent community at large. The more revisable they become, 
the more unstable the structure beeomes. Reflexivity is thus both the condition for 
knowledge and the means for its motility and destabilisation. This raises special challenges 
for a responsible and socially aware scientific practice (Chapter 9). 
As the twentieth century wore on, sci€mce and society at large became increasingly aware of 
the instability of science, probably in no small measure as a result of the massive increase in 
the production of new knowledge and the new technologies of its production and 
dissemination. This has led to a new prominence of science in all facets of our lives. The 
'Y2K spectre' was just one recent reminder of our intimate beholdeness to science and the 
risky unpredictability of such beholdeness. This brings up a second sense of 'reflexiveness', 
one which points far more directly to contingency, risk and ambivalence on the one hand, and 
to enhanced individual possibilities and freedom on the other. As one of its proponents 
declares, 'The theory of reflexive mode:rnisation ... asks what sorts of institutions are possible 
in an age of chronic contingency, of chronic ambivalence' (Lash, 1999, pp. 137-138). At the 
end of this introduction, I will claim that the challenge for contemporary sociology of 
knowledge is to find a way of holding on to both senses of reflexivity at the same time. 
In the traditional sociology of knowlc~dge2, knowledge and society were considered to be 
external to one another, with society acting upon knowledge from outside, bringing interests 
or values or purposes to bear on it, acting upon knowledge as science might act upon nature, 
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bending it to a superior will. With a better awareness of the reflexivity of knowledge, in both 
senses, this is harder to sustain. The intrinsic sociality of knowledge, the thoroughly social 
nature of schemes of classification, not just their vulnerability to outside influence, is what 
must now be accounted for. It is at just this point - on the proper implications of the intrinsic 
social nature of knowledge - that views sharply diverge. This can be seen across the entire 
spectrum of disciplines dealing with knowledge, from philosophy and epistemology, through 
the sociology of science and technology, to the applied disciplines of innovation and policy 
studies. This thesis engages directly with this body of work, sometimes called the science or 
the culture wars. My specific aim is to shed light on the way that knowledge is conceived of 
in several influential fields that deal with education generally: the curriculum, research, and 
with education policy. 
These essays are of South Africa, they represent engagements that have a certain historical 
rootedness that I have not tried to hide, and which I sometimes even foreground, as in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. But they are not essays about South Africa, except in a restricted sense. 
It is worth saying briefly what that restricted sense might be. These essays span the 1990s, 
the 'liberation years' in South Africa, the period of passage from apartheid to democracy, 
from a universally abhorred polity and education system ('Bantu education') to a modem 
enlightened government and its accompanying educational policies. The lack of bloodshed, 
the predominant civility of the process of transition, has rightly been hailed as a global success 
story. The hero of the piece, as befits a mass movement that successfully became the ruling 
political party, is not Nelson Mandela, however much the man himself is revered; it is the 
spirit of the collective, the idea of mass struggle. 
The term 'struggle', common in the language ofneo-Marxism prior to the demise of Eastern 
bloc socialism, carried a special connotation in South Africa. Unlike capitalism, apartheid was 
not a social order that had prevailed over time. Some Marxist analyses notwithstanding, 
apartheid and all associated inequalities were popularly seen as a temporary and eliminable 
perversion of the will, to be vanquished by mass opposition and superior moral resoluteness 
(see the first part of Chapter 8). At crucial moments of transition, in 1990 with the first steps 
towards liberalisation and the release of political prisoners, and later in 1994 with the first 
democratic election, it seemed that virtuous struggle could indeed stop evil men in their tracks 
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and reverse history. It was hard for academics too to exempt themselves from this swelling 
triumphal wave. This feeling of an exception or a rupture in history was buttressed in many 
invisible ways by the stream of academics who began to visit in numbers early on in the 1990s. 
For these academics, reluctantly beginning to accept that they no longer had a clear 
progressive cause to support after the end of the Cold War, South Africa could well have 
seemed the virtuous exception to a bll~ak post-modem future. Other academics encountered 
at international conferences at the time were not quite as optimistic. Their not-quite-
suppressed scepticism was noticeable, but easy to dismiss as the old world ennui and sour 
grapes of societies that had long ago exhausted their historical imagination. 
It was not at all clear then how this South African exceptionalism was stultifYing our 
understanding of broader historical trends at work in the continent and beyond (see Mamdani 
1998), and the way that contemporary debates would place us. We would have been 
astounded then to learn that mainstream post-modernism would place us amongst the last 
naIve modernists: 
To believe as did Augustine, Hegel, Marx (and perhaps I should add, to make 
his position absolutely clear, l~artin Luther King and Nelson Mandela) that 
they spoke for all humanity in their quest for freedom is, for Lyotard, the grand 
mother of an illusion 
Smith 1998, p. 19. 
Other aspects of the political triumphallism of the time, although equally single-minded, were 
more familiar and predictable: if the perversions of political will could be overturned and 
replaced, then all forms of perceived minority interest could and should as well. This was 
taken to apply not only to government and the private sector, but to all forms of 'non-
democratic' social life - to expert knowledge and science, to bureaucracy, and to national 
policy making. All of these were 'oppressive' and must now be rendered 'democratic'. 
It will surely not be surprising that the: knowledge-based activities of the new state policy 
formulation and national curriculum design being the two analysed in this thesis - have been 
politically shaped from the outset, or that the political leaning toward democracy has made us 
amenable to a democratic knowledge politics. But it may well seem ironic in retrospect that 
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the political fonn of South Afiica's belated accession to political modernity has made us so 
vulnerable to some of the more radical fonns of post-modern voluntarism. The chapters in 
this thesis are, in this sense, written against a certain cultural current influential not only in 
South Afiica but, for perhaps different political reasons, also influential in most other parts of 
the world. 
A principal target of this current of thought has been the distinctions between primitive and 
civilised, rational and irrational, concrete and abstract, that are said to be a staple of cultural 
imperialism, colonialism, the dominance of science, and of 'traditional' pedagogy alike. The 
fonn of thinking that resulted in apartheid and Bantu education would seem to be an obvious, 
if extreme, variant. No wonder then that South Afiican educators were attracted to that brand 
of sociology of knowledge that set out to dethrone the distinction which seemed to favour the 
latter in favour of the fonner, an asymmetry to be rejected in favour of a postulate of 
symmetry which declared the radical equality between all fonns of thought. Where the 
asymmetry was seen as a product of modern epistemology, then epistemology itself would 
have to go. Henceforth, not logical but only sociological distinctions could be drawn between 
symbolic fonns. In extreme versions of this view, all construals of intelligence, rationality or 
academic success are considered socio-political constructions, and therefore opposable. The 
political slogan of the militant youth, 'pass one pass all' that arose in the People's Education 
movement of the 1980s rests on such a view3. It is not uncommon to find student activists at 
university challenging their poor grades on the basis that the grade reflects not their ability but 
a disadvantaging power dispensation. While there is a certain analytical sense in which this 
might be so, it should also be clear that it hardly offers a sound basis upon which to 
reconstruct an education system on the ruins of Bantu eduGation. 
Spare a thought in passing for the quandary of the erstwhile revolutionaries who came to 
power on a surge of triumphalism fuelled by imp.ssibly high expectations. Where in the world 
has a democratising regime achieved dramatic educational success? Yet not .nly popular 
expectations but the moral zeal .f the ref.rmers themselves must have helped t. impel them to 
a p.siti(i'lfi where bettennent was achievable through struggle, which in the new disp~nsation 
meant by the will of the people as expressed by the new-in-p.wer. The p.ssibilitarianism of 
this view, te use Geeff Whitty's (1974) still prescient phrase, must have seemed fatally 
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alluring. For better or for worse, I ha,ve labelled this view constructivism, admittedly a term 
open to differing interpretations (see Chapter 4, note 2). 
It is a recurring theme of this thesis that constructivism defined here as a broad anti-
epistemological movement, has taken a perfectly reasonable set of theses about the social 
constitution of knowledge and has radicalised it into a set of sceptical claims about the 
constructedness of reality itself, in which reality becomes merely an artefact of our knowledge 
about it (Chapters 4 and 10). This radicalisation has, I will try to show, had a series of 
unfortunate effects upon the formation of policy, the practice of education, and the conduct of 
government. The chapters in this thesis constitute a set a retracing steps along the path of the 
sociology of knowledge and curriculum. In so doing, I am trying to pick up a thread that 
somehow got dropped as the new sociology of education ran out of theoretical steam in the 
mid-1980s, to be overtaken by the sup,;,rf'icially more exciting family of social constructivisms, 
cultural studies, and post-modern approaches to texts and representation that have helped to 
drive the sociology of education into its current malaise. In this sense, this thesis makes a 
claim to be relevant beyond the debates: and concerns of South Africa. 
This is not meant to be a purely critical exercise. Rather, this represents an attempt at retrieval 
of the sort practised variously by Lash (1998), for example (who uses the term 'hermeneutics 
of retrieval'), but also of the sort practised, in widely different ways, by Wexler (1996), Young 
(1998), Ladwig (1996) and Taylor and Vinjevold (1999). My particular version is to attempt 
to do justice to, but avoid the blandishments of, both the 'old deferentialism' and the 'new 
cynicism' (Haack, 1998 p. 5). My method is to stage debates between representative 
placeholders for these positions: mode one and mode two knowledge production (Chapter 3); 
traditional and socio-cultural constructivism (Chapter 4); the sacred and profane (Chapter 5); 
performance and competence pedagogies (Chapter 6); traditional and radical progressives 
(Chapter 7); reconstructors and critics (Chapter 8); parachutists and truffle-hunters (Chapter 
9); realist and constructivist research methodologies (Chapter 10). My analytical strategy in 
each case is to ask: what happens when the second view in each couple prevails? My 
investigation in each case is to show that the second view, by espousing the radical symmetry 
of all symbolic and knowledge forms, dispenses with the indispensable concept of boundary, 
with results usually the converse oftho~;e intended. My thesis, in sum, tracks the effects of the 
second view in a series of educational sites where knowledge forms and transactions are 
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central - curriculum, pedagogy, policy and research - and sets out to demonstrate the 
conceptual and political indispensability of the boundary. 
There are countless examples of boundlessness in contemporary sociology of knowledge and 
curriculum. One privileged place for such thinking is in the literature on globalisation, where 
the apostles of cosmopolitanism trade sallies with their localist counterparts around the proper 
definition of 'development' (Chapter 2). The term 'glocalism' is sometimes used to suggest 
that the two dynamics are connected. Yes, but how? States these days clearly all face 
outwards and model themselves on world culture, but often without the wherewithal to adopt 
it wholesale; the effect is an internal de-coupling and the promotion of new or revivified locals 
(Meyer et aI, 1997). At the same time, local actors promote local causes with the help of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), perhaps the primary carriers of world culture, and often 
miss the extent to which they exhibit cosmopolitanism, the way in which the local is itself 
cosmopolitan. 
I began this introduction by asserting the centrality of the notion of reflexivity to 
considerations of knowledge. I distinguished between two key senses of the term. The first 
sense denotes the controlled reflection of science in the interests of social responsibility: this is 
the reflexivity of Marx, and, especially, Durkheim and Weber (and Mannheim, see Whitty, 
1997). It is the best face of the first modernity and the socially responsible realists; The 
second sense denotes enhanced personal freedom on the one hand, and increased ambiguity, 
contingency and awareness of risk on the other (Chapter 2). The challenge for a reflexive 
sociology of knowledge is thus in its most compressed form: how to practise the socially 
responsible reflexivity of the first modernity in a time of the second, in the face of inescapable 
motility, contingency and uncertainty, at a time when knowledge has never been so all-
pervasive, or so untrustworthy. 
The spectre of the 'trustworthiness of knowledge looms darkly over everything we do' 
(Barnes, 1999, p. 382). This is so for both the subject and the medium of my argument. The 
English language I use is shot through with a tenacious commitment to an active agency and a 
passive world of natural objects which makes it particularly difficult to re-arrange the terms of 
discussion. When a student dithers, we are wont to say, 'make up your mind'. When 
something goes wrong, we hope that someone is 'sorting things out'. All these strong senses 
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of action polarise the world and we humans who 'make sense' of it. This polarisation, called 
the 'modernist settlement' by Latour (1999), lies at the base of all the disputes discussed here 
and disposes the 'fabricationalism' of constructivism that I confront in this work. For Latour, 
we must find a way of circumventing the modernist settlement or else it will continue to trap 
us in this metaphysical morass. 
My aim in this thesis is more modest. I mean to be analytical, a little less philosophical, and 
somewhat more historical. Above all, I try to take a sociological position on the question of 
knowledge, of how it plays an increasingly important role in our lives, and what educators are 
trying to do about it. It is my contention that there have been wrong turnings. We must re-
direct our sociological steps while we s:till have a discipline with which to do it. 
To return to the question of responsibility for a final time. What to do about knowledge that 
is not fatally voluntaristic, or conversely, fashionably pessimistic, while retaining a sense of 
possibility; this is a task that we can, with Mahfouz's Sheik and young Aladdin, perhaps only 
take up properly on the other side of the modernist settlement, beyond the culture wars, after 
we have solved the problem of the divide. Then, as Latour (1999, p. 297) says, will we 'be 
able to answer the most difficult of alii questions: Are you ready, and at the price of what 
sacrifice, to live the good life together?' 
Notes 
1 When it is said that knowledge is reflexive in this particular sense, it means that 
knowledge to be knowledge must operate in an institutionalised context, which in the 
case of science means, for example, peer review. 
2 I speak rather loosely here. In the progenitors, like Marx, Freud, Durkheim, Weber and 
Mannheim, this is rarely the casle; I mean the secondary industry that grew up in their 
wake. 
3 For the student cadres struggling against apartheid and Bantu education, equality and 
democracy in schooling meant simply that all should pass. 
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Chapter 2 
GLOBALISATION, INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
Introduction: After Providentialism 
(' ... what would happen if radioactivity itched?') 
Beck, 1992, p. 120. 
We live in a world where we no longer believe with Dickens' Mr Micawber that everything 
will turn out well in the end. We no longer have an unquestioning faith in God, or tradition, or 
science, or politicians, or policy planners. Too many plans have run awry, too many 
technologies have produced unexpected and often disastrous effects on citizens and workers, 
local communities, and the environment. We live in a time where information about 
everything is being exponentially generated, much of which we know we will never hear 
about, aU of which we have learnt to doubt to a greater or lesser extent. We all know, to 
differing degrees, that many of the events which rule our lives are determined in places far 
from our control, increasingly beyond our national borders. Even though we may hedge our 
bets with elaborate insurance policies, dietary precautions and routines of personal hygiene, all 
we can know for certain is that tomorrow we will discover a new threat or risk that we never 
dreamed we were vulnerable to. The knock-on effects of world events are literally 
unimaginable: a famine in, say, Mozambique, at least partly caused, by overly austere 
structural adjustment conditionalities attached to foreign loans, causes forced migration 
resulting in hawker-congestion and ethnic tensions in the streets of Johannesburg, and, who 
knows, perhaps lies behind the taxi wars. And acid rain falls on us alL This is the global 
condition. 
At the heart of this condition is the increasingly central role that technology now plays in every 
~ 
facet of life, a technology that is changing at an ever increasing pace, a fact which itself creates 
obligations for societies that want to 'keep up' or 'catch up' or otherwise 'fall behind', to use 
the current jargon. We should not think of technology as a 'thing', say the economists, as 
either hardware or software, but rather as 'the use of knowledge, means, processes, and 
organisations to produce goods and services' (Dahlman and Nelson, 1993, p. 6). And, as 
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many of the key technologies we are talking about here are precisely technologies for the 
dissemination of 'knowledge, means and processes', technology knows few boundaries, of 
firms, markets or countries. Technology is not only of the global condition, it is the condition 
of globality. 
Technology, whether medium or hi-tec;h, 'appropriate' or 'sustainable', has increasingly come 
to be seen as central to all forms of development, especially economic development. This 
view has attained the status of an orthodoxy. As Dahlman and Nelson (1993, p. 1) say with 
disarming directness: 'Technology and technical change are one of the main driving forces 
behind the structure of production, the opportunities for trade, the increase in international 
competitiveness, and the growth of m!~tional income', all devoutly to be desired, to be sure. 
The condition for effective development is the knowledgeable deployment of that technology: 
the condition of 'knowledgeable deployment' is education. Perhaps more tightly even than in 
the heyday of Bekker's 'human capital' hypotheses of the 1960s that so scandalised the anti-
utilitarians of the left and the right, education (or knowledge) is, in the contemporary 
economic narrative, tied more tightly than ever into technology, productivity and 
development, one may add to unplanned risk and uncertainty as well. 
South Africa is implementing reconstmction and development in a climate partly defined by 
the conspicuous failures of the 'planned societies' of the Eastern bloc, but in the wake too of 
the retreat of the more astringent forms of free marketeering that produced anarchy and 
hardship way beyond the economic euphemism of 'market failure' (see Soros, 1998). In the 
era after the Cold War, with the 'cooliJt1g of the casino', few writers of repute would set state 
and market up as ideological opposites in the way they might have before, preferring to 
'inquire into the conditions under which state action and market functioning combine to 
advance growth and development' (Rueschemeyer and Putterman, 1992, p. 259). This is not, 
as some might think, because ideology has now given way to hard-headed pragmatism, but 
rather because the nature of states and markets are changing under conditions of globality, and 
these changes are driving them willy-niJIy into a relation of interdependence. 
From what has been said so far, it should not be surprising that the penumbra of uncertainty, 
doubt and scepticism of the modem period extends to the activities of policy makers as well, 
to 'the dangerous and false security of a "society from the drawing board'" (Beck, 1992, p. 
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119). Even as development planners design consensual schedules that draw creatively on the 
latest literature on technology transfer, innovation, skilling, science and technology and 
economic growth, so counter-discourses are growing apace, based on local needs, local 
identities and local control, and a strong antipathy to central plans of all kinds. A broad cross-
section of world society, organising sectors of the 'Fourth World' described by Castells 
(1997), feeling the cold wind of globality, and often feeling distinctly left out of the circuits of 
distribution, are asserting themselves against what they perceive as technocratic and centralist 
visions of development (see for example Visvanathan, 2001). This too is a global 
phenomenon, even as it is 'anti-globalisation', so to speak. In order to be effective, these 
initiatives will have to be more than reactions against the depredations of globality, they will 
have to deal directly with it. So far, the most sympathetic commentators of their plight are not 
exactly optimistic (Castells, 1997). 
Globalising tendencies do not merely homogenise, create uniformity, and universalise: they 
are not just about Seinfeld, Coca-Cola and the latest Microsoft software. Insofar as they 
distribute knowledge and technology previously the province only of the rich and powerful, 
they also provide opportunities for local appropriation. Globalisation, or 'glocalisation' 
(Bauman, 1998) is simultaneously about the global and the local. Not being at the exclusive 
mercy of either is a definition of survival in these risky times. And education is somehow at 
the centre of most scenarios of survival. 
Global Competitiveness and the 'New Competition' 
As the boundaries and barriers of the pre-global world become increasingly penneable, giving 
enonnously expanded access to technology and world markets, as international 
competitiveness picks up and the increasing pace of change become the order of the day, a 
further feature of contemporary industrial production comes to the fore. Many writers 
currently suggest that we seem to be moving into a new phase of industrialisation altogether, 
sometimes called 'neo-industrialisation' (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991). The configuration is 
difficult to get to grips with, first, because there are at least three major paradigms or theories 
which describe the configuration in different ways, and secondly, because some writers seem 
to be describing an actual historical shift (the 'post-Fordists' particularly) while others seem to 
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be advocating the configuration as It normatively desirable one, to be actively pursued 
especially by those countries in the proeess of developing. 
The nub of the matter, it seems, is the increasing dysfunctionality of a certain kind of 
production regime, based on mass-produced, high-volume, standardised products, depending 
for competitiveness on keeping produGtion costs as low as possible (primarily labour costs), 
on economies of scale, thus making the goods price-competitive on national and international 
markets. This form of production, sometimes called 'Fordist production' (after Henry Ford 
and his production line), based on precepts of classical economics, takes its line from factor 
accumulation and technology, leaving little room for either government policy or business 
strategy to improve upon production allocations (Doeringer and Streeten, 1990). Because 
cheap labour was to be had in the Third World, production plants were frequently sited there 
during the era of high Fordism. 
The rate of change, the rate of information increase, and the growing climate of global 
competitiveness have together turned Fordist production into something of a dinosaur, no 
longer able to adapt swiftly enough to changing market demands, and being too rigid to make 
adaptable use of rapidly changing technological innovations. Enter a new form of production, 
often called 'flexible specialisation', but also known as 'flexible mass production' or 
'diversified quality production', or just plain 'post-Fordist production', having something in 
common with pre-Fordist craft prodw:~tion, low-volume production of customised quality 
competitive goods, with a competitive edge added by rapid adaptability to innovation, highly 
planned and speedy delivery and m13~keting, an economy not of scale but of scope, of 
agglomeration and collaboration. Unlike craft production, 'post-Fordist production' is not 
restricted to low-volume production but is able to 'massify' production cycles or 'batches' by 
embedding them in larger batches. Craft productive enterprises can therefore expand their 
markets through massification, and mass productive firms can correspondingly move upscale 
by customising their products and improving their quality. The 'new' form of production is 
hence one which, in a variety of differenlt ways, tries to combine economies of scale and scope. 
There are two points about the generic form of the new production worth stressing. The first 
is that it depends upon continuous innovation, which can mean either the 'high' end of 
innovation involving the acquisition and deployment of embodied and disembodied 
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(production process) technologies, either by research and development (R&D) or by 
technology transfer; or it can mean 'learning-by-doing innovation' by skilled workers 
constantly adapting existing technology through incremental innovation steps (or of course 
both). The second point is that the emerging new production regime can no longer get by 
with only docile, low-wage semi-skilled labour. It increasingly must also depend upon 
skilled, adaptable, independent and responsible workers who are a source of innovation in 
their own right. For any economy, or firm, therefore contemplating global competitiveness 
and successful participation in the 'new competition', two watchwords have become key: 
innovation and high skills. 
Whilst most analysts agree on the basic configuration needed for the 'new competition', 
relative emphasis and hence policy priorities differ depending on the paradigm (see 
Wilkinson, 1997). For the techno-economic paradigm (TEP), writers such as, for example, 
Freeman, Soete and Nelson (see Freeman and Soete, 1993) (called 'post-Fordists' by Hirst 
and Zeitlin, 1991), policy should focus primarily on national science and technology policy. 
For them, 'diseconomies of competition' occur mainly i~ these areas. The example of 
Hungary, for instance, tells them that, whilst having a reasonable absorptive capacity, actual 
absorption has been low because of too much inward-looking and a poor incentive regime for 
both technological development and trade exports. The lesson from Argentina is that 
political instability inhibits firms from making the necessary long-tenn investments in R&D 
(Dahlman and Nelson, 1993). While not neglecting education and the institutional 
environment, this paradigm stresses outward-directed technological catch-up rather than the 
, 
internal conditions for endogenous development. At the worst, these writers lean towards a 
technological determinism notable mainly for what it does not talk about. As we shall see in 
the next section, they lean also towards a particular notion of 'innovation' and consequently a 
specialist conception of skill and knowledge. 
" 
The jlexispec I diversified quality production writers like Sabel, Piore and Streeck (see Sabel, 
1993; Streeck, 1991), on the other hand. concentrate almost entirely on the institutional 
conditions necessary for cultivating highly innovative behaviour under a particular 
understanding of global conditions. This paradigm understands innovative activity to require 
specific business or state strategies that overcome the 'diseconomies of global competition' 
which are here understood as having to do with information, knowledge and free-riding. 
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These are market inefficiencies that have to be overcome by strategy, not competition or 
demand management. Hence, since efficient manufacturing will require co-operation between 
management and labour and intra- and inter-firm relations of trust and co-operation in order to 
make investments effective, 'The core of a flexible specialisation policy is thus to create and 
sustain those institutional patterns that lead firms to co-operate one with another as well as 
compete' (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991, p. 45). 
It may seem that flexispec is a bridge too far for poorly endowed developing countries, but 
this is not necessarily so. Developing countries are less encumbered by the rigidities of vast 
technical investments which are costly to reverse, and they can 'borrow' technology at a 
fraction of the cost of 'inventing' it (Amsden, 1990, p. 15). There is no reason at all why the 
work practices and relationships among flexispec firms cannot also be applied to developing 
countries and low-tech production in the informal sector as well as the formal sector 
(Doeringer and Streeten, 1990, pp. 1252-1253). 
The main division within the flexispec paradigm is between those, like Piore and Sabel, who, 
drawing their inspiration from the decl~ntralised co-operative business districts of the 'Third 
Italy', emphasise decentralised, voluntaristic (business driven) policies with a minimal role for 
the state; and those like Streeck and Amsden who, drawing their inspiration from Germany 
and Asia, favour state-sponsored stratt:gies and policies to compel firms to develop relations 
of co-operation against their ingrained classically conditioned impulses to compete at every 
point. 
Flexispec generally favours supply-sidle policies that focus on the implementational end of 
production, and hence emphasise the itmovative capacities of the productive workers, clearly 
using a different definition of 'innovation' to that ofTEP. For this reason too, flexispec places 
great emphasis on cultivating this capacity by training in 'broad and high skills'. This is the 
origin of the educational advocacy of non-specialist generic skills. 
Finally, the regulationist school (Lipietz (1987) and Boyer (1993) for example) adopt a 
macro-economic neo-Keynesian approach to 'world production', with an analytically derived 
view of the protagonists that favours a political rather than a policy view. The state is seen as 
crucial, and the nature of that state will be the outcome of a struggle between class forces. 
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The working class must therefore assert itself for power in the state and ensure that low-wage 
policies are not agreed to between the government and the business sector. This is an 
antagonistic view of labourlbusiness relations compared to the co-operative one envisaged in 
the flexispec paradigm. Unlike that paradigm too, this approach is demand-driven and the 
state is to stimulate local consumption as a path to growth. Since the Third World is seen here 
as largely outmanoeuvred by international class forces, this approach favours massive aid and 
debt relieffor the Third World. 
These three paradigms of the 'new production' are all useful in that they highlight various 
dimensions and links in the competitiveness chain, and clarify the different development paths 
that could emerge from different combinations of these dimensions. They clarify too the 
different human resource implications of the various innovation activities of the competitive 
paths: 
• technological invention requires advanced science knowledge and substantial advanced 
research skills; 
• technological 'borrowing' and adaptation requires intermediate science knowledge, some 
research development experience and some work experience; 
• technological improvement requires quality secondary education (with science, 
mathematics and technology), as well as grounded work experience. 
Significantly, not one of these approaches deals with either the substantive nature of that all-
important secondary education, nor in depth with the consequent implications for the notion of 
skills and knowledge that education and training must deal with. 
Innovation in Question 
Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer can indicate 
their clues and formulate their maxims, they know many more things than they 
can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and not 
explicitly, as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore ineffable, 
and a pondering of a judgement in terms of such particulars is an ineffable 
process of thought. This applies equally to connoisseurship as the art of 
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aid of practised example and never solely by precept. 
Polanyi, 1958, p. 88. 
16 
The nature and practice of innovaticn is poorly understood in much of the development 
literature, and those disagreeing have, by and large, not clarified the nature of their 
disagreements. The terms of debate have something in common with the differences between 
orthodox philosophy and history of science, and social studies of science and their respective 
views of scientific change (a difference approached from a different angle in Chapter 10). For 
the former, scientific advance is the product of rational forethought, of design planning, of the 
application of a higWy trained intellig'Emce to a rational puzzle. For the latter, on the other 
hand, scientific breakthrough is prodlLlced as an extension of ordinary 'scientific practice', 
which is itself a messy, arbitrary, trial and error business, and which is driven at least as much 
by serendipity, animus or interest as it is by the epistemic imperative or truth-seeking. Here, 
as in studies of technology and innovation transfer, we can see the 'social studies' research 
programme attempting implicitly or explicitly to answer a question that cannot easily be posed 
in the 'philosophy of science' programme: why is the same innovation or technology 
successful in one context and not in another one which is often identically resourced? 
(Amsden, 1992, p. 58). This question is central to an understanding of the differential 
economic performance of nations. 
It may be useful as a start to borrow from the scholars of scientific change the distinction 
between a knowledge-driven theory of innovation and a social practice-driven one. For the 
first, innovation is driven by an increase in knowledge. In this scenario, advanced research as 
well as R&D are essential, and indeed, public and private spending on research is one direct 
index of international competitiveness in common use (The World Economic Forum / IMD 
International, 1993). The question here for developing economies is how best to transfer the 
knowledge. Landes (1992) provides the conventional answer, which is to enter into networks 
with 'the strong and knowing', and which in turn usually means via multinational companies or 
by 'joint venture' entrepreneurial networking. But this begs the question since not all late-
developing economies 'borrow' from th.e 'strong and knowing' with equivalent effect. For the 
social practice-driven theory, on the other hand, advances in innovation and technology come 
about at least as much as an extension of skilful manipulation of technology, of the art of 
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doing. Some firms or economies then have greater stores of tacit knowledge to draw from. 
Furthermore, the tacit knowledge accrued by the long practice of craft and instrumental 
practice, of 'doing the job', in itself can come to suggest new ways of doing things. For 
instance, a technically simple streamlining of a production process may have major 
productivity consequences. Watanabe's (1993) discussion of the effects of worker-built 
chutes, loaders and stoppers in hi-tech Japanese firms like Mazda is a case in point. 
Nevertheless, we have to ask how useful it is to polarise the issue into alternative exclusive 
choices. From one point of view, the debate certainly is, as Boyer (1993, p. 101) has put it, 
about '... the inner characteristics of innovation. Is it the result of a rational ex ante 
assessment or the unintended and joint result of economic activity itself?' Polanyi (1958) for 
instance notes how, in the early 1920s in England, the scientific study of cotton-spinning 
innovation was occupied for at least the first decade in finding out what the skilled spinners 
already tacitly knew. Foray (1993) notes too how, historically, Japanese firms have come to 
develop 'techno-pulled' innovation, while US firms, relying on a well-developed scientific and 
R&D infrastructure, have tended to develop 'episteme-pushed' innovation, and consequently, 
as the Japanese disapprovingly observe, the US firms too frequently indulge in over-
specification, or 'overspec' (Watanabe, 1993, p. 363). 
Nevertheless, prudent economists will insist that there are crucial returns to investment in all 
three areas; basic research, R&D and learning-by-doing innovation, suggesting that we need 
another way of considering the issue. Such a way is provided by a recent research programme 
which poses the difference between 'episteme' and 'techne' rather as one between 'product' 
and process' (see Foray, 1993, p. 10 passim). This approach does not polarise 'knowledge' 
and 'doing' so much as distinguish between two necessary and complementary components of 
all knowledgeable activity: the coded innovative knowledge 'product' or result of the activity 
on the one hand; and the tacitly embedded unarticulated knowledge which is the 'process' 
condition for its productive realisation, on the other. 
The crux of this distinction entails that basic research, R&D, and learning-by-doing innovative 
activities all have both a 'product' and a 'process' dimension. Approaches that valorise 
'product' only tend to lose sight of both the tacit knowledge of the researchers, which is at 
least as productive a resource as the product, and underestimate too the tacit knowledge of 
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the workers needed to put the product 'to use' in the production cycle. Not only does that 
knowledge have to be in place, and sufficiently adaptable, for the 'product' to become 
productive, but it has also to be 'willing' to adapt: as Streeck puts it; 'the reason why one 
cannot teach an old dog new tricks is not that the dog is old, but that he wants to remain the 
kind of dog he has grown to be' (quoted by Elam, 1993, p. 30). Equally, approaches that 
valorise learning-by-doing downplay the codified and hence transmittable dimensions of 
knowledge in both generic (research) a.nd non-generic (production) activity. The message in 
much of the recent literature is clear: 'product' and 'process' as well as their fruitful 
interaction all are essential for productive innovation. 
There are a number of implications of this conclusion worth reiterating: 
• knowledge as tacit competence is as crucial to the quest for successful innovation as is 
knowledge as 'result' (which would include research results like experimental algorithms, 
patents, trademarks and other forms of intellectual property). The latter are inert (often 
expensively so) without the former, and the former can only become productive by means 
of some measure of 'articulation' with inarticulate skilled innovativeness via explicitly 
designed institutional arrangement8. The Japanese Quality Circles are an example of such 
an arrangement. 
• all forms of practice have a tacit dimension, including, and perhaps especially, experimental 
and applied science. It is increasingly recognised that it is the training in research and 
problem-solving skills that has long-term market value, rather than rapidly obsolescent 
content-knowledge. This holds true for all kinds of training. As Pavitt (1993, p. 37) says, 
'economists and other social scientists will benefit enormously in both the accuracy and 
impact of their analyses if they dis,card their conceptualisations of science and technology 
as activities producing easily transmissible and applicable "information", and recognise 
them instead as search processes and skills embodied in individuals and institutions'. It is 
this point that gets fudged when industrialists doggedly insist that employees should have: 
'job relevant' skills. 
• this perspective switches the focus of attention away from either research-centrism and a 
preoccupation with amounts spent on pure and applied research; or practice-centrism, and 
a preoccupation with incentive regimes for fostering shop-floor creativity. It places the~ 
focus squarely on the institutional forms most congenial to stimulating productive 
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interaction (learning-by-interacting) across the many interfaces that cnss-cross the 
productive cycle. These include: the basic research / R&D and application interface 
(science parks, for example); the intellectual property/production technology interface; the 
firm/environment interface; the firm/firm interface; and the user/producer interface. 
• finally, firms need R&D operations not so much to produce 'product' innovations, as to 
keep the general climate and level of organisational learning - the firm's 'social absorption 
capability' (Dahlman and Nelson, 1993) - up to speed, competitively speaking. 
We may say therefore that knowledge to facilitate the diffusion and deployment of generic 
technologies, as well as knowledge for originality and diversity, are becoming the primary 
productive resource for firms seeking a globally competitive niche. Small wonder then that 
economists are unanimous in saying that 'education and training policies must now move to 
centre stage in the promotion of world development' (Freeman and Soete, 1993, p. 398). 
Learning for Innovation 
I think therefore I produce. 
Castells, 1997, p. 359. 
Moving towards an 'informational economy' (Castells, 1993) means that traditional 
competitive factors, like cheap labour and raw materials, lose their pre-eminence. To remain 
competitiv~, enterprises must continually strive to move 'up the value chain'. Skilled human 
resource endowments then become the key competitive resource. Such resources are not 
simply found: they have to be deliberately developed. 
The extent of globalisation is certainly debatable, and while there are some who like to think 
that South Africa has a choice as to whether we can enter these deep waters or not, it is hard 
to disagree with the Trade Monitor's view that 'cliche or no cliche, South Africa lives in a 
global village and even its poorest and most unsophisticated citizens buy and enjoy products 
which originate either wholly or partly in other countries' (Trade Monitor, 1993). More 
technically, this means that 'the internationalisation of trade, business and technology is here 
to stay' (Nelson and Wright, 1992, p. 1961). 
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The internationalisation of these three factors restructures the environment of economic 
intercourse. It divides competing economies into those which have made the needed 
investments into education, training and research and which are therefore in a position to 
capitalise on the new global dispensation; and those which haven't and which therefore aren't. 
The latter group, who are on Emmei:~'s (1991, p. 43) 'slow train', are falling further and 
further behind the 'convergence club' (Nelson and Wright, 1992), and who may never catch 
up. Poised in the middle are a group of economies that might go either way. South Africa 
belongs to this group. 
What are the bare essentials needed to join 'the club'? More to the point, where should 
human investments be made? About some of the factors there is no doubt: a broadly-based 
schooling is universally accepted as the sine qua non. This is more specifically usually taken 
to mean high-quality secondary education, although this is hardly a standard. US secondary 
education, for example, is not equivalent to that of Germany, France or the UK, either in 
length or quality. Nevertheless, secondary school enrolment remains an international index of 
competitiveness (World Economic FOIUm / IMD International, 1993). On this index, South 
Africa, in its class of fifteen late developing countries (LDCs), ties for third place with 
Hungary just behind Korea and Taiwan, just ahead of Chile, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Clearly quality is not part of this calculation. 
For some commentators, like Alice Amsden, a quality secondary education is by and large 
sufficient. In her view of late industrial 'catch up', this lays the basis for learning-by-doing, the 
strategy she feels LDCs should best plump for. This assumes too that most LDCs will opt for 
mid-tech rather than hi-tech development. But this position tends to play down certain other 
saliences of the product/process nexus discussed above, especially the need to keep up with 
technological innovation elsewhere even where the strategy is not one of high-end innovation. 
It is clear, then that 'a strong cadre of university trained engineers and scientists' (Nelson and 
Wright, 1992, p. 1961) is essential to keep national technological absorptive capacity viable. 
Going-it-alone 'techno-nationalism' pollicies no longer succeed in the global economy. 
It is the intermediate level of education, training and skill - that obtained in the last two years 
of the secondary school career - that is the Achilles heel of South African education. On the 
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one hand, there has been a great deal of attention paid to the bottom end, basic education, and 
there has, for reasons traceable to our British higher education heritage, been something of a 
preoccupation with idiosyncratic low-participation excellence at the top end. The 'middle' 
educational experience has hardly been debated at all, yet much of the current research shows 
that it is the key to national innovation. 
What does this mean for the education and training system? The problem is certainly 'not that 
of devising the one best model of skill development for all labour market environments, but 
rather to identifY the constraints and possibilities offered by the labour market structures 
prevailing in a given sector in a particular country' (Marsden, 1993, p. 373). We can eliminate 
the Japanese model of an intensive, highly competitive broad general education curriculum, 
with on-the-job training of all skill specialisms, simply because the quality of schooling in 
South Africa is so poor (Joffe, 1993; Green and Steedman, 1993), and the basis for broad and 
diverse further skilling will just not be adequate. This means that, in order to cater for 
subsequent training, whether in special institutions or in on-the-job training, post-compulsory 
education will have to offer some or other versions of both theoretical and practical 
vocationally-oriented options within the main stream of a consolidated single exit certificate. 
There is a strong argument for making these options available as part of an expanded version 
of the present matriculation (school-leaving) examination. As King (1993) points out, we 
should not underestimate the popular cachet attached to the known certificate: 'It seems 
entirely possible that versioning the present matric (in the manner of versions of the French 
baccalaureate) would exploit the hard currency attached to the notion of matriculation whilst 
taking into account the strong pressures to "technicise", "commercialise", "scientise" and 
"vocationalise" this form of certification' (King, 1993, p. 200). 
Retaining popular symbols of excellence is related to a final point. There is no high quality 
education system in the world which does not 'place great emphasis on educational 
achievement, engendering high educational aspirations amongst individual learners' (Green 
and Steedman, 1993, p. 14). Communities must come to believe that hard work, not only 
merit or luck, ensures success, and that education has a high value in itself (compare this with 
the Gramscian position discussed in Chapter 7). As King (1993, p. 205) says, this means that 
we may have to shift our goal from 'high participation' to 'high performance'. This ethos will 
clearly take a long time to build on the rubble of our thoroughly discredited system, but only 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
22 
when such an ethos takes hold will w(~ be able, without political repercussions, to build the 
'Talent Highways' that are so necessary for the education system as a whole to develop 
quality and high performance (King, 1993), and for the innovation economy to be adequately 
served. 
All of this assumes a strong state that looks after all its citizens and promotes their welfare. It 
is just this kind of state that is placed in question by globalisation. 
Conclusion: Whither the State? 
What if, as a result of developmental changes, the modern state can no longer 
serve as the framework for the: accomplishment of commonly accepted ends? 
What happens if, in the effort to promote more equity, justice and material 
benefit, contradictions set in that have an opposite effect? What happens if, in 
a state in which development rationale and theories of development provide 
both the logic and the text on which the relations of rulers and ruled are based, 
it no longer can square the circle between theory and practice? 
Apter, 1987, p. 307. 
The global economy drives the search for greater productivity in the direction of innovation-
led growth, as we have seen. Innovation supervises rapidly diversifying commodity 
production but it does not necessarily create jobs. This trade-off between competitiveness and 
employment is clearly evident in South Africa. As the Brazilian President said of Brazil in 
1964 with bitter irony, 'Brazil is devl~loping but the people are not' (quoted by Hoogvelt, 
1987, p. 71). Growth and mass well-being are no longer in tandem in the 'new competitive' 
economy. 
Apter, Castells and Reich describe, in different ways, the dynamics and effects of this situation 
on society. Reich (1991) discerns a growing rift in the workforce between the new 
information class of' symbolic analysts' who thrive on the circuits that innovation requires, and 
the service and production classes who by and large do not. Castells (1997) distinguishes in 
similar vein between 'self-programmable labour' and 'generic labour'. The latter are falling in 
income and opportunities way behind the former because they do not possess 'reprogramming 
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capability': they merely possess skills with built-in obsolescence. The symbolic analysts, says 
Reich, will be naturally drawn to the allures of globalisation and 'laissez-faire 
cosmopolitanism' while the service and production classes will favour a return to a 'zero-sum 
(economic) nationalism' of the kind that the discourse of globalisation disallows (Reich, 1991, 
p.311). 
Apter's analysis of polarisation is more drastic and chilling. His starting point is to question 
the self- sustaining ideal of all development writing, one 'based on a notion of an expanding 
and generalised middle class, a party of stability and civility at the political centre of society, a 
productive and functional class providing the means for a mediating social policy within the 
context of the .. , social democratic state' (Apter, 1987, p. 298). This self-sustaining ideal of 
the generalised middle class is today a myth. Where Cold War developmental tendencies may 
in the past have fed the 'generalised middle', the developmental tendencies of the innovation 
economy are producing a 'functional polarisation' in society between two broad groups of 
people: the 'functionally significant' class who are in gainful employment and who contribute 
to the innovation economy on the one hand; and the growing 'functionally superfluous' class 
who have low skills, scant chance of competing in the innovation economy, and whose 
contribution to the social product is consequently negative. 
When people are functionally superfluous for any length of time they become marginalised, 
then displaced and then dispossessed. They slide right out of society's embrace because they 
cannot be accounted for in terms of the logic of the development narrative. The 
disillusionment produced - in the promises of well-being, in the blandishments of the state, in 
the narrative of equity, and in democracy - is not to be underestimated. The latter has 
particular consequences. Continuing democracy depends upon losers believing that at some 
future time they may yet be able to win if only they keep playing the game. Disillusionment 
with democracy means giving up that belief. This has serious consequences for the 
stakeholder model of policy negotiation, which depends on the conversion of desires, needs 
and demands into interests which can be negotiated (Apter, 1992, p. 161). If significant 
constituencies lose their belief in this process, then they position themselves outside the formal 
polity and they resist all attempts to bring them into the institutionalised circuits of 
compromise. At this point, crime and violence as the only recourse, become the inevitable 
result. Since the contradiction between innovation and marginalisation is unmediatable, 
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violence and terror become the logical political tools of the marginalised: 'one can say that the 
spread of terrorism is a function of development itself, and in global terms' (Apter, 1987, p. 
37). Violence (or for Castells, crime) is the price we pay for innovation, progress and 
rationality - the price we pay for development. 
There is an optimistic and a pessimistic response to this scenario. As for the former: 
The liberal and social democratic response has been various, but mostly it has 
been to emphasise the need to retrain and educate, modernise, and innovate, 
hoping to expand opportunities. Increased social benefits to the marginalised 
plus investment, a kind of revisionist Keynesianism will presumably bring about 
necessary increases in productivity to stimulate growth and re-employment. 
Apter, 1987, p. 318. 
Part of the hope of this view is to be able to lure the marginalised back into stakeholder 
politics by asking them to participate in society while the innovation economy gears itself up 
to produce fruits for all. But this is to assume that the marginalised have chosen 'exit' rather 
than 'voice', and that this choice can be reversed. If we follow Apter, then we must conclude 
that the marginalised have been bootedl down the 'exit' option. Nothing short of major social 
transformation can boot them up again. 
Reich (1991, p. 301) is only marginally more upbeat: 'To improve the economic position of 
the bottom four-fifths will require that the fortunate fifth share its wealth and invest in the 
wealth-creating capacities of other Americans'. For this to happen, however, the 'fortunate 
fifth' will have to see themselves as sharing a common fate with the four-fifths ('if they don't 
eat we don't sleep'), which they are not necessarily disposed to do, seeing themselves in 
cosmopolitan rather than national or local terms (see Chapter 8). Common destiny is fuelled 
by cultural homogeneity, and powerfully undermined by cultural and social heterogeneity. In 
that case, Reich grimly recommends 'a positive economic nationalism' which means increased 
public spending on social investments, especially education. But with that we are back to the 
vain hope of Apter's social democratic 'noble lie', one shared too by every reconstruction 
programme so far proposed in South Africa. 
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Radical pessimism about the propensity of the state and the state-supervised formal economy 
to secure well being for all leads in one of three directions. The first is in the direction of anti-
statist social movement politics with a bent for 'inversionary' tactics, including violence. This 
is the 'civil society' politics of the global village. The second is towards alternative 
development strategies, towards inclusive democratic policy deliberation, NGO-driven 
development and the fervent hope of a redeeming non-formal sector. The third is to 
fundamentalist revolt, on the one hand, or an institutionalised global political economy of 
crime on the other. 
We may conclude, therefore, that the new international division of labour, between generic 
labour and reprogrammable labour, delivers an economically driven but educationally 
produced schism amongst citizens that could not have been foreseen by the well-meaning 
advocates of mass education. So far, the mainstream political and policy response has been 
frankly unconvincing. It has been to argue for multiple re-entry to education for the (hopefully 
temporarily) excluded, lifelong learning. But here is the question that is always begged - to 
what kind of education? What kind of skills and knowledge are they excluded from? What 
knowledge is of most worth for the millennial citizen? 
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Chapter 3 
WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS OF 1\10ST WORTH FOR THE MILLENNIAL 
CITIZEN? 
Introduction 
What knowledge is of most worth for the millennial citizen? The question is frequently asked, 
but the answers are far from unequivocal. What is most striking about them is that they 
invariably fall into one of two mutually .exclusive categories. The first category provides 
answers to the question in terms, of ~~knovvledg~ and skills (the various 
multiculturalisms and feminisms, for example Arnot, 1997), p()litical knowledge (human rights 
education, as in the Australian studies curriculum, for example Moore et aI, 1991) or moral 
knowledge and skills (the inculcation and practice of autonomy, for example Appiah, 1997). 
The second category, growing increasingly vociferous, provides an answer in terms of skills 
and knowledge for economic PtOdudivity. The business pages of virtually every daily 
newspaper extol the virtues of flexibility, innovativeness and adaptability, cognitive skills 
supposedly for a rapidly changing world of work. Adherents of the first category, in other 
words, would educate for cultural and political participation; adherents of the second, for 
economic participation. The two citizenships are rarely, if ever, discussed together within a 
common framework. 
Anti-utilitarianism in educational circles runs deep. It is probably associated with the 
strategies of acade~c freedom and autonomy that higher education institutions everywhere 
have deployed/;i~ce the nineteenth century against undue influence by church, state or 
economy. AfS Carr (1993) has argued, the liberal anti-utilitarian consensus prevailed in the UK 
with the passing of the 1944 Act, whitch also had the unfortunate effect of downgrading the 
status of technical and scientific education for the middle decades of the century. The tide was 
only stemmed with Callaghan in the 1970s. 
All of that has now been swept aside by the advent of the global economy and the rise of the 
neo-liberal consensus, which demands not only a new relevance from educational provision, 
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but a new accountability on the part of educators to globalisation's new public good -
innovation. What are the skills required to produce economic innovation? These must be the 
focus of education, is the insistent refrain. 
The response of educators, with important exceptions some of whom will be discussed shortly, 
has been to rehearse anti-utilitarian arguments and to produce negative and pessimistic 
diagnoses of education's new beholdeness to the market and the economy. We have been 
warned of the dangers of impending instrumentalisation, commodification and marketisation of 
knowledge. One thoroughly pessimistic account is produced by Wexler (1990). Wexler 
begins by reminding us of Marshall's three forms of citizenship - civic, political, and 
sociaVeconomic - and the two conditions upon which these forms depend rationality and 
solidarity. National solidarity has been fragmented by the new identity social movements, and 
rationality has been deconstructed by post-modernism. Since these two conditions for 
citizenship no longer exist, citizenship itself, in Marshall's sense as a progressive cluster of 
rights, must disappear. Taking its place is a new reflexive self-regulating idet'ffifyregime for 
the new informational class (the 'fortunate fifth'), and a 'splattered' media-regulated identity 
regime for Reich's 'bottom four-fifths' of society. There is a great deal more to Wexler's 
dense and enigmatic account than I can do justice to here. The repressive consequences of 
'universalised reflexivity' have recently been explored further by ZiZek (1999), and the 
possibilities of subordinate identity construction for the new Fourth World by Castells (1997), 
amongst others. Wexler (1996) himself has subsequently analysed emergent prefigurative 
forms of identity re-centering and resacralisation, but the swingeing diagnosis of globalised 
society as one that systematically dispossesses many of its citizens remains compelling. 
Why is it then considered so unseemly to ask - what will the educated graduate do with what 
school or higher education has made avail~ble? Is it possible that some of the pessimism is a 
by-product of the implicit distinction between productive knowledge and critical/reflexive 
knowledge? Are these knowledges not related or relatable in some way? 
A small number of sociologists of education have taken another view of the relation of the 
economy to education. Finegold and Soscice (1988) re-opened the debate on the left by 
charging that education and training in the UK had fallen increasingly out of step with the 
needs ofan advanced or 'high-skill' economy. The 'old' curriculum, what Young (1999) calls 
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the 'curriculum of the past', was and largely is a 'low skill' one, by which is meant that a small 
minority attains high skills, a large majority fairly mediocre ones. A 'unified high skill' 
educational transformation, it was claimed, could change all that, and lead the economy and its 
society toward winning nationhood. A number of educators embraced this new vision rather 
uncritically, and still do. But it soon Ibecame apparent that the conceptual resources for re-
thinking the changes the global economy heralded were not present in the initial 'high skill' 
vision. For these, one has to tum to s;;ientific literatures often not familiar to educators: the 
sociology of economic innovation, for (~xample (Chapter 2); the sociology and social studies of 
science and technology; and interdisciplinary analyses of the changing social organisation of 
knowledge production. 
This last feature - the changing social organisation of knowledge has proved to be central 
for re-thinking the changes to society wrought by globalisation, and a narrative is slowly 
beginning to emerge about the changing social nature, production and dissemination of 
knowledge. I will examine one influential version of this narrative in greater detail. But first, 
the outlines of the 'knowledge argument'. 
The Knowledge Argument 
The globalisation literature may differ on many points, but it is unequivocal in this respect: we 
are entering a new form of society where the social organisation of knowledge and the social 
organisation of learning are dramaticaJ:ly changing. Whether we are examining the economy, 
the polity, or the realm of society and culture, knowledge as a form of symbolic capital 
increasingly becomes the central form of productive capital: 
• in the economy: knowledge in the form of data, plans, blueprints, patents, programmes: 
and theories becomes immediate~iJ productive in the sense that it decreasingly requires 
labour and machines as intermediaties before it produces value1. 
• in politics and civil society: knowledge of all sorts is increasingly sought by groups, 
communities, as well as individuals as they conduct themselves and pursue their interests in 
the bewildering complexity of modem civic life. Recent examples would include contests 
around the desirability of mineral e:xtraction, land rights claims, abortion, the environment, 
rights to anti-retroviral medication, and so on; 
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• 10 private life: knowledge becomes the tool with which individuals negotiate the 
complexities of everyday life, from taxation (tax counsellors), to unfair labour practices 
(shop stewards and human resource personnel); from relationships (marriage counsellors) 
and diet (nutritional knowledge) to health and consumption (consumer information 
agencies); As Melucci (1996, p. 1) evocatively puts it: 'to feed ourselves we consume 
symbols, to love and reproduce we resort to the advice of experts, to desire and dream we 
use the language provided by the media' . 
Successful existence in modem society can be characterised, with Giddens (1990, pp. 88-92), 
as depending simultaneously on trust in proliferating expert systems, on the one hand, and on a 
deepening reflexivity at both an individual and an institutional level on the other, as citizens 
increasingly monitor, question, demand justification and accountability from, and otherwise try 
to cope with, a world of increasing uncertainty and risk (Beck, 1992). Some writers 
encapsulate this increasing salience and reach of knowledge in modem life with the term 
knowledge society2. 
To say that knowledge becomes more salient in modem society is not to deny that knowledge 
and its possession has always conferred power in every kind of society known to us. But in no 
other society has the sheer volume, and even more importantly, the pace of its production and 
obsolescence, been so dramatic. So it is not merely a question of access to knowledge that 
becomes important to all citizens in late modem society, but access to and command of the 
marginal additions to knowledge that becomes key (Stehr, 1994, p. 98). It is at this point that 
the work of knowledge producers and reconfigurers becomes central to the life of all citizens, 
in wealth-creating activities or not, in modem society. 
I have so far made a demand-side case for the increasing salience of knowledge in modem 
saciety by showing how knowledge becomes a vital tool for persons and groups who wish to 
presper in economic, political and civic life in the global ising world. But there is a supply-side 
case to be made as well. The apartheid-produced inequities may have masked but cannot 
entirely disguise the trend that South Africa has followed along with many, if not all, modem 
industrial states; namely, the increasing massification of higher education and the increased 
production of competent knowledge producers. We may justifiably conclude that the 
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combination of supply and demand factors, push and pull, has ensured the increasing centrality 
of knowledge in various dimensions of social life. 
There are a number of implications that should briefly be mentioned. The first is that the 
traditional employers of knowledge workers and of knowledge - higher education institutions, 
statutory research bodies, private and public sector institutions - are quite unable to absorb the: 
volume of qualified graduates pouring onto the labour market. Increasingly, competent 
postgraduates will find employment in research and development units, in research institutes 
and centres, in NGOs, or in episodic reonsultancy and self-employment. These will also now 
contribute to knowledge production via research-based activities that have been, by and large" 
the preserve of the higher education institutions and the statutory councils, at least since the 
professionalisation of the universities in the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
A second implication is that civic, political and economic life is increasingly organised around 
the dynamics of knowledge-generating units. These units are increasingly dispersed in time 
and space, rather than around spatially fixed institutional locales - the firm, the shopfloor, the 
university, the laboratory (Castells, 1989) - mainly because of the dramatic advent of 
information technologies. These allow different functions in disparate places to become co·· 
ordinated to common tasks. The information network becomes the place, increasingly, where 
knowledge work is pursued by the new 'class' of workers, an elaboration of the white-collar 
administrative stratum, that Reich (1992) calls the new class of 'symbolic analysts'. As we 
shall see in a moment, this means that academic work becomes increasingly trans-institutional; 
and trans-institutionality increasingly becomes one central feature of the knowledge work that 
graduates of the future will prosecute. 
This is not some brave new world. Much of the deployment of information technology and 
the de-localisation of knowledge work is driven primarily by the imperatives of wealth creation 
rather than by the desire for a better quality of life or an attempt to optimise 'societal learning' 
(Castells, 1989). Furthermore, in most countries, delocalisation and uncontrolled networking 
leads to burgeoning fragmentation, which is why the coordination and stimulation of a national 
innovation system is regarded today as such a pressing issue3. But more importantly, human 
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issues are often left behind in the stampede to celebrate the supposed liberatory virtues of 
technology-carried knowledge activities. As Stallabrass (1995, p. 10) says: 
aside from commercial interests, there is also an unholy alliance of post-modern 
disintegration theorists and wide-eyed New Agers, producing a ludicrous 
mosaic of the world immersed in a great, shifting sea of data, each person 
jacking in and finding exactly what they want, in their own personalised order 
and format. 
What this burgeoning of technology-carried knowledge work will do for communities, 
solidarity and citizenship is not yet clear. There is much talk of 'virtual community'. But real 
local communities don't go away: they just become more or less tied into the knowledge and 
power networks; as Castells (1989, p. 349) says, 'people live in places, power rules through 
flows'. 
A final general point. It is common cause that there is savage unevenness in South Africa as 
elsewhere regarding access to and participation in the 'global knowledge structure' (Vorster 
and Nel, 1995). This is starkly registered in the differential performance patterns of higher 
education institutions in terms of research productivity as measured by international citation 
indices; see, for example, ARHS (1995). It is certain that this will change in time. But 
because knowle9~_@d_PQwer.Jlr~.~Q.glQ~_~lyj111~!:1~Il~.c:i.L.R()werIknQwtedg~Lflows under the 
present global economic situation will remain asymmetrical. This is not so much cause for 
pessimism as it is a challenge to legal regulation. For while technology lends itself to global 
flows, it is increasingly recognised that innovation systems, and education systems, are 
resolutely national phenomena, with national cultural characteristics and distinct national 
inflections (Green, 1999). This point remains of premier importance. 
Having considered in rather general terms the increasing salience of knowledge, this chapter 
now goes on to examine two different ways in which 'new knowledge production' can be 
grasped and its changing conditions of social production mapped. 
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Two Modes of Knowledge Production 
There is a global increase, registered in South Africa too, in what might be called 'problem-
solving' or 'strategic' as opposed to 'disciplinary' research. Of course, certain kinds of 
problem-solving, or applied, research have been a feature of research systems ever since the 
time of the ancient universities. However, with the increased production of graduates and the 
increased salience of knowledge, coupled with a growing public demand for relevance and 
accountability, an influential and controversial analysis (Gibbons et aI, 1994) has identified a 
new mode of knowledge production characterised by a form of social organisation that is 
somewhat different to traditional types of pure or applied research. This can be captured in 
the following (see Gibbons et aI, 1994; Ziman, 1994; Gibbons, 1998): 
• unlike disciplinary research, where the research problem originates with the problematics 
of the discipline, the problem for problem-solving research arises in a context-of-
application. This means that knowledge is not produced elsewhere (say in a laboratory) 
and then applied to a worldly problem: the knowledge is now increasingly produced 
through addressing the problem directly. 
• unlike disciplinary research, either pure or applied, 'problem-solving' research is 
transdisciplinary. It is pursued by a team of researchers, often located in different 
departments of an institution, often located in different institutions, sometimes located in 
different cities or even countries. In other words, context-of-application research 
frequently cuts across discipline boundaries as it searches for solutions. 
• such research is thus frequently trans institutional, and many research groups that form 
research communities are increasingly trans institutional. 
• such research is often financed from more than one source, increasingly not only from 
traditional statutory councils but also from a variety of donor, civic or corporate clients, 
often in tandem. 
• such research is organised and regulated by management structures that are often less 
hierarchical and far more collaborative than the traditional academic research team, and 
that are designed to take into acc~ount a wider, more hybrid social accountability - to 
donors, to local communities, to diverse disciplinary communities, to local government, to 
corporate concerns. 
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• unlike disciplinary research with its peer-group-assessed internal criteria of scientific 
excellence, and unlike conventional applied research with its single corporate client and 
unproblematic criteria of utility, the quality of such research is increasingly being assessed 
against hybrid, contextually-relevant criteria. Evaluation thus becomes a new field of 
research and application, as well as a new kind of problem for national research systems, 
knowledge clients and donor agencies alike. 
For better or for worse, this 'new' form of research has come to be called 'Mode 2', in 
contrast to disciplinary research, which is called 'Mode 1'. The Mode l/Mode 2 distinction 
has, un surprisingly, caused something of a stir. The thesis itself has been derided as over-
stated, and in any case unoriginal, being little more than a fashionable re-statement of the 
Starnberg group's 'finalisation' hypothesis of the 1970s (Weingart, 1997), which ventured that 
as sciences matur~d, their potential for relevant application increased. The characteristic of 
transdisciplinarity, its central feature, has been called vague and far from clear (Rip, 1997). 
And some wonder whether the phenomenon, probably more prevalent in some branches of 
science like biotechnology than in others such as physics, shouldn't rather more modestly 
simply be called 'strategic research', a pragmatic label that preserves some of the sense of 
local autonomy of the scientific endeavour in its 'compromise between serendipity and 
targeting' (Johnstone, 1990, p. 223). 
Undeterred, the Gibbons group makes large claims for Mode 2. Peter Scott, a member of the 
original Gibbons team, summarises some of the most important implications of the Mode 2 
thesis for higher education in the following way (see Scott, 1995; Scott, 1997): 
• Universities will lose their monopoly position as the pre-eminent provider of both new 
knowledge (research) and of skills and certificates as they are increasingly drawn into the 
marketplace where they must compete with other public and private agencies for 
customers and their livelihood. 
• Local knowledge will come to occupy an increasingly important place in accredited 
learning courses, and as a resource in research, as academics and the public alike come to 
disregard the distinction between academic and local knowledge. 
• The stress will increasingly come to fall on 'transferable skills' and 'generic competences' 
as the mobility of knowledge workers becomes a pre-requisite for the job. 
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• Courses will increasingly become modularised to provide the greatest flexibility to busy 
recurrent customers. 
• Forms of research will proliferate. 
Scott, it should be clear, sees education in general but higher education in particular 
increasingly movingfrom a Mode 1 world to a Mode 2 world (see also Kraak, 1998, pp. 9~ 
10). I will take issue with this interpretation in later sections of the chapter. 
Of course we should immediately admit that the Mode 2 thesis is something of a fairy story. It 
overhomogenises the evolution of a phenomenon that probably happened much earlier, and it 
overdichotomises it, presenting it as tv,ro discrete ideal types that probably never exist in their 
pure form in the real world. Nevertheless, I will claim that the distinction provides a few 
useful levers for educators grappling with changes in knowledge, in learning, and in curriculum 
policy and planning, its overgeneralisations not withstanding (Shin, 1999). The first is that it 
produces a background rationale for evident changes in knowledge and learning that lifts the 
issue out of an insular perspective that would account for described and desired changes in 
terms internal to learning theory or to policy planning only. The slew of education policy 
scholarship that directs reproaches at government for 'marketisation' as if this were some 
ideological blind spot that could be reversed if only the politicians concerned would see the 
error of their ways is not so much a waste of time as a woeful display of ignorance about the 
wide array of factors at work not only in the global economy but also in the global science 
system and their massive impact on knowledge and learning. The second advantage is that it 
suggests an implicit relationship betwc::en two regimes of knowledge production, as we saw 
briefly with Scott above, that will have important implications for curricular formats, as we 
will see. It allows us to pose the question quite directly: what is the historical relationship 
between traditional disciplinary formats and the emergent constellation of interdisciplinary 
research and teaching programmes? }[s Mode 2 really set to replace Mode I? I will first 
examine the two main contending possibilities here, and will then go on to discuss some of the 
implications for thinking about knowledge, skills and learning. 
The replacement thesis presumes that we are moving from one era to another, from elitist and 
unitary to democratic and plural form:, of knowledge production, in short, from Mode 1 to 
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Mode 2. In that Mode 1 is seen as politically and epistemologically conservative, the 
replacement thesis accrues normative as well as analytical force: Mode 1 was bad and Mode 2 
is good. Scott's optimism indicated above is rooted here. 
The ac!junct or supplementary thesis makes the following rather different assumptions. First, 
that Mode 2 has always, in some although not all forms, been with us for a long time, but that 
under late modernity it has become much more visible. Secondly, that Mode 1 could not 
disappear since Mode 2 competence depends upon a prior disciplinary competence. 
Since it is the adjunct thesis I hope to defend here, some implications of the thesis can be 
usefully listed: 
• Mode 1 is orthodox, disciplinary knowledge production and learning. This is not going to 
disappear. It will, however, be affected by the degree and form of emergence of Mode 2. 
This will necessarily differ across institutions and across organisations and units within 
institutions. But whatever else happens, the importance of Mode 1 undergraduate training 
should never be in question. Where it is, for example in the wholesale introduction of 
interdisciplinary undergraduate programmes at some institutions, then large questions 
about learning are raised. 
• Since Mode 2 knowledge production depends upon a sound Mode 1 disciplinary base, the 
general policy priority is clear: as an indispensable first step, strengthen and consolidate 
Mode 1 undergraduate courses in the institutions. Mode 2 development will then follow. 
Mode 2 does not have to be created since it is market·pulled: it has to be facilitated, or 
encouraged to develop, and it has to be regulated. For Gibbons et al (1994), this is the 
test of policy success4. If an institution is pushed towards Mode 2 by an aggressive 
funding policy before it has adequate Mode 1 capacity especially amongst the staff, then it 
is unlikely that the result can be beneficial. Having said that, there may well be various 
routes to consolidate Mode 1. For example, one route may be to continue to emphasise 
Mode 1 learning in postgraduate courses, and thereby to tout for Mode 2 business on the 
basis of demonstrated Mode 1 excellence. An alternative route may well be to open the 
institution to Mode 2 (market remunerative) business, like flexible short courses (for 
example), and with the revenue generated, finance a Mode 1 consolidation operation. This 
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latter approach will depend upon at least some Mode 1 capacity, whether existing in the: 
institution or contracted in from outside. 
• Contrary to belief in some quarters, Mode 2 is not more democratically run nor more 
democratically accessible than Mode 1. There may be greater access into the knowledge 
networks via the new information technology, but this does not on its own ensure 
epistemological access into the highly specialised activities of Mode 2 research teams. A 
condition for participation in Mode 2 research is still going to be competent prior 
induction into a disciplined mode of inquiry, and this for the foreseeable future is likely to 
remain a specialised and therefore access-restricted practice (see Chapter 9 for the 
consequences of ignoring this precept). 
• The most effective examples of Mode 2 are research projects which configure disciplinary 
specialists within an organisational format that produces a knowledge outcome that could 
not have been produced by any om: disciplinary input. The classic example of the Gibbons 
team is the Human Genome Project. The conditions of success include the form of the 
partnership, the regulatory environment, the financing arrangement, and the evaluation 
regime. In other words, the conditi~ons of success of Mode 2 concern the conditions under 
which previously autonomous or d:lsjunct but highly specialised disciplinary operations can 
be productively reconfigured. It does not mean that all higher education courses should 
now become interdisciplinary, or practical, or skills-based. This would be to try to 
produce the social form of transdisciplinarity within a single course or single individual. 
And this would of course lose the singular contribution of Mode 2, which is productive 
partnership across previously insul~;ted specialisms. 
A key question is how academics will respond to the challenge of Mode 2. Even when 
academics are deeply engaged in Mode 2, the evidence is that they continue to value their 
standing and participation in professional societies, the values and norms of their academic 
disciplines, and they continue to extol the virtues of peer review. That is, they continue to 
value a Mode 1 intellectual climate itnd will continue to pursue Mode 1 research activity 
although this will increasingly depend upon the continued flow of funding to basic research 
(see Fuller, in Barnett and Fuller, 1998). In the most successful higher education units or 
departments this should not be surprising, since real status and reward attends their positions. 
This might not be the case for all acade:mics in all institutions. Nevertheless, with the prospect 
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of escalating postgraduate production, it is likely that competition for academic posts will 
intensify, and that this will continue to nourish the sense of the value of the deep roots of 
traditional academic culture (see Luke, 1998, for a more pessimistic view). 
A second possible response is that academics in especially professional faculties, with medium 
rather than outstanding disciplinary research track records, will embrace the sexy immediacy 
of Mode 2 as well as its financial accompaniments, which in the present completely 
unregulated environment can well be considerable. Such Mode 2 involvement can have 
positive as well as negative spin-offs for the discipline. The positive includes a sense of 
topicality and practicality that can rejuvenate a tired faculty and attract good students. The 
negative has to do with the way that academics respond to the time lost in consultancy. They 
may for convenience simply teach their Mode 2 involvements instead of what the curriculum 
requires. This would not be good for undergraduate grounding as I have already observed. 
Or they may employ graduate tutors to do their teaching for them. These tutors may be Mode 
1 proficient, or they may not. Either way, the teaching outcomes are likely to be uneven. 
Probably good faculties/departments will make it their business to balance their teaching and 
research commitments properly, although this can only be done by hiring support staff that 
assist with networking, data-basing, software updating, writing research proposals, and so on. 
The best research departments already employ such highly specialised people. 
In some departments distinct tensions will develop between teaching and research. When that 
happens, there is no doubt that the former will suffer. For instance, in departments with high 
Mode 2 involvement, we will find dramatically diminished teacher-student interaction. This is 
always cause for concern, but for labour-intensive research supervision it could be disastrous. 
Remuneration for teaching will probably have to be severed from that for research, no matter 
how cherished the traditional desire for teaching/research unity may be (see for example, 
Barnett in Barnett and Fuller, 1998). The new global vogue for distance postgraduate 
offerings obscures rather than obviates this problem. 
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Learning in Mode 1 and Mode 2 
In this section I will first discuss Gibbons' view of the relationship between Mode 1 and Mode 
2 and the implications for learning and knowledge, and then briefly show how the matter is 
dealt with in the learning skills literatun;) and the curriculum policy literature. 
How does Gibbons himself view the issue of historical accession? Does he favour a 
replacement or an adjunct view? The case made is equivocal, sometimes contradictory, but I 
must conclude that he espouses the former but leans toward the latter. When he first 
addresses the issue, Gibbons seems clear: 'Mode 2 is not supplanting but rather is 
supplementing Mode l' and 'Indeed, it is an outgrowth of it' (Gibbons, 1998, p. 33; see also 
p. 54). Not long after, though, he speculates about 'the extent to which Mode 2 becomes 
dominant' (ibid.), and from there it is a. short step to advocating the teaching of Mode 2 skills 
directly, not supplementarily. 
What are Mode 2 skills? Gibbons, like the management writers, is at times content to speak in 
general terms about the skills of 'flexibility' and 'reconfiguring' (in Chapter 5 I will develop 
this idea in terms ofthe skill of higher order recontextualising, or 'verticality'), but on its own 
this does not take us far. When he poses the question as to what abilities transdisciplinarity 
will require, he arrives at the skills of computer simulation, modelling, and the ability to work 
with complex models. 
How should undergraduates learn thc~se? Through problem-based, as distinguished from 
discipline-based, learning. Using medicine as his example, Gibbons reports that 'some' 
medical schools teach students 'repertoires of problem-solving' (Gibbons, op. cit., p. 40) in 
place of the disciplines. 
The belief is that by using a problem-based approach students will gradually 
pick up much (sic) of the knowledge that they would have acquired by going 
the other way around i.e. bt~ginning with anatomy and going on to the 
fundamental sciences and on from there to symptoms 
ibid. 
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This clearly leans towards supplantation not supplementarity: medical schools can hardly 
mount both kinds of curriculum, Gibbons goes on to muse about the slow diffusion of the 
new model and of medical reluctance to adopt it. The implication is that it is Mode 1 
prejudice and academic conservatism that holds back the medics, There are at least two 
assumptions here that can be questioned, Perhaps it is the case, or rather perhaps medics 
believe it to be the case, that solving problems requires a prior grounding in some discipline 
before students can be expected to display a higher order reconfiguring skilL Perhaps students 
do need a thorough grounding in anatomy and the basic sciences first. Differently put, perhaps 
they have to learn the skills of reconfiguring and modelling within the framework of an 
ordered explanatory system, 'Once they have achieved these precious insights, they are in a 
position to continue their own education indefinitely' (Gardner, Torff and Hatch, 1996, p. 50), 
The second assumption is related to the first, namely, that generic skills can be learnt directly 
as generic skills in a context-of-application. A recent review of the literature on generic 
(sometimes called 'polycontextual') skills shows that this is a vain assumption (Breier, 1998), 
We learn higher order modelling skills in specific discourses first. Genericity consists in 
generalising the skill to analogous situations. There is no generic learning context, where 
every student can learn the generic skill. 
As Linda Darling-Hammond (1997), referring to school-based education, remarks: 
Active learning aimed at genuine understanding begins with disciplines, not 
with whimsical activities detached from core subject matter concepts '" 
Darling-Hammond, 1997, p. 107, 
The argument against disciplinarity that accompanies the replacement view thus holds a 
potential danger: the learning platform of neophyte students may be compromised and, at 
worst, undermined. And if this is the case in the best of systems, how much more so is it not 
the case in educational systems with shaky foundations such as is found in many developing 
countries, and in South Africa? 
The case made by Gibbons for universities in the developing world exhibits this same troubling 
implication. Gibbons rails against the 'ideology of pure science' (Gibbons, op. cit., p. 53) 
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(meaning adherence to Mode 1) that seems to hold sway in such institutions. 'Why not move 
to Mode 2?' is his rhetorical question. But it may well be that it is less blinkered ideology than 
rational calculation if good Mode 2 indeed depends on a good Mode 1 base. Further on in his 
paper, in concert with William Saint of the World Bank, Gibbons castigates the development 
agencies for funding Mode 1 rather than Mode 2 higher education in developing countries. 
This time it is not ideology but 'vested interests' that drives the aberration. But is it not at 
least as likely that the same institutions that do not do Mode 1 research well will be unable to 
do Mode 2 well, and for the same reason, namely, that they do not have the basic platform, 
and support structure, to do it with? \Vhat these universities need, it seems to me, is precisely 
the resources and support to do, and teach, Mode 1 properly. That even in developing 
situations it is the 'better universities' (the ones with Mode 1 competence) that manage to do 
Mode 2 (Gibbons, 1998, p. 53) underscores the point. To celebrate the virtues of local and 
lay knowledge in this context, as Scott (1997) does, seems irresponsible to me. 
In the end, the pervasive unstated assumption in Gibbons' and Scott's advocacy of Mode 2 is 
that, somewhere and somehow, Mode 1 will continue. This is perhaps a safe bet in the 
developed countries, but not quite so safe in South Afiica and other late-developing countries. 
If a funding and incentive regime were to take Gibbons and Scott to heart and incentivise a 
wholesale move to Mode 2, the meagre Mode 1 base on which it all rests could easily 
collapse. 
My argument so far, then, has been that to adopt a radically disjunctive replacement thesis for 
Mode 2, a celebratory post-modern view, would lead us at best into difficulties and perhaps 
outright contradictions. Consider Young's (1999) distinction between what he calls a 
'curriculum of the past' and a 'curriculum of the future'. The former, like Mode 1, is inward-
looking, transmission-oriented, disciplinary, and makes a strong distinction between everyday 
and school knowledge. The latter, like Mode 2, comes with emancipatory promise, is outward 
looking, innovative, and problem oriented (Young, op. cit., p. 10). Young immediately goes 
on to concede that there are features of the past curriculum that may still be valuable for the 
future: 'Some sense of "learning for it:; own sake" is essential; always having to search for the 
uses of knowledge can be a constraint IOn learning as it can be on research' (Young, op. cit., p. 
11 ). Young concludes from this that polarisations that pit models in opposition to one another 
(from one to another) have weaknesse:, that a more relational approach might avoid. He goes 
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on to speculate that the optimal relation between academic and vocational learning might be 
sequential, rather than the unified model that a Mode 2 replacement type view and the more 
ardent post-Fordists have been recommending. 
Chapter 6 discusses further the ambiguous upshot of dichotomous from/to curricular reform 
thinking in South Africa in terms of Bernstein's distinction between competence and 
performance pedagogic models. Central to the former model, as mirrored in what Taylor and 
Vinjevold (1999) call the 'radical wing of the progressive consensus', is an aversion to all 
learning that smacks of rote memorisation, regarded as producing 'surface' learning and 
understanding only. Active learning and 'deep' understanding is the watchword, and 
groupwork is de rigueur. Yet, in the best new research, it is clear that things cannot be 
divided up so neatly between memorisation and understanding. This is shown starkly by the 
'paradox of the Chinese (or Asian) leamer' (Biggs, 1991; Marton, Dall' Alba and Lai, 1993). 
Hong Kong students, it seems, concentrate on memorisation, yet typically do well in 
assessments designed to tap deep understanding. The false sequentiality of the replacement 
thesis is here clearly displayed. In other words, procedures of learning and forms of 
understanding cannot be so easily dichotomised, demonised and written off as the most 
enthusiastic of the radical progressives would believe. 
Indeed, as Entwhistle (1998) shows, there are pathologies attached to holistic 'comprehension 
learning' (namely, 'globetrotting' - the tendency to ignore details and to generalise beyond the 
data) just as there are to serialist 'operation learning' (namely, 'improvidence' - the tendency 
to stick to a predetermined order at the expense of seeking connections). Entwhistle 
concludes that we need a far greater grasp of how learning of various kinds, through rehearsal 
and elaboration, builds up over time stable nodes of organised, compressed ordering principles 
that are potentially recallable by memory, but that also act as reconfiguring or 
recontextualising agents. He calls such nodes 'knowledge objects': ' ... a knowledge object is 
much more than a mental image of a diagram. It can pull into awareness currently unfocused 
knowledge, almost in the way that hypertext in computing uses certain emphasised words to 
indicate the existence of additional information' (Entwhistle, 1998, p. 96). The earlier 
mnemonic systems were clearly primitive knowledge objects. In Chapter 5 I examine the case 
of a non-literate worker who, through memory, has built up a simple knowledge object that 
allows him to design and construct carts and wagons to specification. What his unusual skill 
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will teach us is how dangerous it can be to neglect traditional skills of conceptualisation, 
however learnt, in favour of problem-solving skilling, no matter how 'relevant'. 
Conclusion 
We clearly need far greater insight into the ways and workings of learning and thinking than 
we have at present available to us. Globalisation has merely sharpened the point. It has also 
hopefully become apparent through the course of this chapter that, useful as distinctions like 
Mode 1 and Mode 2 are in directing our understanding of the changes visited upon us by 
globalisation, we will have to be much more careful in relating modes of knowledge 
organisation to each other than we have been so far. This chapter has tried to sustain the 
argument that, although we may be able to make useful distinctions between different modes: 
Mode 1 Mode 2; curriculum of the past - curriculum of the future; memorisation 
understanding, a redemptivist style of (:rusading that portrays the world as en route from one 
to the other will simply crudifY the picture, and will certainly not aid our understanding of 
what knowledge and skills our millennial citizen will find most worthwhile. 
Notes 
1 'What is specific to the informational mode of development is that here knowledge 
intervenes upon knowledge itself to generate higher productivity' (Castells, 1989; see 
also Stehr, 1994, p. 102). 
2 '1 conceive of a knowledge socic!ty as a society in which science and technology have 
extensively heightened the capacities of society to act upon itself, its institutions and its 
relations to the natural environment' (Stehr, 1994, p. 105). It is precisely the unintended 
consequences of such technical hubris that creates the constellation above - and 
paradoxically, the thrust for new knowledge. This is explored further in Chapter 10. 
3 'Universities in many countries are not adequately tied into a system of innovation and 
innovation training. This does not only apply to sciences and engineering, for innovation 
is just as much an issue in social sciences, business practices, the law and the arts. 
Innovation attitudes will also have to extend to social relations' (Carnoy, 1993, pp. 90-
91; see also Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1995). 
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4 'The secret adaptability is for at least some academics and administrators within a 
university to become part of Mode 2, to move inside the research networks and into the 
changing markets of goods and services existing outside the university. The test of 
institutions, and of governments, is whether they develop policies and structures which 
allow, and indeed encourage, this to happen' (Gibbons et at, 1994, p. 152). 
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Chapter 4 
SCHOOLING AND EVERYDAY LIFEI 
Introduction: Insulation and Hybridity 
A central debate in cultural studies and the sociology of knowledge can be characterised in 
terms of the distinction between insulation versus hybridify. Insulation stresses the 
interdictory and impermeable quality of cultural boundaries, of textual classification, and of 
disciplinary autonomy. It highlights the integral difference between systems of knowledge, 
and the difference between the forms and standards of judgement proper to them. It stresses 
the virtues of purity and the dangers of transgression. Hybridity, by contrast, stresses the 
essential identity and continuity of forms and kinds of knowledge, the permeability of 
classificatory boundaries, and the promiscuity of cultural meanings and domains. In 
contemporary progressive curriculum theory, learning to 'cross-over' cultural boundaries is, or 
should be, the aim of all pedagogy (for example, Giroux, 1991). Questions of judgement and 
of classificatory integrity take second place to the goal of 'border crossing'. 
In the cultural debates of the last twenty years or so, insulation has come to equal insularity, 
and to be associated with conservatism and reaction, while hybridity, which has come to equal 
liberation, is associated with opposition to cultural imperialism and the stultifying effects of 
tradition. A shift in the terms of cultmal debate does not necessarily signify a power shift in 
the cultural field at large, although it may. The claim made here is simply that the framework 
of debate has shifted, that a certain temper or moral mood has taken root putting the 
hybridisers on the offensive and the insulators, willy nilly, on the defensive. Albeit with 
differences of inflection, this is as true for South Africa as it is for Europe, the Americas, and 
probably most of the Third World. It is this temper which pervades the intellectual debates 
around curriculum theory. 
None of this is surprising. Hybridisem seem, after all, more actively so than insulators, to be 
trying to come to terms with what Jameson (1984) has called the 'cultural dominant' oflate 
modernity, a world of fluid and plural meanings, of de-absolutisation of cultural authority, and 
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of the permeation and dissolution of previously hard boundaries. Powerfully driven by the 
explosion of the means of communication and transportation, the vastly accelerated 
production and circulation of people, artefacts and especially information has produced a crisis 
of communication and interpretation whereby the habitus (the preconscious cultural 
interpretive grid) of many people no longer happily coincides with their habitat (the world of 
meanings they must deal with everyday) as it did for the premodems. Consequently, 'the post-
modernity debate has to a Igreat extent been motivated by attempts to grasp the phenomenon 
of increasing intersemiosis produced by modernity' (Hieskala, 1993, p. 596f As 
intersemiosis and interpretation come increasingly to the fore as central global problematics, so 
the relational and articulational dimensions of the cultural tapestry loom larger, and so too 
does the plausibility of border crossing, seepage and hybridity. The ubiquitous contemporary 
terms 'networking' and 'connectivity' carry much of this freight. 
All knowledge is a description by social actors, and its disarticulation from one discursive 
terrain and rearticulation in another is accomplished through redescription. This account 
shares with others in the mainstream of the oppositional temper the project of delineating the 
limits of insulation and of hard boundaries, of showing how, despite vested interests, meaning 
'crosses over'. In this chapter, the stick is bent the other way a little. That means an 
exploration of the key project of insulation, namely, delineating the limits to 'crossing over' 
and hybridity, but from within the oppositional temper and by holding on to the centrality of 
interpretation, articulation and intersemiosis. In other words, the possibilities and limits of 
hybridity are examined for a globalising world, where the nature of knowledge is said to be 
changing (Chapters 2 and 3). The implications for curriculum theory will also be examined. 
The border in question here is the one between common sense knowledge and codified 
curricular knowledge, between ordinary everyday knowledge, and the codes, texts and canons, 
the mastery of which is assessed and certified at school. Within this focus, the hybrid project 
consists in 'bridging school knowledge or public knowledge and the students' own cultural 
knowledge, and thus encourag(ing) students to analyse this interaction, and then use the 
knowledge learned to take charge of their lives.' (Sleeter and Grant quoted by McLaren, 
1991). It is the limits to this project, or more plainly put, the unintended consequences that 
ensue when this project is unreflectively put into practice, that will be the central point of this 
chapter. 
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In concluding this introduction, it is worth commenting in a preliminary way on the question of 
'social constructivism' or constructiviHms (Sismondo, 1993al In discussions of science, a 
distinction is made between 'internalist' and 'externalist' accounts of the advance of scientific 
knowledge, closely related to the 'philosophy of science' versus 'social studies of science' 
distinction discussed in Chapter 2. Inte:rnalist accounts attempt to justify scientific progress by 
means of rational rules and protocols of the scientists themselves. Whether these be primarily 
rationalist (neo-platonic or neo-kantian views on the rational generativity of theory) or 
primarily empiricist (realist or positivist views on the role and rules of observation and 
method), they stress the 'in principle' regularity of scientific work in the pursuit of justified 
true belief Those rejecting such an internalist account, generally point to external social 
factors that impinge upon, and influence, the direction of scientific results. Most, if not all, of 
the 'externalists' have taken the linguistic turn4 admirably captured by Woolgar (1988) when 
he announced that the social constructivist programme wishes to 'reverse the arrow' (p. 50), 
from [object ~ representation] to: [representation ~ object]. That is to say, representations 
construct what we come to take as the objects of science, not vice versa. 
Everything depends on what is meant by representation. It can be taken in a neo-idealistic 
way to mean 'frameworks of thought', 'discourses', 'ideologies', or theories, but it need nots. 
It can be taken to mean a 'system of inscriptions', a set of prescribed social practices, 
negotiations, and power relations that eollectively produce the knowledge in question. 
There are a number of points of agreement across the constructivist continuum. Many writers 
see a de facto convergence around 'mild' (Sismondo, 1993a) or 'moderate' constructivism 
(Yearly, 1988). The main differences ;are twofold. If one inclines to the 'radical' or relativist 
pole of the continuum, one is deprived of the resource to call any representation a 
misrepresentation. Feminist scholars may, for example, want to be able to say, to take 
Sismondo's (1993b) example, that the nineteenth century view that pubescent girls should 
avoid strenuous exercise because it was harmful to their health is more than a discursive 
device to create middle class housewiv,es. It is also bad science, and wrong. Strong or radical 
constructivism disallows refutations of this sort: milder forms simply suspend or bracket 
judgement (Hacking, 1998). More seliousiy, the strong view tends to take the position that, 
because representations give rise to the world, the world can be changed simply by deciding to 
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change our representations of it. Derrida (1976) has famously analysed the 'wishing-to-say' 
(p. 244) of Jean-Jacques Rousseau who believed that French citizens could regain their 
primordial freedom simply by taking it, ignoring or at least underestimating the submerged 
reefs of hierarchy and differentiation already inscribed in the social landscape. The strategy of 
'wishing-to-say', and correlatively, of trying to 'wish away' a social reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1971), the result of trying to assert the priority of 'speech' over 'writing', is self-
defeating (Cornell, 1992). It will be one of the contentions of this chapter that, by taking the 
idealistic view of representation, voluntarist curriculum and cultural theorising is liable to 
Rousseau's 'wishing-to-say' contradiction, and liable too to the symbolic violence that is often 
inadvertently triggered as a consequence (see Chapter 9 for an example in the domain of 
'democratic' research collaboration). 
As far as the present discussion is concerned, one can afford a certain degree of agnosticism. 
Whether mathematics progresses nominalistically or realistically, the mathematics curriculum 
is most certainly a real social object, constructed by determinable sets of people, both 
designers and practitioners, an 'institution' that is an orderly catalogue ofredescriptions which 
are ordered quite differently, for quite different social reasons, from that of the pure 
mathematics endeavour. It is this 'purely social object' that will be the main object of scrutiny. 
Fields, Recontextualisation and Translation 
Consider, for example, the case of a group of Brazilian street children who make their living 
by selling coconuts in the informal markets of the capital city (Carraher et aI, 1985; 1988). 
While based on an intuitive grasp of the decimal system, the children's methods for calculating 
the price of, say, seven coconuts at thirty five cents each are highly idiosyncratic when 
compared with the algorithms taught at school which are based on a formal study of the place 
value of numbers. Both kinds of activity, in turn, are distinct from, but seem somehow related 
to, the kind of discourse conducted by academic mathematicians. Thus, the street and school 
calculations can, the observer feels, be shown to be at least homologous, even if different, 
embodiments of the distributive axiom of multiplication over addition, where for any three 
numbers a, b and c: 
a x (b + c) = (a x b) + (a x c) 
e.g. 7 x (30 +5) = (7 x 30) + (7 x 5) 
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This example highlights the need for ,an analysis of three kinds of theoretical consideration. 
First, the struggle for knowledge is contested within distinct social domains or fields. Studies 
of disciplinarity are premised on a distinction between disciplinary and non-disciplinary forms 
of knowledge (Messer-Davidow et aI, 1993). The approach developed here entails finer-
grained differentiation among fields. However, rather than focussing on intra-domainal 
matters, the present chapter is concerned with transactions between domains. Boundary 
analysis looks at how knowledge relates across domains of social activity, rather than across 
disciplines, and therefore involves a consideration of the recontextualisation or translation of 
knowledge across the boundaries of these domains. All translations or recontextualisations 
produce deviation and discrepancy. The discussion that follows will draw on the work of 
Bourdieu, Bernstein, and CalIon. 
For Bourdieu (see especially Bourdieu., 1993a; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) social life takes 
place in a set of relatively autonomOU8 but interlocking spheres of 'play' called fields. Within 
each field agents contend for the form of capital that constitutes the stake of that field. Apart 
from wealth, the capital of the economic field, Bourdieu distinguishes between social capital, 
denoting valued social relationships; cultural capital, denoting one or other form of legitimate 
authority or knowledge; and symbolic .capital or prestige. The quantity of capital possessed by 
the actors determines their relative place and rank in the 'space of positions' (Bourdieu, 
1993b) which constitutes the field. Bourdieu is evidently reliant here on an extended 
economic metaphor for his account of social action. 
Social reality exists in minds at the same time as it exists in things. The objective notion of 
field is thus always complemented by the notion of habitus, which denotes the subjective 
system of dispositions, the practical sense of the game, the bodily schemata of perception and 
action that agents inhabit 'naturally' and that steers their strategic action. Each objectively 
structured position in the social field thus has its subjectively structured set of dispositions 
ontologically paired with it. Habitus its what gives social reality regularity and predictability, 
since agents become habituated to their positional lot and act dispositionally in habitual ways, 
or 'naturally', from it. Habitus/field therefore together constitute a double-register patterning; 
of social practice. 
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Of particular interest here is Bourdieu's emphasis on the role of the education system in 
distributing the capital which produces and reproduces social hierarchy. The move from the 
dynastic state, where privilege was dependent on birth and patronage, to the bureaucratic state 
of the twentieth century has not entirely removed the role of family position in reproducing the 
social order. But familial location has become overlaid by the function of schooling in 
imparting not only educational credentials but also real skills and definable dispositions to 
them. Thus, the transmission of privilege is not automatic but open to failure; schooling 
associates probabilities of success to existing social positions without necessarily producing 
that success: ' ... reproduction operates statistically, which means that the class ... perpetuates 
itself without all of its individual members reproducing themselves' (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 29). 
Just as habitus provides space for the possibility of individual choice and rational calculation 
outside of the habituality of our dispositional inclinations, so education provides space for 
social mobility both up and down the social hierarchy. For Bourdieu this is one of the 'costs' 
of the shift from a dynastic to a bureaucratic order. But the 'gains' more than compensate: 
the mechanism of reproduction offered by schooling has a powerful legitimating effect. The 
properties certified by schools, being defined in terms of personal talent or merit rather than 
heritage, have the appearance of naturalness, reasonableness, morality, and universality of both 
access and recognition. 
Schooling is by no means the only institution to function in this way, but in Bourdieu's scheme 
the education system provides the pre-eminent machinery for the authorisation of social 
hierarchies (Wacquant, 1993). At the symbolic level these mechanisms are far more efficient 
than the brute force, ecclesiastical fiat or naked class power of earlier times because they work 
in a subterranean way. Domination operates through belief: external structures become 
internalised and the dominated become complicit in their own domination. This is the essence 
of symbolic violence: ' ... no power can be exercised in its brutality in an arbitrary manner, ... it 
must dissimulate itself, cloak itself, justify itself for being what it is - it must make itself be 
recognised as legitimate by fostering the misrecognition of the arbitrary that founds it' 
(Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 25). It is in this sense that Bourdieu refers to 'legitimate symbolic 
violence.' Symbolic violence is that surplus symbolic power which affects our destinies all the 
more powerfully because it has slipped off the horizon of consciousness, and therefore cannot 
be opposed or otherwise dealt with. 
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Possession of an article of universally recognised cultural capital such as a school diploma 
confers symbolic power on the holder. Symbolic power is the ability and social standing to 
have one's inscriptions recognised: 'a power of consecration or revelation, a power to 
conceal or reveal things which are already there' (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 138). 
Bernstein (1990) uses a related but nOK identical notion offield (or arena), dividing society up 
into the field of production (of knowledge: principally the academy), the field of the state, and 
the field of reproduction or symbolic control, principally education. The last has many sub-
fields, which regulate dominant and subordinate discursive relations by policing the legitimacy 
ot: and access to, the resources of the Godes operating in that sub-field. 
Codes are composed of categories which are regulated by principles of classification which 
are ultimately linked to social relations of power. School mathematics is an example of such a 
code. The discursive system depends for Bernstein, as for Durkheim (see Chapter 5), on the 
strength of classification within and between categories. Strongly classified categories and 
codes are strongly insulated from otheJr codes and categories, and each system of classification 
has its agents for maintaining insulation that either shape, reproduce, repair or otherwise 
police the categorial boundaries. Strong classification, or differentiation, generates greater 
autonomy between fields; weak classijication allows different fields to become integrated by 
common organising principles. For example, a weakly classified or weakly insulated curricular 
discourse will tend towards an integrated curriculum with minimal disciplinary specialisations, 
while a strongly classified curricular discourse will tend towards strong subject boundaries, 
strong forms of assessment and curricular streaming. 
All societies have at least two basic; classes of knowledge for Bernstein - mundane or 
everyday knowledge (horizontal discourse), and esoteric knowledge (vertical discourse) (this 
is discussed further in Chapter 5). Esoteric knowledges are the domain of educational 
practice, while mundane knowledge rarely is, although the constructivists hope to change this. 
Knowledge passes through the educational system via a series of reinterpretations which 
Bernstein calls recontextualisations. This means that a discourse (like chemistry, for example) 
is delocated from its substantive pra·ctice and context in the experimental laboratory and 
relocated into a new discourse (like Grade 7 science, for example) according to different 
principles of selection, ordering and focusing. This relocation transforms the practice of the 
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original discourse into a completely different practice. That is, 'real' chemists do not actually 
do the things schoolchildren have to do to learn school science, but it is on the basis of the 
latter that chemistry 'competence' is constructed, evaluated and rewarded in the school 
system. This recontextualisation is clearly a result of, and will in turn exercise, considerable 
symbolic power. 
CalIon (1995) has provided an interesting clarification of the ways in which alternative 
explanatory models of the knowledge production process help us account for the dynamism of 
knowledge innovation and dissemination. The major advance this clarification provides is to 
show that each model emphasises one feature and ignores others; and that a more adequate 
explanation requires the inclusion of the strengths of each model. His first model is the 
traditional rational model of the scientists and philosophers that explains knowledge growth in 
terms of the steady accretion of robust explanatory statements, and which was earlier in this 
chapter referred to as an 'internalist' account. The 'tragic beauty' (Calion, 1995, p. 36) of this 
model is that is allows the spotlight to fall solely on the internal logic of the system of 
knowledge statements, and does not provide a framework for understanding why and how 
particular ideas become knowledge at particular times and places. 
All other models attempt to inject a social (or 'externalist') understanding into the transactions 
of knowledge. CalIon's model two is a competition model, which, using an economic 
metaphor, explains knowledge as an outcome of a competition for scarce resources. While 
this model allows us to see that knowledge is always the outcome of contestation amongst 
groups of agents, it has nothing to say about the internal features of that knowledge, either its 
content or its form. This is Bourdieu's approach, and Calion shows that, while it does take us 
beyond the narrow focus on individual scientists that model one restricts us to, it can at best 
provide a snapshot of particular knowledge 'episodes', but cannot easily follow their passage 
overtime. 
Model three presents knowledge as the product of socio-cultural practice, which I earlier 
called constructivist. This model sets out to emphasise the commonalities, or even identity, 
between various social practices, and minimises the possible differences between them. These 
commonalities are of at least three kinds: 
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• between knowledge practices and other kinds of social practices; 
• between different kinds of knowledge practices; 
• between knowledge workers and other kinds of social actor. 
For this model, all of these are more alike than they are different (as formalised in the 
'symmetry principle' of the Strong P'rogramme of the Edinburgh School of sociology of 
knowledge). In each case, the implication is, we should treat these as if they were the same, as 
if there were no epistemological or social difference between them. This model has two other 
features worth mentioning. The first, tme to the focus on practices, stresses the importance of 
'non-propositional elements', of tacit or non-codified skills in the production of knowledge. 
The second, like model two, stresses social context (the external) above the form and content 
of the knowledge itself The affinity with the practice-driven model of innovation discussed in 
Chapter 2 is clear. 
There are a number of severe conceptual problems with considering all knowledge production 
under the rubric of 'social practices' (Turner, 1994), but these will not be pursued here. The 
fourth model, shared in different ways by Bernstein and CalIon, is a model of what CalIon calls 
extended translation. 
CalIon invites us to think of any knowledge statement, the preferred focus of model one, as the 
contingent end point of an extended chain or network of inscriptions - graphic displays, tables, 
laboratory notes, various versions of n::ports and so on - together with technical devices and 
embodied skills. Actors (here called ac:tants because they can be either human or non-human, 
such as enzymes for example), are attributed by inscriptions or technical devices which, when 
added into a translation network, lengthen it. 
The fundamental property of translation is not, as it is for Bourdieu, to act as a bearer of 
power, but to produce discrepancy, or productive deviation. Translations proliferate because 
they produce discrepancies, additions lmd subtractions in the inscriptions themselves, which 
are the material marks of the effect of ~:ocial context. The great advance model four has over 
models two and three is, therefore, that the social context is analysed by its effect on the body 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
53 
of knowledge itself: the explanation for translational proliferation is sought not in the context 
but in the inscriptions themselves. 
Callon's argument is that each model has something to offer, and the implications is that 
model four retains the best features of the other three. The point of this discussion of Callon is 
not to belabour the similarities between 'extended translation' and 'recontextualisation', but 
rather to demonstrate, from another point of view, that neither an internalist account, nor an 
agonistic model like Bourdieu's, nor a constructivist model like that of the socio-culturalists 
will, on its own, help us understand curriculum as nested within the larger flux of knowledge 
in society. Rather, some kind of recontextualising or translational model is required to lend 
precision to why certain knowledge forms have the purchase that they do. 
To return to the central concern of the present chapter: how is one to regard the appropriate 
place of curricular mathematics knowledge? For Bernstein and for CalIon, curricular 
knowledge is part of that large class of esoteric discourses, separated from everyday 
knowledge by two things: a hard boundary which we weaken at our peril, and a 
recontextualisation or translational network that has in any case reconfigured the original 
mathematical practice. For the socio-cultural constructivists, the boundary between the 
mathematics curriculum and everyday knowledge is artificially exclusionary, epistemologically 
unjustified, and must be removed. The aim here is not to find the right pigeonhole for 
mathematics curriculum. But it is crucial that we understand the limits to hybridisation, the 
point at which the emancipatory strategy turns against the intentions that drive it and becomes 
self-hampering. 
Learning what Counts 
Since the beginning of recorded history academic mathematics has provided among the most 
enduring philosophical problems. Since Euclid, it has enjoyed wide recognition as one of the 
most easily identified, fully realised, aesthetically pleasing and powerfully useful disciplines. 
Elaboration of the discourse is undertaken by initiates who display a highly specialised 
disposition and have served a relatively long apprenticeship. It is considered an important 
aspect of study at the school level - where students struggle to master the curricular version of 
its rigorous language - and mathematical proficiency is an entrance requirement for many 
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areas of post-school study. It is not surprising, therefore, that the relationship between the: 
academic discipline, school mathematic:s, and everyday life is a contentious matter. 
The distinctions drawn above between mathematical discourses of the street, the classroom 
and the academy provides the terrain for current debates in mathematics education. Current 
conservative orthodoxy (a particular version of model one) is based on the assumption that the: 
formal mathematical knowledge of academic discourse represents the truth about the world 
which transcends time, place and culture. What is important at school, therefore, is to 
transmit a pure form of this knowledge. This, in tum, because it is based on an essential 
distilled truth, will be applicable to the calculating, measuring and reasoning tasks demanded in 
any real life situation. 
The constructivist challenge to this view charges that a school curriculum dominated by 
academic mathematics privileges a certain kind of knowledge; that this kind is a tool of 
modernity, with all the worst phallo-, logo- and Eurocentric connotations of the term. As a 
result, children who do not share these perspectives - the working class, black people and 
women - are excluded from the discourse: the Brazilian street children, for example, invent 
ingenious solutions to problems encountered in their daily lives, yet are unable to perform 
analogous tasks in a school setting and therefore fail their mathematics. For constructivists, 
the solution to this problem is three-fold: a political campaign exposing the imperialistic roots 
of the present mathematics curriculum (see, for example, Fasheh, 1988); a pedagogical project 
aimed at incorporating examples from the life-world of learners from a variety of race, gender, 
class and cultural backgrounds into sl~hool mathematics (Gerdes, 1985); and recognition of 
prior learning. All three solutions are problematic. 
In South Africa, one of the most glaring indices of the depth of the racial divide in the 
education system is the failure of black children in mathematics and science programmes at all 
levels. Under the circumstances it is understandable that the traditional curriculum has been 
identified as an exclusionary mechanism and that educators advocate a programme of radical 
redress. This overtly political thrust coincides with the pedagogical prescriptions of a number 
of other groups: the problem-centred learning advocated by some university-based 
educationists (Olivier, 1993), and petmutations on the constructivist theme propagated by 
dozens of teacher development programmes provided by non-government organisations 
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(Volmink, 1993), to mention only two. In fact, the development of a new counter-orthodoxy 
is rapidly emerging and the basis of the new national curriculum for general education in South 
Africa, Curriculum 2005, being phased in from the lower grades as from 1997, is exemplarily 
constructivist (see Chapter 7). 
Bernstein's model ofrecontextualisation is useful in understanding the contest in South Africa 
between the old orthodoxy and the emerging new constructivist order. Bernstein observes 
that the nature of the relationship between two fields of recontextualisation - the official 
recontextualising field (ORF) and the pedagogic recontextualising field (PRF) - is key in times 
of curriculum change. Dominance of the bureaucracy (ORF) through centralised processes of 
curriculum construction and systems of assessment and inspection severely limited the 
participation of professional teacher organisations, NGOs, academics, business groups and the 
range of other actors which constituted the PRF during the apartheid years. Access to the 
writing of syllabi and textbooks was tightly controlled within the white education departments, 
and all interested actors outside the ruling party labour, business, academics from the 
English-speaking campuses and teachers - were excluded from participation. For many 
opponents of apartheid it was state dominance of the curriculum process which produced an 
exclusionary curriculum, and their emancipatory project was to storm the citadel of esoteric 
knowledge and break down the walls. 
The emergence of a new order after 1994 has been accompanied by the rapid growth of the 
pedagogic recontextualising field. In the struggle for a new mathematics curriculum the PRF 
has been dominated by a strong constructivist alliance, whose work is characterised by two 
features. First, while the present curriculum is primarily the product of recontextualisation 
from the academic into the school field, constructivists concentrate their efforts on 
recontextualising everyday knowledge into the curriculum. The key assumption here is that 
esoteric mathematics can be bridged for all children, but especially for marginalised 
constituencies, by means of everyday examples. Secondly, the constructivist position has no 
theory of the boundary: it is as if there is no disjuncture between fields; as if, for example, the 
syntax of school mathematics could be perfectly aligned with that of ordinary everyday 
activities. In the terms developed here, constructivists are strong hybridisers whose pedagogy 
assumes a flattening of the everyday/school boundary. 
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Dowling (1993) is in sympathy with the political goals of the constructivists, and because of 
this sympathy, he is opposed to their pedagogical programme, presenting a particularly strong 
case for what could go wrong in their practice. His analysis of mathematical textbooks in the 
UK leads him to conclude that the texts prescribed for 'lower-ability' students (the G series), 
and which incorporate numerous examples intended to model everyday situations, succeed 
only in further excluding their readers from the esoteric discourse. 'Higher-ability' students, 
on the other hand, are inducted directLy into esoteric mathematics (the Y series). Dowling's 
argument proceeds as follows. 
The recontextualisation of public domain or everyday material into the curriculum for 
disadvantaged learners involves a two fold deformation. First, it does violence to its everyday 
setting in that the material in which the learner is supposed to recognise himlherself parades as 
real life, but is recontextualised according to the curricular needs of the mathematics it 
purports to exemplifY. The result is neitther 'real' mathematics nor recognisably 'real life.' The 
debate in mathematics about the relation between esoteric knowledge and that of other 
discourses - not only of the everyday, but also of more 'empirical' scientific disciplines such as 
physics - has a long and fruitful history. Dowling's strong position would seem to imply that 
school mathematics should incorporatc~ no 'real world' examples. This is a debatable issue, 
but his larger point is to emphasise thle disjuncture between school knowledge and everyday 
life. Dowling's second objection to the way in which the everyday is imported into 'lower-
ability' mathematics texts is that it does violence to the student in inculcating a view of 
mathematics as a series of specialised solutions to particular problems, rather than as a 
connected set of axioms and theorems. In substituting procedure for discourse, constructivism 
obscures the interconnected and generalised nature of school mathematics and precludes the 
induction of the student into the discipline of mathematics because the localising strategy of 
indigenous examples induces the student to mistake algorithmic solutions for generalisable 
principles, and thus to mistake the nature of mathematical practices. For 'higher-ability' 
students, by contrast, the discursive elaboration of generalisable principles is foregrounded. 
This induction involves a subjugation to the discipline: the discourse is in authority over their 
actions insofar as its methods are non-negotiable. However, the subjugation results in the 
production of a new subjectivity, alongside the localised individuality of the everyday subject, 
like adding an extra room to a house;. This is the subject who passes mathematics. The 
'lower-ability' student is, paradoxically, left free to be a local individual but a failed 
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mathematics learner. The constructivist approach, a 'wishing-to-say' pedagogy, 
uncomfortably close to the pedagogical strategy of the ruling classes in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Britain6, produces a result opposite to its explicit intent, visiting the 
exclusion on disadvantaged students it was constructed to avoid. 
Walkerdine (1988) shares Dowling's view on the contrived nature ofa pedagogy which would 
unproblematically proceed by induction from 'real world' examples. However, she is less coy 
than is Dowling about deriving implications for the classroom from her theoretical analysis. 
She shares the anger of the constructivists against the exclusivity of formal mathematics. 
Walkerdine sees too the need for a closer relationship between everyday and school 
knowledge but, unlike the constructivists, who would achieve such a tie by flattening the 
boundary and hybridising the discourses, she theorises the nature of the boundary. F or her, 
the existence of exclusive domains of discursive activity is a sine qua non: the problem is how 
to travel from one to the other. 
In terms of the theoretical framework being developed here, Walkerdine's project is to 
theorise the nature of recontextualisation or translation: what happens when a set of signs 
which make sense in one discursive domain are transformed into a different set of meanings in 
another? How can this transformation be achieved so as to make the formal discourse 
accessible to a wider range of learners? And, most important, how can the signs of 
mathematics be stripped of their power to pathologise and regulate and be imbued with a 
liberatory charge? For Walkerdine the starting point for answering these questions lies in 
recognising that everyday practices and school tasks are separated by a sharp disjuncture. In 
the first, a metaphor, such as selling coconuts, calls up a specific set of practices within which 
certain things are doable and others not. This is reasoning within a familiar context, adopting 
a subject position within a known discourse. An example to illustrate this point is afforded by 
the Brazilian street children alluded to earlier: the cost of seven coconuts may be calculated 
by doubling thirty five cents three times, and adding another thirty five cents. The kind of 
abstract reasoning entailed in a school situation, on the other hand, involves conscious 
reflection on the linguistic structure of the discourse itself (Walkerdine, 1982), a reflection on 
the internal relations of combination (for example, cost thirty five cents times seven). This, 
in turn, requires ignoring the metaphoric content which might detract from focusing on the 
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logical relations entailed in the statement, by directing attention to the specific local practice to 
which the statement refers. 
The next step is to distinguish between those relations of signification in the everyqay world of 
the learner which provide fruitful points of articulation with the discourse of school 
mathematics, and those which may be misleading or repressive. For example, the formation of 
a mathematical sign such as 'more' does not merely involve the representation of an object, 
operation or relation by a symbol, but occurs within a specific signifying practice. The 
opposite of 'more' in home-based eating practices is more likely to be 'no more' rather than 
'less'; in school-based mathematical practices, on the other hand, 'less' is the opposite of 
'more' . In ignoring the distinction between the everyday and school fields, the assumption is 
made that any everyday metaphor is suitable for effecting egress into the metonymic relations 
of mathematics, thus opening the possibility for confusion. 
The pedagogical task, therefore, is to identify areas where out-of-school practices might 
usefully dovetail with school mathema1tics and to structure the school discourse so as to work 
systematically through the process of tJransfer. The shift from one practice to another involves 
the prising apart of one set of relations of signification and rearticulating or translating them to 
produce new meanings. This in tum is achieved through the construction of complex 
signifying chains, 'which facilitate the move into new relations of signification which operate 
with written symbols in which the referential content of the discourse is suppressed' 
(Walkerdine, 1988, p. 128). 
One example of a discourse containing such a signifying chain which Walkerdine (1988) 
quotes is set in the home: a mother and her four-year old daughter are discussing how many 
friends the latter will have to play, and how many glasses of juice and biscuits will be required. 
First, the daughter names the seven children she wants to invite. Secondly, the mother helps 
her to raise one finger to correspond with each name. In the first step, the names are signifiers 
of the children, but in the second step, they drop to the level of signifieds in relation to the new 
signifiers, the fingers. In the third step, the fingers in turn become the signifieds for the next 
level of signifiers, the spoken numbers which are counted off the fingers. And finally, the 
spoken numerals are represented as written symbols, which are the signifiers most appropriate 
for arithmetical manipulation. This process is represented schematically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The construction of mathematical knowledge as a signifying chain. 
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Constructing such signifying chains is a far cry from the approach advocated by the 
constructivist groundswell: that any and all everyday experiences are suitable metaphors for 
mathematical relations. 
There is a widespread perception of mathematics as a central mechanism in sorting and 
regulating the population, where its success is attributed to the conception of mathematical 
knowledge as absolute. The response of the constructivists to this analysis is to break down 
the distinction between school knowledge and everyday life~ to attempt to infuse that form of 
the discipline taught at school with a variety of meanings which resonate with the thematic 
experiences of flesh and blood subjects. Dowling presents a convincing argument that this 
approach merely displaces and exacerbates the symbolic violence perpetrated by mathematics 
education. By insisting that school mathematics be concerned with localising 'real world' 
problems, the discipline and its generalising power is squeezed out of the curriculum. By these 
means, the boundary bashers unwittingly connive at the marginalisation of their pupils. 
A prudent boundary crossing would seem to promise more fruitful possibilities. This is based 
on the recognition that not all everyday objects are suitable resources for the metonymic 
relations of the discipline. The same signifier is attached to different signs in the respective 
fields of everyday life, the school curriculum and the academic discipline. Recontextualisation, 
or translation, consists in prising apart relations of signification in one domain and 
rearticulating them in another, a practice without guarantees since, as CalIon shows, 
translations always produce discrepancies. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter started off with a concern that children, often from disadvantaged groups, fail, or 
are failed by, a curriculum and pedagogy that alienates large numbers of children from the 
educational process. The action of this 'surplus' power is symbolic violence, and the overall 
project is to explore curricular and pedagogical ways for 'forcing symbolic violence into 
retreat' (Bourdieu and Coleman, 1991, p. 386). The particular variant of such thinking 
pursued in this chapter suggests that various constructivist approaches to mathematics, 
specifically designed to empower disadvantaged groups, seem to fare no better than the 
curriculum that they are designed to replace. In fact, they could well fare worse. This has led 
to a reflection on the matter of boundaries and the complexities of redescription between 
domains. 
The strategy of the constructivists is to reason that exclusion occurs because of an 
unwarranted disparity between curricllllar content and the sensuous content of the everyday 
lives of the children who must learn this foreign and hostile knowledge. This disparity, say the 
constructivists, constitutes an unneces,sary barrier to the learners: it is a barrier arbitrarily 
constructed by agents of the status quo, and it must therefore be removed in the interests of 
empowerment and emancipation. This strategy is extrapolated from a strong social 
constructivist epistemology which can be read to say that, since barriers of this sort are 
socially or discursively constructed, they can just as easily be dismantled by the same means. 
Following Bourdieu, Bernstein and Calion, the view presented here is that the multiple 
accretions of power lodged in social classificatory boundaries, while dislodgeable, cannot be 
effectively dealt with by means of a 'wishing-to-say' strategy, or by means of voluntarist 
theorizing. All that this achieves is the postulation of a condition of 'false equality' between 
domains or participants (see Chapter 9). If people are indeed to act upon this condition, one 
of 'playing fields' levelled by fiat, then they will stub their toe especially severely on the reefs 
of social hierarchy which are not displal.ced but merely removed from view by the 'wishing-to-
say'strategy. And when that happens, people may either continue to blame the status-quo, or, 
imagining that the liberatory forces have given it their best shot, they may begin to blame 
themselves for non-inclusion. This would be copybook symbolic violence. There is no more 
effective method of domesticating the 'unfortunate four-fifths' (Chapter 2). 
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The argument here is that the position of the constructivists is a genre of radical politics that 
should give all progressives pause. The dual strategy recommended here is, in the words of 
Gloria Anzaldua, 'one that knows the border and crosses the line' (quoted by McLaren, 1994, 
p. 219), not one that crosses the line by acting as iidthough the border were not there. To 
repeat: to cross the line without knowing it is to be at the mercy of the power inscribed in the 
line. The question is how to cross, and that means paying detailed attention to the politics of 
redescription and translation, to the means required for a successful crossing. The main 
pedagogical implication is that there is a definite limit to the usefulness of everyday knowledge 
in inducting learners into school mathematics. This is not to say that the line is legitimate, 
merely that the battle cannot be won by trying to erase it discursively. If the best way to cross 
the border turns out to be by taking the correct documents, the warrantable social or cultural 
capital, no matter how socially contested these may be, then the progressive strategy consists 
in finding out how to empower people by ensuring that they have the wherewithal to cross the 
border safely. That means that there is no everyday short cut to competence in the discipline 
of school mathematics. A curriculum premised on such a short cut can only turn out to be a 
new impediment. 
The issue of the border, or boundary, is explored further in the next chapter. There the focus 
shifts from the boundary itself and its crossing to the similarities and differences in internal 
structure of the knowledge domains that the boundary insulates. An argument against the 
monism of the constructivists is developed through a discussion of two exemplary dualists, 
Durkheim and Bernstein. 
Notes 
1 As I said in the Prolegomenon, the original version of this paper was co-authored with 
Nick Taylor, although later extensively revised by myself. His main contribution is to 
the section 'Learning what Counts' . 
2 Also Honneth (1992, p. 27) '... it is primarily changes within the communicative 
infrastructure of the social lifeworld to which post-modern social theories with a 
sensitiveness for the times react'. 
3 While by no means identical, the terms 'constructivism', 'constructionism' and 
'constructionalism' will be taken as broadly equivalent. I consider this to be 
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uncontentious. As Lynch (1998, p. 14) comments, ' ... I have conflated constructivism 
with a panoply of avant-guarde radical intellectual movements: relativism, radical 
feminism, cultural studies, deconstructionism, post-modernism and so forth. I am not 
alone in this, as such conflation is itself a feature of the field. Persons affiliated with 
these· various movements ... freely overstep and disregard epistemic boundaries, and even 
celebrate the transgression of such boundaries'. 
4 " ... truth and knowledge can only be judged by the standards of the inquirers of our own 
day. Nothing counts as justification except by reference to what we already accept ... 
There is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some other test 
than coherence" (Rorty, 1979, p. 178). 
5 'To acknowledge a constructivist dimension in our relation to the objective world is not 
ipso facto to endorse a socio-cultural idealism' (McCarthy, 1989, p. 207 fh.26). See 
also Sismondo, 1993a. 
6 ' ... the lower orders were taught specific, contextualised "facts" mechanically - the 
capacity to generalise across contexts was not provided or encouraged. 
Decontextualised knowledge was for others ... ' (Goodson, 1992, p. 5). 
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Chapter 5 
INTIMATIONS OF BOUNDLESSNESS 
Dereglement1 
Boundaries are the condition of intelligibility of ourselves and of our world. This Kantian 
precept snakes its way through much of the social theory of the early twentieth century only to 
come up short against a trend of social thought everywhere evident as the century ended. It 
sometimes even seems as if the notion of boundary has become the quintessence of 
totalitarianism. To live a life beyond bounds and without boundaries is the dominant ethical 
ideal (Jardine, 1999); to enquire into facts and meanings that exceed epistemological 
boundaries is the primary research ideal (Lather, 1991); to teach children to cross boundaries 
wherever they may find them is the ideal of pedagogy (Giroux and McLaren, 1994); to treat 
the world as a continuous network of interlinked intensities and flows beyond all divides and 
divisions is all there is and should be (Deleuze, 1995). 
There is something disconcerting about this tum of events. Not that it is some completely 
novel view from nowhere. A version of it has been central to progressive, evolutionary, or 
revolutionary views since at least the Enlightenment, where change, whether driven by 
aesthetics, science or politics, was considered to be a bounds-transcending event series. What 
marks the more recent constellation from the standard progressivism or romanticism of 
modernity, though, is a certain extremism - as if modernity were taken to a logical, but mad, 
conclusion. It would seem as if, as in forms of paranoia, a certain organising centre is missing 
from an otherwise rational edifice. 
Georg Simmel expresses a version of the earlier orthodoxy with representative elegance. 
Boundaries, or forms, are the pre-condition for meaningfulness. Without them, the immensity 
of the world would swamp life and render it a marsh of senselessness and uncertainty. 'The 
boundary, above and below, is our means for finding direction in the infinite space of our 
worlds' (Simmel, 1971, p. 353). This does not mean that life is defined only by forms and 
boundaries; life is also self-defining, and to that degree, boundary-transcending. 
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Consequently, life and form, existence and boundary, are 'partners of a dialectic .. .' (Tester, 
1993, p. 11): boundaries and fonns create the conditions for meaningfulness and sense even 
as life transcends those fonns and boundaries in order to extend that sense. In other words, 
boundaries are the condition both for the constitution of sense and for the transcendence of 
boundaries. A slew of contempora.ry sociological theorising, perhaps most explicit in 
Giddens's successive versions of structuration theory, comes to mind here. A central nostrum 
of modernity also comes into view: that there can be no progress or innovation, let alone 
violation, without boundaries, even as there can be no boundaries without their transgression. 
As Durkheim was wont to say, the epi80dic violation of a rule 'serves to re-affinn the sanctity 
and authority of the rule' (quoted in Wrong, 1994, p. 57). Fonn and life are both logically and 
sociologically co-dependent. This much is standard to Freud as well as to most of the 
sociological greats, and is captured with gaunt economy in Borges's aphorism 'oppression is 
the mother of invention'. This is standard too in attempts in the sociology of science to 
understand the social construction of truth: ' ... all distrust presupposes a system of takings-
for-granted which make this instance of distrust possible. Distrust is something which takes 
place on the margins of trusting systems' (Shapin, 1994, p. 19). 
Everything hangs on the maintenance of a certain balance, a certain symmetrical dance 
between fluidity and fixity. Here lies the rub. For a great many contemporary writers, this 
dialectic has become radically destabilised, and fonns that were once merely constructively 
constraining have become reified and life-constricting. Simmel's two great examples were of 
course money and theory, both of which assert the precedence of fonn over life. The remed 
fonns become prisons, naturalised cages that might once have been the product of creative 
genius but now stifle it. In the current cultural temper they have become the radical other of 
genius, of freedom, of the life of the spirit, of the autonomous citizen of the globalised world. 
In this generic story, 'great divides' abound: between the subject and the object; between 
culture and nature; between the solitary person and the collective; between the 
statelmarketlbureaucracy and the people; all versions of the life-fonn dialectic now polarised 
and fixed into implacable opposition. The definitional activity of fonns, on the one hand, and 
self-definition on the other, are irreconciled and irreconcilable. Between ourselves as self-
definers, and that 'other' definer, opens up a gulf of mistrust, in which civil social relations, 
civility as social cement in Shapin's (1994) tenns, must whither. For the would-be explainer 
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of social life, a certain principle of dynamism, modernity's dynamic principle of form-
transcendence, goes by the board. It might not have been a particularly elegant or even 
adequate principle, and it has certainly been shot full of holes by successive waves of the social 
theory avant-garde. But in one version or another, it formed the organising basis of every 
sustaining theoretical grand narrative of modern social science. 
No more. Social theory collectively simply does not credit the form-transcendence account 
anymore, bar the odd stout soul. We seem trapped once more in one or other of Leibnitz's 
two labyrinths of reason, the labyrinth of liberty or the labyrinth of necessity (Turner in Buci-
Glucksman, 1994, p. 24). This is an aporia of the cruellest sort, for it forces social theory to 
either one or other end of the 'great divide', or leaves it to scratch in the ruins for perforations 
of the next staging of an unforeseeable transcendence, for the messianic moment which can 
only come unannounced (Benjamin, 1969). The last is, perhaps, the honourable or gallant 
thing to do, but most writing flies with one or other wing of the dichotomy. This takes the 
form of either a melancholic (or tragic) response to the sceptical turn, or a joyous and 
celebratory one. Both of them deal with boundaries in an unmediated or dichotomising way. 
In the idiom of this chapter, they either re-affirm the 'great divide' or collapse it. 
Central to the joyous response is a taking of the perspective of life unconcerned with the 
shaping power of form: where boundaries are, freedom should be. This celebratory 
voluntarism, that deals with boundaries by various discursive strategies of ontological 
disavowal, epistemological trivialisation, or confiation, is self-defeating. What matters for the 
present argument is that this kind of social analysis takes as its central premise that boundaries 
are always and by definition imprisoning, and should therefore be crossed, transgressed, 
combated and otherwise wished away wherever they appear to manifest themselves. Or as 
Tester (1993, p. 28) puts it, giving this trend one current appellation, 'Post-modernity can be 
interpreted as the intimation of boundlessness ... ' . 
This chapter is a meditation on the fate of boundaries under conditions of scepticism or 
incredulity, when intimations of boundlessness abound. The specific domain-focus will be on 
the curious way in which 'new literacy studies' has come to define 'literacy'; and the empirical 
focus, albeit brief, will be on some practices of a 'non-literate' worker on a wine farm outside 
Cape Town in South Africa. But first, back to basics. 
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Sacred and Profane 
Emile Durkheim is the exemplary sociologist of the boundary. Taking as his focus 'primitive 
cultures', systems of classification in premodern society, Durkheim set out to construct a way 
of grasping the fundamentals of cultural classification - the why and the how of boundary-
instantiation. In The Elementary ForrllS of the Religious Life he famously draws a distinction 
between two orders of existence which relate thought and practice in two fundamentally 
different ways. The first order is the everyday world of' sensual representations', the world of 
matter and sense, where meaning arises directly out of bodily encounters with the world, with 
other people, with reality. It is a world of flux and of particulars, and it is driven by the most 
practical and direct wisdom: proverbs, prudence, street lore, on-the-job knowledge, the 
rhythmic language and wisdom of the domestic community (Lyotard, 1991, pp. 191-196). 
Schutz would characterise this as the world of the 'natural attitude', Geertz as common sense 
as a cultural system. For Durkheim, this was the profane world. 
The second order is the religious world, one of prescriptions and interdicts that are not 
pragmatically modifiable but are 'fix€ld and crystallised', 'immutable' (Durkheim, 1915, p. 
433). This sacred world is an order of verities not originating in bodily hexis, and therefore 
arbitrary, in Pierce's sense of unmotivated: taboos, explains Durkheim, can be attached to any 
object. The religious world is thus a world of arbitrary conceptual relations, a symbolic order 
constructed by an accretion of 'collective representations' (Durkheim, op. cit., p. 434) that are 
a collective accomplishment, the 'work of the community', in contrast to the 'sensual 
representations' of the everyday world that are the work of continually changing experiential 
particulars. 
Religion is then for Durkheim the ur-cognitive classificatory scheme of the sacred, the ur-form 
of ordering social representations in 1110n-empirical, formal ways. The force of the ordering 
comes from 'outside of the object in which it resides' (quoted in Thompson, 1994, p. 125), 
not from the object itself. It is the result of a process of 'examination and elaboration' 
(Thompson, op. cit., p. 126): it is the result of a cognitive process of idealisation. 
Durkheim means at least two things with this faculty of idealisation. The first is clearly the 
purely cognitive or speculative sense of being able 'to connect things with each other, to 
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establish internal relations between them, to classify them and to systematise them' (Durkheim, 
op. cit., p. 133). The second is that offorward projection towards an order and a world more 
desirable, more felicitous, more powerful - in a word, better - than the one we have in hand at 
any specific point in history. 
Durkheim thus plays upon the double sense of ideal: ideal first as the facility to manipulate 
objects and relations in non-empirical virtual space in thought, as he says; ideal secondly as 
the projection into and towards that which is more desirable. Both together allow us to break 
with empirical facticity and to imagine an ordering of objects that is 'logical' and 'hierarchical' 
(Durkheim, op. cit., p. 137). This is a key feature of virtual connections that allows, as 
Foucault (1981, p. 59) says in a related idiom when discussing disciplinarity, 'the possibility of 
formulating new propositions, ad infinitum', or as Hacking (1985, p. 156) says when 
discussing styles of reasoning, to 'generate new classes of possibilities' . 
The faculty of idealisation is thus Durkheim's motor force for cultural change. With this, he is 
in a position to effect his startling reversal. Quite against the conventional progressivism of his 
Victorian contemporaries such as Frazer, Durkheim makes the argument, more strongly as the 
book progresses, that science, far from making a break with superstition and religion, is 
formally isomorphic with religious thought. Both of them are sacred modes of cognition. 
Indeed, 'the fundamental categories of ... science, are of religious origin' (Durkheim, 1915, p. 
418). Given his second sense of 'ideal', Durkheim is progressive enough to want some 
forward movement, so 'scientific thought is only a more perfect form of religious thought' 
(Thompson, 1994, p. 133). But on the formal level, they are the equivalent. 
Furthermore, science, like religion, arises from the collective not from the individual: it is 'at 
the school of collective life that the individual has learnt to idealise' (Thompson, op. cit., p. 
130). This too constitutes a relatively profound reversal from the 'great cultural-historical 
tradition which assigned truth to individual disengagement and error or distortion to 
membership in the polity' (Shapin, 1994, p. 40). Truth is produced in social communities, not 
by solitary souls in isolated creative ferment, science's persistent self-presentation of the truth-
making process to the contrari. 
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In other words, Durkheim's strong hypothesis might be stated as follows: the prototype of 
socially constructed social knowledge.is the outcome of, and depends upon, a hard distinction 
between everyday, particular, sensory, individual 'profane' knowledge, and esoteric, 
collective, generalisable, non-sensory 'sacred' knowledge. Religion and science are both 
forms of the sacred, of the esoteric and of the social. 
The sacred is characterised by an 'e:xtraordinary contagiousness of character' (Durkheim, 
1915, p. 318), a sort of spontaneous associational bent which must be curbed, because the 
principle of meaningful organisation of the everyday depends crucially on the 'intrinsic 
attributes' (Durkheim, op. cit., p. 323) of the objects found there, while that of the sacred 
depends on the idealised system of cOlmections established by the communal canon. Allowing 
contagion free play would open the pragmatism of the everyday to arbitrary investitures of 
meaning, emotion and moral sense. Or to put it another way, common sense must b~~ 
protected from the power and proclivity of esoteric knowledge to remake it in its own self-
image. Apparent here is an early intimation of the concept of recontextualisation and 
translation. 
Does this not make religion or the esoteric life irrational? Not at all, says Durkheim. They are 
merely non-empirical, not irrational, and certainly not unsystematic: these non-empirical 
connections are furthermore the engine of knowledge since they allow inquirers to break with 
the naturalising logic of the everyday, allowing them 'to bind together things which sensation 
leaves apart from one another' (Durkheim, op. cit., p. 325)3, 
A position like Durkheim's is invariably in favour of disciplinary specialisation. Not only is 
such specialisation a defining instance of the division of labour, says Durkheim, but it 
cultivates social interdependence, which is a mark of advanced civility (see also Shapin, 1994). 
Durkheim's response to those who lament the fragmentation of knowledge and society is to 
assert that the generally educated man, the transdisciplinary epigone of globalisation theorists 
of the learning society (see Chapter 3), is bound to be an antisocial egoist, since his polymathy 
all too easily breeds a smug and false sense of self-sufficiency. Far better to cultivate a sense 
of mutual interdependence, to drive people who might not otherwise do so willingly, to act 
with co-operative civic-minded virtue:4. New sociologists of work echo Durkheim's emphasis 
upon co-operation and interdependence in the global workplace (see Elam, 1993), So too the 
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sociologists of science: 'The very power of science to hold knowledge as collective property 
and to focus doubt on bits of currently accepted knowledge is founded upon a degree and a 
quality of trust which are arguably unparalleled elsewhere in our culture' (Shapin, 1994, p. 
417). 
Part of Durkheim's distinctiveness lies in what Ringer (1993, p. 299) calls his 'hostility to 
interpretation'. On the one hand, this means that his primary stress was upon the differences 
between profane and sacred logics. On the other hand, because interpretation as a problem is 
shifted to the background, the operation of 'crossing-over', or the redescriptive process of 
idealisation itself, is left unexamined. Durkheim routinely supposed that intellectual 'facts' 
were immediately and unproblematically intelligible. Does this mean then that such a position 
automatically leads to an undervaluation of interpretation and a proclivity to positivism? 
Not necessarily. Shotter (1993) has for instance shown that what holds together a wide range 
of interpretivist writers - including Vico, Wittgenstein and Bakhtin - is a view remarkably 
close to that of Durkheim's. According to Vico, the sensus communis of everyday life is 
created by flows of activity, which in turn generate 'sensory topics' which emerge as spaces, 
or habitats, of shared meanings and feelings in already shared circumstances. Webs of 
metaphor connect the shared topoi to the sensus communis and back to the transactions of the 
everyday, ensuring practical continuity. These connections, importantly, are tacit. Everyday 
metaphors thus do not explain, but 'show' participants a common quality of life that is neither 
rationally deductible nor reducible: 'As such, it (the sensus communis) cannot be "explained" 
... (either from within an academic discourse, or in any other way)' (Shotter, 1993, p. 470). 
Shotter goes on to show how this view compels a distinction between common sense and 
esoteric discourse. First, the subject matter of common sense is determined by sensuous 
events and is thus wholly contingent on circumstance, whereas that of esoteric discourse is 
predetermined by the arbitrary systematics of the canon. Secondly, because of its systemic 
objectivisation, the subject matter of esoteric discourse can, as Wittgenstein has said, be 
'surveyed' in rational contemplation, that of common sense not. Why? Because it is only a 
set of ordered statements that enables us to see how, within the subject matter of the 
discourse, things, as Rorty says, 'hang together'. Indeed, it is this ability of 'surveying', of 
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showing that we know how things 'hang together', that we must be able to display in order to 
display competence5• Thus, as Shotter says, paraphrasing Foucault, esoteric discourses 'form 
as systematic the objects of which they speak, i.e. form them as mental representations' 
(Shotter, 1993, p. 473). 
The key point Shotter is extracting fi'om the interpretivists he surveys is that the topic of 
common sense is very rarely arbitrary, while the object of esoteric discourse, and its relation to 
other objects in the discourse, often iH. As we saw above, this is a key reversal Durkheim 
effects in his distinction between the sacred and the profane, a reversal not only of the 
conventionally accepted view of things, and of the view of nineteenth century anthropology, 
but a reversal too of all those who define modernity, along with Habermas, as the passage 
from mythos to logos. 
Amongst the many implications here, I comment on only one. When the constructivists, 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 10, emphasise the unfoundability of all accounts of the world in 
order to establish the equal unfoundability and hence radical equality of all forms of 
knowledge and domains of meaning, they make an epistemological point that does the reverse 
of what they intend it to do. As McCarthy (1989) shows, using Rorty as his example, such an 
epistemological claim is utterly alien to common sense thinking. Ordinary people in the 
everyday sensuous world believe in that world as a precondition for acting in it. We routinely 
treat, and hold our co-participants accountable for so treating, the reality and the objectivity of 
the world as invariant to discrepant reports, as Pollner (1975) would say. Objectivity and the 
invariance of the world is an idealising presupposition and precondition for all interaction and 
social practice in the everyday world. And scientists are not immune from this logic: 'It is, as 
we know, an important part of going to the doctor, flying on a plane and, indeed, maintaining 
social order generally. Not only is it not wise for science-studies analysts to invest their life 
savings in palladium futures: to do so would be to ignore a crucial part of the story' (Simon, 
1999, p. 74). 
Durkheim, then, true to his exemplary modernism, constructs a series of binaries separated by 
a discontinuous, if permeable, interdictory boundary. It is a binary grid which reverses a 
number of standard tropes of mainstream modernity: 
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Most dramatically, science is aligned with religion and against the everyday by defining their 
common roots in idealisation, which is the condition for explicit and systematic classification, 
an operation that the pervasive allegoricity of the everyday is unable to perform6• More 
importantly perhaps, and undermining of the 'great divide' schema that aligns form with 
Nature, and life with Culture, Durkheim's genius is to show that form and truth reside with, 
and spring from, Culture, while Nature's place is with the naturalising suppositions of the 
natural attitude. In so doing, he removes the production of truth from the domain of Nature 
and the solitary man or woman, and restores the sacred to collective life. 
For all that, Durkheim's inversions are only partly helpful. In his desire to characterise both 
religion and science as non-sensory, and the everyday world as solely sensory, he ends up 
characterising two worlds of existence in exclusively epistemological terms. The problem here 
is that epistemological domains are not co-terminal with sociological ones. No-one lives only 
in the sacred or only in the profane. The problem also runs deeper: neither the everyday 
world, nor the world of science, is epistemologically homogeneous. Indeed, argues Latour 
(1993), science has always comprised 'hybrid monsters', productively mixing science and 
society. At least part of the burden of the constructivist challenge to science studies has been 
to show that the practice of science always partakes of the profane as well, contains profanely 
structured practices, and cannot therefore be adequately explained without reference to 
patterns of the profane - that is, to sociological patterns: '(was the sacred always hybrid?)' 
Knorr-Cetina (1994, p. 18) asks in parenthesis. The orthodox Durkheimian answer is no, and 
it is this answer that every periodic wave of protesting realists (for an example, see Atkins, 
1995) has given to the hybridical persuasiveness of the constructivists, those new young 
Hegelians as Fuller (1995c) calls them. 
In giving the answer in this strictly Durkheimian way, the new defenders, like the old, and like 
Durkheim himself, render themselves unable to acknowledge, let alone investigate, the profane 
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practices nesting within the social institutions of religion and science; nor, for that matter, the 
sacred practices in everyday life, and it is this latter which is of interest in the present chapter. 
But this is not to agree with the constructivist hybridizers. By conceding that the social 
institution of science has always been hybrid, or has always produced hybrids, is not to 
concede anything about the epistemological integrity of the sacred part of scientific practice. 
That being so, one is also not forced into a tactic of defensive pluralisation which conceives of 
the domain of social action as radically plural and radically equal, as the 'new literacy' 
theorists are inclined to do (see below} in order to shore up the integrity of profane practice, 
thereby losing any possible analytical edge to the concept of 'literacy' by losing all sense of the 
sacred. 
Only certain kinds of scientific practiee are sacred, not the entire form of life. Once this 
reasonable point is established, then one can proceed to ask, how, wherever we may find them, 
in whatever pure or hybrid form, are we to characterise the different forms of epistemological 
practice of sacred and profane? Or, '(in what basis are we going to establish the comparison 
of collectives?' as Latour (1993, p. 127) asks, but sadly doesn't answer. For a start in this 
direction, we must tum to another exemplary neo-Durkheimian, Basil Bernstein. 
Vertical and Horizontal 
Constructivism deals with the 'gr~a.tdivide', the asymmetry of discourses, by collapsing the 
distinction between the sacred and the profane. Hereafter, specialised knowledge ensembles 
are to be treated as in principle the same as everyday knowledge ensembles, and are to be 
discussed in terms of their continuity with the latter. As we saw in Chapter 4, this is a direct 
result of treating them all as socio-cultural practices. Hereafter, all discursive ensembles are to 
be treated as arbitrary, because they am now solely products of cultural activity7. 
Latour (1993) has pointed out one paradoxical effect of this one-way conflation. By 
construing everything in terms of social construction, the social (or Cultural) becomes the pre-
predicative and therefore 'natural' Real which all other things are henceforth judged in relation 
to: 'Constructivist where Nature is concerned, it is realistic about society' (Latour, op. cit., p. 
94). This helps to explain why many constructivists, formally relativists, hold such strong, 
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even dogmatic views about the explanatory priority of social context (this is explored in 
greater detail in Chapter 10). 
Such a paradoxical realism about society leads to a singular occlusion. If all cultural content is 
arbitrary, then the analytical task must always be to expose the basis for its arbitrariness, which 
necessarily lies in the social field from which that arbitrary content issues: 'It follows from this 
conceptualising that sociological analysis should be concerned more with the activity of the 
field, that is the procedures of its reproduction, than with any given content of the field, for 
any given content is arbitrary' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 169). The internal structure of the 
symbolic system is thereby prevented from having any structuring significance, and this, for 
Bernstein, is the great flaw in Bourdieu' s analysis of culture discussed in Chapter 4: it is about 
the social field and its structures and activities, and has nothing to say about symbolic systems 
themselves. To put that another way, Bourdieu, and other adherents of what CalIon (1995) 
called the 'competition model', reduce all differences of cultural content to the play of power 
and interest. As a consequence, Bourdieu has nothing to contribute to the way that rules in 
knowledge forms and rules in social relations may be mutually implicated. 
To start then, a way of talking about forms of knowledge is required. In a way reminiscent of 
Durkheim's sacred and profane, Bernstein first distinguishes between horizontal discourse -
local, segmental, context-dependent, tacit, multilayered; and vertical discourse - a coherent, 
explicit, systematically principled structure that is either hierarchically organised, or takes the 
form of a series of specialised languages8. 
The difference between the two is most clear when considering acquisition. Horizontal 
discourse is acquired in segments where there are only loosely organised rules of distribution. 
It is context-dependent, and transfer across contexts can only occur on the basis of analogic 
extrapolation. Vertical discourse cannot be acquired segmentally, only via access to the 
explicitly assembled symbolic structure, which occurs via specific prinCiples of 
recontextualisation and access to which is regulated by explicit distributive rules (who can get 
what, when and how). 
So far, Bernstein has extended Durkheim's schema by collapsing the distinction between forms 
of mastery. Both horizontal and vertical discursive mastery can occur only through the 
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manipulation of duly constituted obje(;ts of a discourse: the former is not 'practical' and the 
latter 'formal'. Indeed, they are both 'formal', but their forms differ, as do the distributive 
rules which govern them. 
Bernstein now springs a Durkheimian reversal by distinguishing, within vertical discourse, 
between hierarchical and horizontal knowledge structures. Horizontal discourse does not and 
cannot have knowledge structures b~~cause it has no recgntextualis,ing principle, regulating 
distribution in terms of time, space and actors, because it is by definition common to all 
belonging to the domus. Hier~cbical and horizontaL knowledg~:Lstnlctur~s, as modes of 
vertical discourse, both do. Hierar,chical knowledge structure, the paradigm case being 
physics, is pyramidical in shape, and n.;IW knowledge is integrated into propositions that are as 
inclusive or general as possible and as few in number as possible. (Set aside for the moment 
the now commonplace modification that 'knowledge is less cumulative than we thought' 
[Hacking, 1995, p. 148]). Horizontal knqwledge structure takes the form of an expanding 
series of non-translatable specialised languages with non-comparable principles of 
description. Growth of knowledge here occurs by the addition of specialised languages, only 
very rarely by their integration. Further, Bernstein distinguishes within horizontal knowledge 
structures between those with strong grammars of realisation (like economics) and those with 
weak grammars (like sociology and anthropology). These latter are acquired not by learning 
'procedures of investigation and instruments of observation and understanding of the theory' 
I'" (Bernstein, 1998, p. 18). They are learnt by acquiring a 'gaze', a particular mode or style of 
recognising and realising what counts as 'real' reality (ibid.). 
Horizontal knowledge structures thus partake of the vertical in that they, like any knowledge 
structure in vertical discourse, are regulated by a more or less specific principle of 
/ 
recontextualisation. That is, competent members can give an explicit ~tcount of the way in 
which they have arrived at a specific position; they can re-trace their st~ps and show how they 
have made the recontextualised objects 'hang together'. This is esseI1\tially an elaboration of 
i 
Durkheim's faculty of idealisation, and it is a defining feature of all examples of vertical 
discourse (see Entwhistle, 1998). On the other hand, a horizontal knowledge structure 
partakes of the horizontal in that its specialised languages relate to each other in the manner of 
segments of horizontal discourse: 'both are serial, segmental, and have potentially volatile 
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contents' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 178): that is, they are strongly insulated from each other, non-
translatable and non-comparable. 
The main point that Bernstein wishes to make with this argument, against the reductionism of 
Bourdieu, is that only after we have understood the internal structuring of symbolic systems 
and the way in which that structuring creates rules of distribution which shape possibilities for 
positionality within that system, can we come to a complete understanding of social 
positionality in relation to cultural formations. 'To privilege the particular features of the field 
and the habituses these select, sponsor, and legitimate, whilst excluding the features of 
knowledge, reduces the power and possibilities of analysis' (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 180). 
Bernstein has thus returned to Durkheim's binary schema, not simply to replicate it, but rather 
to pay Durkheim the ultimate compliment, to take a leaf out of his performative book and 'do 
for science what Durkheim had done for religion' as Latour (1993, p. 54) describes the 
'Edinburgh daredevils' (the proponents of the 'strong programme') as having done. That is, 
Bernstein has re-theorised the sacred by delineating invisible alignments in Durkheim's binary 
table: he has attempted to show that the distinction between sacred and profane is not the 
same as that between written and oral, formal and practical mastery, by showing the 
fundamental role of distributive rules in both, as well as in the social relations which optimise 
the discourse. 
Prometheus Unbound, or What Does it Mean to be Literate? 
In this part of the Chapter I shall examine new literacy studies (NLS) in terms of some lessons 
extracted from Durkheim and Bernstein. The intention here is not to present a comprehensive 
discussion ofNLS. What follows hardly does justice to NLS, and is intended simply to display 
a non-Durkheimian approach to 'great divides', and to examine some of its consequences from 
a neo-Durkheimian perspective. 
NLS comprises a cluster of approaches to the concept and practice of literacy that has recently 
rejuvenated the way that literacy is considered, especially cross-culturally. A core precept of 
NLS, shared with much of contemporary ethnology, is that the 'great divide' between oral and 
literate cultures, and between related binaries like concrete and abstract thought, is a self-
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serving one that should be collapsed forthwith. Formal reading and writing, or print literacy, 
should be seen as only one literacy amongst others; hence, literacies. 
There are two typical ways in which this is taken forward in NLS. The first, following Heath 
(1983) and Street (1984; 1993) talks about a 'literacy event', or 'literacy practice', as 
everyday occasions where print literacy is used, or referred to, or conceptualised, as part of a 
broader socio-ideological context of practice. In Street's view, this means that print literacy 
becomes part of a broader class of communicative practices (after Grillo, 1989). The second 
approach, following Gee (1990), likewise sees print literacy as a practice that belongs to a 
broader class of practices, this time 'secondary Discourse', 'secondary' because acquired in 
formal non-intimate contexts. By this definition, and true to NLS's founding precept, literacy 
is a practice like 'oral literature' . 
The first definition therefore defines print literacy as a communicative practice that involves 
written language in some or other way; the second defines it in terms of competency in a 
secondary Discourse. Both of these re-definitions collapse the 'great divide' by nesting print 
literacy within profane practice (Durkheim) or horizontal discourse (Bernstein), in much the 
same way as did that other anthropologist, Bourdieu, and with much the same result: namely, 
that the option of considering literacy as a structured symbolic practice sui generis, or as part 
of a broader category of symbolic practice different to profane everyday practices, is hereby 
surrendered. Of course, much can and has been said about the social, political and ideological 
embeddedness of print literacy. But as we saw above in Bernstein's discussion of Bourdieu, 
once the boundary between the sacred and profane is collapsed, nothing further can be said 
about literacy as a discourse, because any investigation of the formal properties of discourse, 
the formal properties of the content of symbolic systems, is precluded by the conflationist 
strategy adopted to the 'great divide' byNLS. 
This strategy is formally the same as, although the mirror opposite of, that adopted by Levi-
Strauss who addressed the 'great divide' between 'primitive' mentality and 'scientific' 
mentality by making his 'savages' look and think like 'scientists'. NLS, in an attempt to deal 
with the same problem, construes print literacy as primarily another kind of cultural 
accomplishment, and much ofNLS scholarship endeavours to show that there is, after all, very 
little that can be accomplished by print literacy competency that cannot be quite satisfactorily 
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accomplished by other equally meritorious cultural accomplishments (prinsloo and Breier, 
1996). One is ineluctably left with the question of 'who then needs itT In similar vein, the 
sociologists of science who debunk: the pretensions of science to transcendental Truth see 
themselves not as refuting scientific truth claims but as unmasking their unwarranted 
metaphysical aspirations (Hacking, 1998). Whether or not the scientists appreciate this form 
of cognitive therapy or not is moot: there are certainly increasing signs that they don't, nor do 
they appreciate the subtle distinction between 'refuting' and 'unmasking' (see Sokal and 
Bricmont, 1998, for example). The consequences of such diminishment in the educational 
domain are different, and could be far-reaching. Latour (1993, p. 98) scathingly comments; 
'Is there a better way to finish off those one wants to save from condemnation?' The final part 
of this chapter briefly examines an example of how the optic produced by NLS creates a 
particular disabling blindness, by coding a certain practice by an illiterate worker as just 
another everyday cultural accomplishment. 
Migiel Hendricks is a farmworker on a wine and fruit farm in the Breerivier Valley near Cape 
Town. He never went to school, although he did attend literacy classes for a while: he was 
under the impression that he needed to be literate to get his driver's licence, which is not the 
case in South Africa. He confesses: 'I really did not learn anything. Only that the girls had 
nice legs' (Gibson, 1994, p. 3sio. Hendricks is a tractor driver on the wine farm. He welds, 
lays out fertiliser and irrigation systems, and is a general vehicle repairman. 
Singularly, he also builds wagons from scratch, which includes designing and constructing the 
frame, surface and beam, all correctly positioned about the axle or axles. When asked how he 
made a particular wagon, he comments: 'I just looked at an old wagon standing there at the 
top. Then 1 measured it and made a plan in my head how exactly 1 wanted to make this one' 
(Gibson, op. cit., p. 36). Hendricks' modesty aside, his ability is not merely mimetic. He 
builds wagons from specifications given by the farmer, sometimes unlike any he has seen 
before. 
The boss said what kind of wagon he wanted. Then 1 went and sat down and 
thought about how 1 was going to build it. For this kind of wagon, with a 
shorter 'bak' (enclosed boot) it costs less and makes it lighter if you use only 
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over. It depends on where you attach the jack, how long and heavy the jack is. 
Gibson, op. cit, p. 37. 
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Hendricks goes on to explain, in graphic detail, using a wheelbarrow, and using his arm and 
wrist to display articulation, what is at stake in calculating this. 'You have to use your 
common sense,' he says. 
Hendricks is clearly performing some kind of abstract calculation here of the sort which is 
precisely not commonsensical. It is a process of extrapolation that he describes as follows: 'I 
may not be able to read or write, but I use something I have learnt in one case and adapt it' 
(Gibson, op. cit., p. 38). This goels for the construction of plans and the estimation of 
materials: 'By the second wagon I almost always ordered the correct amount of material' 
(ibid.). 
How would one go about understanding what Hendricks is doing here? If we follow a 
Heath/Street definition we will probably not identify this as a literacy 'practice' or 'event': 
neither reading nor writing is involv'ed, and although Hendricks is able to reconstruct and 
communicate his mental steps to the interviewer, it is clear from what he says that his wagon-
building is by and large a solitary activity. Gee (1990) may well identify it as an example of 
secondary Discourse, although apart from a short course in welding, we might be hard put to 
identify the context of acquisition of this undoubted skill, formal or otherwise. NLS has in 
fact very little to say about it at all. 
Hendricks can, in his own words, make a plan in his head, and he is able to extrapolate - 'pas 
dit aan', or 'pass on the metre'. Durkheim would identify it as an example of the faculty of 
idealisation, a case of 'examination and elaboration'. He is clearly able to manipulate objects 
in virtual space. Nor can we plausibly say that this manipulation is only analogical. Hendricks 
is able to re-describe the features of a. wagon into the formal measurements, dimensions and 
quantities that make up a plan, and he is able to translate the plan into a wagon. He is 
deploying some or other principle of recontextualisation here, and because of it, he can 
generate new forms and combinations: he can build a wagon he has never seen before. 
Hendricks, in the terms developed in this chapter, displays elements of an under-elaborated 
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faculty of verticality. This takes the form of a germinal horizontal knowledge structure, 
admittedly with a highly simple grammar. It is, in other words, a rather sacred form of 
common sense, a style of reasoning evolved all by himself, but a style of reasoning for all that. 
This style of cognition is surprisingly similar in form to the one Entwhistle (1998) found 
amongst his Edinburgh undergraduates revising for their finals. Some of the most successful 
students did not try to memorise every fact seriatum, but constructed summary nodes, or what 
Entwhistle calls 'knowledge objects'. Such a 'knowledge object' is more than merely a mental 
image: 'It can pull into awareness currently unfocused knowledge, almost in the way that 
hypertext in computing uses certain emphasised words to indicate the existence of additional 
information' (Entwhistle, 1998, p. 96). The understanding thus produced translates into a 
distinct 'feeling of confidence that an understanding can be reconstructed at will from sets of 
interlinked ideas and information' (ibid.). This 'pull-down' competence, in a vastly different 
time and place, is, I suggest, what Migiel Hendricks exhibits when he builds his wagons. One 
student describes it in uncannily similar terms: 
I clear my mind and something comes ... it was almost as though I could see it 
all fitting into an overall picture ... it pulls in pictures and facts as it needs them 
and suddenly you know where you are going next 
Entwhistle, 1998, p. 96. 
Is it far fetched to say that Hendricks has acquired, and can realise, a related (meta)cognitive 
skill usually associated with advanced literacy? Is Hendricks' cognitive skill communicable? 
The neo-Durkheimian answer is not to look for whether it occurs in a communicative context 
or not, as Gee would, but to examine first the communicative entailments of different 'orders 
of discourse'. Hacking (1985; 1992) shows, for example, that our empirical knowledge, those 
'observation sentences' which we know because they correspond to encounters with sensuous 
reality, are easily understood across contexts, cultures, even languages. They are relatively 
easily translatable. As long as one has been in that situation, one will know what the person is 
talking about. Not so the sentences within a style of reasoning. These are generated as 
intelligible and interesting only from within that style of reasoning: and to understand them -
to be a communicative recipient - requires first sharing that style of reasoning, which in 
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Bernstein's language means having been inducted into the relevant principle of 
recontextualisation. 
Communication thus figures differently whether we are within horizontal or vertical discourse. 
F or the first, communication depends upon having had the same sort of experiences, having 
been exposed to similar sensuous particulars as your co-communicator. For the second, 
communication depends upon sharing a style of reasoning, or 'discourse', which means in turn 
having accessed the same recontextualising principle. No such principle is necessary for 
communication within horizontal discourse. 
Hendricks' 'explanation', or reconstmction, of his operations is at least partly understandable 
to the interviewer, and my citing it here presumes some understanding by the reader. But how 
understandable would Hendricks be to his fellow workers on the farm? Could Hendricks 
explain to a non-initiate fellow-worker how to build a wagon? This is at least a testable 
question, but the account given here would doubt that it could be easily done. Why? Because 
most of the non-literate workers on the farm are unpractised in the skill of recontextualisation 
since they have not had exposure to a sustained process of induction into recontextualisation -
that is, literacy. For what, after all, Gan literacy be but the generic context for the induction 
into principles of recontextualisation? And what reason might we have for not regarding this 
faculty of Hendricks' as a kind of 'writing within speech' (Derrida, 1978, p. 197), a proto-
literacy in all but name, and one moreover that can only be invisible to the old and the new 
literacy studies alikell? 
Hendricks has evolved his protean capacity with, as far as we know, little more assistance than 
the farmer's encouragement. The r1eally interesting question would be how he stumbled, 
uninducted as it were, into the realm of the sacred, into vertical discourse. One would have to 
identifY the vertical or proto-vertical discourses that inhabit Hendricks' habitat, and that have 
helped to construct the habitus of this: singular puissant subject. There are literate people on 
the farm, to be sure, the farmer probably foremost amongst them. Then there is television, the 
church and the Bible, unsuccessful literacy classes and communal readings of the newspaper 
on Sunday. These do not exhaust the possibilities, nor even suggest anything plausible. Recall 
too that Hendricks lives in a rural enclave, within a neo-feudal set of relations between worker 
and farmer, where occupational mobility is low and career advancement limited, and anyway 
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not in terms of occupational categories that might have literacy requirements. NLS might 
conclude with some justification that Hendricks really does not need literacy, and I am quite 
sure this is the answer he himself would give were one to ask But from a neo-Durkheimian 
perspective the question is rather: how, and under what conditions, can vertical discourse be 
accessed outside of formal contexts of transmission? A thorough-going answer may well 
contribute to a rethinking of the role of formal educational institutions given the cognitive 
demands and requisites oflate modernity (see Young, 1999: and Chapter 3). And it would 
certainly also help to explicate how sacred practices lie nested, often unremarked, within the 
routines of the everyday. Above all, though, it would question whether we advance our 
understanding of knowledge practices in any way if we merely regard literacy as another 
mundane kind of social accomplishment, as NLS does. 
Does this conclusion not also merely consign Hendricks to perpetual illiteracy and recapitulate 
Latour's dereliction by another route? The neo-Durkheimian answer is no, since idealisation 
and vertical discourse are here distinguished from horizontal discourse, and valued as a distinct 
form of symbol system with a distinct social role: social differentiation depends upon 
knowledge differentiation for Durkheimians, and systematic idealisation is the only way to 
project benign possible futures. Without it, no concept of social change is possible, no 
revolution, (an idea borrowed by politics from science, after all, [Latour, 1993, p. 70 ft]). 
How will this conclusion help Hendricks? It probably won't, but then, for Durkheimians, the 
task is to understand the conditions for social development, not that of individuals, in the first 
instance. The really interesting question then is to understand the role of vertical discourse in 
social change and the ways in which access to it is or is not, can or cannot, be advanced by 
education. Hendricks' story is a pinprick of light in this dark firmament, but it bums brightly 
for all that. 
A case has been made here for the cardinal importance, for innovation, of a capacity for 
knowledge manipulation, an importance not fully appreciated by writers like Gibbons (1998) 
as we saw in Chapter 3, and an importance radical constructivists minimise with unfortunate 
consequences. In the following chapter, constructivist (or 'competence') pedagogies are 
explored. In particular, the question is asked: 'what kind of citizen do these pedagogies 
fashion?' As we shall see, it is not a foregone conclusion that these pedagogies are best 
served to produce the reflexive citizen of the new millennium. 
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Notes 
1 'Abandonment to the absence of boundaries' (Blanchot, 1988, p. 3). 
2 ... 'perhaps, to repeat a myth, Thales did singlehandedly open up the continent of 
mathematics. The typical case, however, is a large number of people approaching the 
same subject matter with related styles of argumentation. This must necessarily be the 
case. For a style of reason opens up a new field of discourse, with new positive 
propositions to assert or deny. Such a new field is a relatively large-scale social 
phenomenon. A body of discourse needs quite a lot of speakers' (Hacking, 1985, p. 
149). 
3 It is for this reason that Foucault's (1977, pp. XV-XX) laughter at Borges's Chinese 
encyclopaedia is so oddly misplaced. What Foucault takes to be an impossible or 
heterotopic order is merely a non-empirical invisible or arbitrary one - that is to say, a 
sacred one. It belongs to the common realm of the scientific rather than being opposed 
to it. Although Foucault's larger point is certainly profound, it is odd that he has to 
make the point in this way. 
4 'This culture generale, formerly lavishly praised, now appears to us a loose and flabby 
discipline ... We disapprove of those men whose unique care is to organise and develop 
all their faculties '" as if each man were sufficient unto himself, and constituted an 
independent world. It seems to us that this state of detachment and indeterminism has 
something anti-social about it. The praiseworthy man of former times is only a dilettante 
to us ... The categorical imperative of the moral conscience is assuming the following 
form: Make yourself usefully fulfil a determinate function' (Durkheim, 1964, pp. 42; 
43). 
5 'The examination is nothing but the ... official recognition of the transubstantiation of 
profane knowledge into sacred knowledge' (Marx, quoted in Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1990, p. 141). 
6 'If anything can mean anything ~:lse, as allegory tends to believe, then it is both enriched 
and impoverished' (Eagleton, 1998). 
7 Li Puma (1993) illuminatingly distinguishes between a formal and a substantive notion of 
arbitrariness. A formal notion, shared by most anthropologists, and by Durkheim, holds 
that social valuations of cultural forms are arbitrary; a substantive notion, held by 
Bourdieu, holds that cultural contents are historically arbitrary, and that any symbol 
could, in principle, have been replaced by any other. 
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8 It is possible to align this discussion with trends in contemporary psychology. Luria 
(1976) for example distinguishes between situational and abstract thinking, in ways that 
resonate with Bernstein's horizontal and vertical discourse. Luria also goes on to 
associate the capacity for abstract thinking with literacy and the higher capacities of 
language. I have avoided making this connection here. It tends to essentialise the 
subject (Larochelle, 1994) by suggesting that we can speak of situational or abstract 
thinkers. The position taken here is that these are discourses which subjects access or 
are positioned in some or part of the time. A psychological framework is also difficult 
to use to discuss conditions under which sacred tendencies interrupt profane contexts 
and vice versa (see also Dowling, 1994). 
9 The discussion draws on the helpful paper by Mignonne Breier (1995). 
10 This excerpt and all subsequent ones come from the excellent ethnography by Diana 
Gibson (1994), Farm Workers, Literacy and Literacy Practices in the Breerivier Valley. 
The Social Uses of Literacy Research Project, University of the Western Cape. Page 
numbering refers to the draft copy of the report. 
11 Diana Gibson (1994, p. 41) tentatively proposes this idea but does not elaborate the 
point. 
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Chapter 6 
THE WELL-TEMPERED LIGARNER: 
SELF-REGULATION, PEDAGOGICAL MODELS AND CURRICULUM 
POLICY 
Introduction: The Self-regulating Citizen and Curriculum Reform 
Democratisation and modernisation have always, albeit problematically, gone hand in hand, at 
least if we understand democratisation as the deepening of practices of autonomy and self-
control: 'the more societies are modernised, the more agents acquire the ability to reflect on 
the social conditions of their existence and to change them in that way' (Beck, 1994, p. 174). 
Indeed, one might take this as a hook on which to hang an analysis of policy the various 
ways in which modem states contrivle to rule by the creation of self-regulating subjects: 'In 
multiple social arenas, intervention strategies [were] constructed for individuals to think of 
themselves and personally to act as healthy, productive citizens and workers' (Popkewitz, 
1995, p. 56). This relation of s~~lf-regulation to governmental regulation through the 
construction of creative self-regulating citizens is the emblematic policy aim of 
governmentality, the form of state slteering most appropriate to late modem, or reflexively 
modem, society. This is the form of symbolic control pursued by the curriculum reforms and 
their social logic which I shall discuss below. To say this is not to make a critique of the 
reforms, nor to attach a label on them. Rather, it is to map out a path of enquiry, for the 
important thing is to analyse how the Hociallogic works and by what modalities it will produce 
subjects of a particular sort. 
The recently liberated reconstructive state in South Africa leads something of a charmed life in 
this regard. Pried loose from a universally hated polity and policy regime, and set on the road 
towards collective autonomy, South Africa's new rulers have, f~r a short time at least, a grace 
period in which to institute a new polity, policy and policing conjugation. And they have set 
themselves to the task with a will. South African curriculum planners have borrowed 
eclectically from the Scottish, US and New Zealand cases. In particular the latter case, where 
an outcomes-based approach is teamed up with a national qualifications framework, has been a 
conscious model for South African emulation. 
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The section that follows below will discuss in greater detail the way in which the South 
African curriculum planners hope to implement the outcomes and qualifications reforms. The 
next section is on pedagogic models which are the principle focus of the chapter, for although 
outcomes and qualifications taken together are a comprehensive reform initiative, it is in their 
implications for pedagogy, for what teachers and learners will be presumed to be able to do, 
that the combined effect of these reforms is most dramatic. 
The control of curriculum and curriculum policy has been a central means by which states have 
pursued the problematic couplet of self and governmental regulation. There are many 
recurring motifs in curriculum policy world-wide that seek to effect the precarious feat of 
governing through the tutelage of autonomy, a principal form of 'steering at a distance' (Ball, 
1994). 
Two central motifs of this form will be discussed in this chapter. The first is the 'child' or 
'learner-centred' curriculum. Naturally, the terms of the discourse will differ from context to 
context, from the US (Evans and King, 1994), New Zealand (New Zealand Qualifications 
Authority, 1996), England (Whitty and Willmot, 1991), Scotland (Scottish Vocational 
Educational Council, 1994) or Northern Ireland (McKernan, 1993) to mention only a few, but 
it is remarkable to what degree outcomes-based education rhetoric converges around the 
social aim of individual learner empowerment (see also Chapter 7). What is brought well to 
the fore in the outcomes-based approaches that the South African documents draw on is the 
social project of maximising the citizen/learner's flexibility, opportunities, mobility and access 
(see Department of Education, 1997a). Outcomes-based learning programmes are 'learner-
paced and learner-centred' (Human Sciences Research Council, 1995, p. 21): the learners 
determining their own educational pace, maximising their occupational opportunities and 
becoming fully participating citizens in all spheres of social, political and economic life is the 
guiding ideal. A binary distinction is drawn between traditional education which subordinates 
learners to elite, access-restrictive and ideologically discredited curricula, on the one hand, and 
outcomes-based education which empowers learners to take control of their learning as they 
take control of their destiny, on the other. Indeed, with the social project so well to the fore, 
getting to grips with the politics of outcomes-based pedagogy is often tricky, since to raise 
difficulties against it is all too often seen as raising objections to the social project driving it 
(see also Morrow, 2001). 
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In many of the South African documents, the social project of egalitarianism and 
empowerment is linked to the skill needs of the national economy, usually also seen in the light 
of the global economy and global competitiveness. Global competitiveness, it is often said, 
means that economies require a well-qualified population, and that they require workers with 
flexible, generic and constantly up-graded skills (see Chapter 2: Young, 1996, p. 1). National 
qualifications frameworks, the secondl related motif to be discussed here, is said to be a means 
to enhance flexibility and the educatllonal opportunities of learners across all sites of formal 
and non-formal learning. Such frameworks allow previously disadvantaged learners to redeem 
their unqualified competencies, (rec;ognition of prior learning) and permit recurrent and 
multiple re-entry for purposes of reskilling (lifelong learning). In fact, national qualifications 
frameworks are often put forward as the pedagogical reconciliation of personal, social and 
economic goals. 
What is clearly evident in such frameworks is the attempt to marry the flexible, active and 
autonomous modal individual of reflexive modernisationl to an educational framework that 
will not only promote flexibility, autonomy and choice, but presuppose it and, in a certain way, 
produce it. 
Outcomes and Qualifications: The South African Case 
Outcomes-based education in South Africa is part of an ambitious reform plan to project all 
certified and certifiable learning activities onto a single national qualifications grid, the 
National Qualifications Framework (NQF). The NQF and its parent body the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA, as established by the South African Qualifications Authority, 
Act of 1995), are set to generalise the outcomes approach through all tiers of the education 
system, from general education, through further education, to higher education. 
The purpose of a National Qualifications Framework is to make it possible for 
all candidates to achieve national qualifications through a wide variety of 
mechanisms and a multiple delivery system. The Framework will generate 
coherence across the traditional divides of education and training, and allow 
articulation between currently fragmented and divided sectors and institutions. 
It will also provide access to, and progression through, recognised 
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qualifications for all learners, whatever their level, and allow learners to transfer 
credit across different modes of study and qualifications within the national 
framework. 
Human Sciences Research Council, 1995, pp. 7-8. 
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It is evident that the NQF vision is propelled by a strong version of the social project discussed 
above, driven as it is by the major Afiican National Congress-aligned trades union federation 
through the medium of the National Training Board (NTB), from whence came the idea of a 
qualifications framework. 
The qualifications framework idea rests upon a two-pronged argument, with an egalitarian 
strand and an epistemological strand. The egalitarian argument takes issue with the exclusivity 
and selectivity of the present qualification system which restricts both access and progress. 
The assumption is that the NQF, in contrast, should promote access and maximise progress. It 
should foster the former by accrediting prior learning by permitting multiple re-entry and 
multiple sites of delivery. It should foster the latter by permitting mUltiple re-assessment on a 
pass-fail basis. This means, as Young (1996) noted, that ' ... in theory, therefore, all students 
can pass' (p. 5). This will mean a move away from content-defined curricula and norm-
referenced assessment to competency-defined curricula and criterion-referencing, ... ' from 
information (content) to a focus on skills and competences' (Department of Education, 1996, 
p. 41). Furthermore, in theory, anyone can start anywhere in the NQF and proceed to any 
other level, since the levels are all interconnected: 'from sweeper to engineer', or 'porter to 
doctor', as the union slogans have it. A popularising pamphlet (Education Information 
Centre, 1996) depicts the NQF as a building site scaffolding, a kind of cognitive jungle gym, a 
universe of all transmittable knowledge and skills infinitely interconnected, a vista of 'seamless 
progression' (Human Sciences Research Council, 1995, p. 67). 
The epistemological argument takes issue with the academic/vocational tracks of traditional 
education which are premised on a strong divide between mental and manual labour. The 
qualifications framework, by contrast, views all knowledge and skills as interleaved. 
Consequently, in place oflearning tracks, the NQF and the outcomes approach offer 'learning 
pathways' which are learner selected and learner driven. Learner-driven means that learners 
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proceed at their own time and pac1e through the learning pathway which is facilitated by 
arrangements of re-entry, re-assessm(mt, and credit transfer and accumulation. 
A social vision of integration and of social justice propels this epistemological elision. If it is a 
faulty epistemology that underpins the hierarchical division of skills and qualifications into 
mental and manual, academic and vocational and white collar and blue collar, then, the 
argument runs, the epistemology must change. The NQF thus assumes that all skills and 
competencies are essentially and in plrinciple on the same epistemological footing. This must 
be the case if they are to be exchangeable in terms of a transferable credit value. 
This in-principle equation of the status of all learnings has at least three direct implications for 
formal education as it is traditionally known. First, if all learnings are generally of a kind, then 
at some level they must all be tapping the same mother lode of competence. Consequently, 
the approach divides the basic unit of competence, the outcome, into 'critical' and 'specific' 
outcomes. Specific outcomes are specifiable skills, particular things a learner must be able to 
'do' and these pertain to specific levels (unit standards), specific learning areas, and specific 
learning programmes. This form of stipulation is familiar from vocationally based qualification 
schemes such as that of the Scottish Vocational Education Council (SCOTVEC). Critical 
outcomes, on the other hand, are gt;:neric transdisciplinary competencies which are said to 
underlie all integrative skills. These alre extremely broadly framed, for example, 'the ability to 
make wise and safe choices for healthy living' is one critical outcome. It is hard to see how 
they will be assessed. Indeed, it looks likely that the real assessment will be of the specific 
outcomes only. 
A second implication is that the spedalised status of schools, colleges and universities as 
'specialised learning organisations' {Young and Guile, 1996) will be dissolved. The 
accreditation of prior learning depends upon a break between the site of learning and the site 
of assessment and accreditation. Learning sites and settings are thus despecialised and 
decentralised, while standard-setting, monitoring and accreditation are recentralised into a new 
national beauracracy as we shall see in a moment. Henceforth, as Young and Guile (1996) 
noted, we will have to deal with a host of 'non-specialised learning organisations' where the 
distinction between the context of acquisition and the context of application is increasingly 
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blurred, where the social difference between learning a skill and displaying it at the workplace 
disappears. The affinity with the Mode 2 argument discussed in Chapter 3 should be apparent. 
A third implication is, consequently, a change in the specialised social definition of the 
pedagogue, the teacher. If 'there are certain generic qualities evinced by all teachers and 
trainers, whether they be in the formal classroom or on the factory floor or in the development 
context such as health education' (Department of Education, 1996, p. 44), then the traditional 
notion of a teacher disappears2. And indeed, the NQF constructs a new pedagogical persona, 
the 'education and training development practitioner' (ETDP). The ETDP is the person who 
is engaged in 'the practice of organising systematic learning' (Department of Education, 1996, 
p. 16) wherever that might take place. This holds too for teacher education: 'Teacher 
education should be understood as including the education of teachers in a wide variety of 
settings' (Department of Education, 1996, p. 16). This shift is one that has long been 
promoted by non-formal educational practitioners of all kinds - the distance educators, the 
educational projects in the field of literacy, early childhood education, adult basic education, 
and many others in the training field. It is a shift from a visible to an invisible pedagogy and 
entails a new although problematic invisibility of the pedagogue too, as we shall see below. 
The NQF thus presages a shift from a transmission-content pedagogic model to an acquisition-
competence model. It moves the emphasis and the focus from provision (the teacher, the 
textbook, and the curriculum) to learning (the leamer, the employer, learning outcomes and 
assessment). It is indeed, as the name NQF plainly says, an assessment or qualifications 
framework. 
All qualifications frameworks, as noted by Young (1996), fulfil three functions: a selection 
function, a standard-setting function, and an incentive-providing function. Frameworks differ 
as to how they fulfil these. Selectivity is either high or low. As Young (1996) noted, the 
rigidities of high selectivity make that form more appropriate to the stable hierarchical 
occupational structure of mature modernity rather than to the flat occupational networks said 
to be in flux in late modernity. Standard setting is either norm or criterion referenced and 
incentivisation is either through competitive incentives or through feedback incentives. The 
NQF is, in these terms, a low-selectivity, criterion-referenced, feedback-incentive framework 
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At the heart of this curricular approach lies the 'learning outcome', a notion which refers 
simultaneously to two things: it n£ers to what the learner has displayed, their level of 
competence evinced at the end of a course, on the one hand; and it refers to the stipulation or 
description of the expected standard of performance. This latter, called a unit standard, is a 
systematic description of 'capabilities' (skill descriptors), 'entry assumptions', 'performance 
outcomes', 'assessment criteria', 'underpinning or embedded knowledge', 'range statements' 
(difficulty descriptors) and 'moderation' stipulations (procedures for standards monitoring). 
Unit standards thus recognise 'capabilities'; a prescribable set of unit standards make up a 
qualification which recognises 'compE:tence'. 
This is a formidable architecture of educational delivery and learning facilitation. The devil, as 
always, will be in the detail, and the trick will be to write unit standards and qualifications 
standards that are broadly acceptable and user-friendly. Who should do the writing is not 
altogether clear. A variety of indus,try initiatives have been in progress (in electrification, 
hospitality, engineering, transport, plastics industries and the adult literacy field, to mention a 
few), but the formal education sector has made only modest headway. The new formal 
curriculum based on outcomes, called Curriculum 2005 (see Department of Education, 
1997b), was introduced into Grade 1 in 1998. The other grades are to follow in the years to 
come. There are a number of popular discussion documents about the NQF prepared for 
different audiences in circulation. "Most of them encourage or exhort participation with a 
greater or lesser degree of fervour. A newsletter from the Western Cape curriculum service 
proclaims 'To all our educators, trainers, learners, parents and everyone else concerned. An 
urgent invitation. YOU are urgently invited to take part in the design of a new approach to 
lifelong learning and development in South Africa' (Western Cape Education Department, 
1996). This dream of direct participation is to be found in serious documents as well: ' ... all 
relevant stakeholders should participate in curriculum development for teacher education. 
Such participation should occur at all levels of curriculum development' (Department of 
Education, 1996, p. 46). 
This stress on participation IS entirely understandable gIven the social project of 
democratisation and egalitarianism that drives the NQF, but it is difficult to imagine in 
practice. In the meanwhile, the NQF also proposes to establish an imposing new 
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administrative infrastructure to oversee the new system, one which is over and above the 
existing rather cumbersome national bureaucracy. It will have five levels: 
• The SAQA parent body overseeing the entire operation. 
• A series of sectoral authorities (SET As) acting as intermediaries in the employment field. 
• A series of national standards bodies (NSBs), which are to establish competency 
standards. 
• A series of standards generating bodies (SGBs) for each domain, like teacher education for 
example. 
• A series of quality assurance councils (ETQAs) to monitor and audit the standards. 
For the cash-strapped South African national system of education, struggling to achieve racial 
parity, this is more than a little ambitious, especially given the time frame, even if it is quite 
understandable given the virulent form of administered inequality that was apartheid 
education. Nevertheless, as may already be clear, the rationale for the NQF and the outcomes 
approach is not disputed: its pedagogic form and logic may well be. Commentators such as 
Young (1996) have made some interesting and useful comments about the area most likely to 
be contentious, that of standards and standard setting. Young (1996) cautioned not to try to 
overspecify the standards and to leave a certain leeway for professional judgement. He was 
also wary of the rigidities of unit standards and advised the curriculum planners to leave a 
certain space for originality and creativity. As Mulcahy (1998) shows, in Australia 
considerable differences emerge between central and local standards and competencies. 
How do we know when or whether noble social goals are met by pedagogical arrangements? 
Or, put another way, how does one get to grips with a proposal of this nature that is so self-
evidently righteous? I intend to approach the question by distinguishing between two different 
kinds of pedagogical modeL 
Competence and Performance Models of Pedagogy 
Technology is society made durable3. 
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The 'critical history of rationality' is a recent and increasingly influential approach in the field 
of the history of ideas and the sociology of knowledge (see Dean, 1996). Tracing a lineage 
back to Kuhn and Canguilhem, the main text of the approach is undoubtedly Foucault (1979) 
on 'governmentality'. Governmentality refers to a form of state craft forged in the eighteenth 
century which refers in tum to a fonn of governing, or rather techniques, apparatuses - in a 
word, technologies - of governing whose principal distinctiveness lies in the yoking together 
of a body of formal knowledge (sUtch as the human sciences) to a particular 'regime of 
practices' (say, schooling or punishing or curing). Thus, critical histories of rationality study 
the relation between disciplinary knowledge and practical knowledge embedded in a regime of 
practices, between theoretical discourses, particularly of the human sciences and practical 
discourses of regulation, between epis:teme and techne, through the conjoining lens of a device 
called here a 'technology of government'. In what sense is the regulation to be regarded as 
technological? A technology may be thought of as an assemblage, a set of arrangements, or 
better still, a network which constructs programmes of action which co-ordinate a network of 
roles. A particular pedagogic practice, for example, distributes particular roles to agents that 
are both human (teachers, learners, employers, development agents, etc.) and non-human 
(delivery regimes, textbooks, assessment protocols, etc.) in order to structure the field of 
possible action in one way rather than another (see Mulcahy, 1998, for a related approach to 
'curriculum technology'). If we consider the case at hand, outcomes-based education and the 
NQF, it will be seen that we have so far looked at disputes in the terrain of the discourse of 
practical regulation itself, but have not so far begun to characterise or analyse the knowledge 
base nor the particular pedagogic model that informs it. 
Popkewitz (1994, 1995) and others (such as Ball, 1990, 1994) have extended the critical 
history of rationality approach to the field of education. Popkewitz (1995) argued that, 
inscribed in the discourse of systemic school reform is a research tradition of 'constructivist 
psychology' which forms a 'cognitivist template' for the allocation, or projection, of learners 
and teachers of a particular kind. Learners are projected as active, creative individuals, which 
Popkewitz (1995) regarded as an appropriate nod to the democratic emancipatory spirit of the 
times. For them there are multiple paLths to achieving the same end, and much of the choice 
there is theirs. The end or outcome: is, however, not open to negotiation. Teachers are 
projected as 'self-governing' professionals, whose professional competence is judged not by 
mastery of an explicit set of rules or the achieving of particular results but rather by an 
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internalisation of goals, a fusing of social professional goals with personal goals. The 
constructivist projection thus blurs the boundary between the inside and the outside, the 
teacher's thoughts and feelings and their professional practices in the classroom. Popkewitz 
(1995) remarked that this is potentially a far more pervasive form of regulation than that of 
merely regulating the professional actions of teachers. 'Good' teachers are now 'required' to 
feel personally involved and fulfilled as part of professional competence. 
Besides regarding this as unnecessarily intrusive, Popkewitz (1995) also took psychological 
constructivism to task for being insufficiently socially constructivist. Psychological 
constructivism, despite a certain rhetoric of liberation and autonomisation, in the end acts to 
naturalise and depoliticise the selectivity of curricular knowledge4. Despite its democratic 
lineaments, Popkewitz (1995) complained, constructivism acts as a mystifier rather than a 
constructor of social relations and divisions. This critique recollects an earlier critical theoretic 
approach to technologies and forms of knowledge, one which saw these as impositions on 
already-formed subjects. This is to regard technology and its forms of knowledge as working 
an objectification on already-subjects, a form of symbolic domination. A progressive politics 
against technology-as-objectification is consequently a politics of liberation from 
objectification and towards a world of unobjectified subjects. Foucault (1979) famously, but 
most of post-structuralist thinking as well, regarded and regards liberation as an essentially 
theological or metaphysical concept. In contrast, he wished to understand technologies of 
government as modes of subjectification, as modalities that construct subjects with 
dispositions, acting within a determinate field. 'Emancipation' as a concept does not function 
in this view. It is rather by exploiting the free play of the system that respite occurs, through 
the daily practice of liberty, not through the endlessly deferred utopia of liberation, that is for 
Foucault the progressive politics worth pursuing. 
The questions to be asked now are the following, 'What is the nature of the pedagogy 
inscribed in outcomes-based education and the NQF?, 'What is the technology at work here?' 
'How does it construct teachers and learners?' The aim in what follows is to show the link 
between models of pedagogy and forms of social regulation. The aim is also to go beyond just 
showing the link and towards demonstrating its social logic, showing the imbrications between 
forms of pedagogic and social relations. Popkewitz (1995), much in common with the spirit 
of the present chapter, began to delineate the human science basis of many of the educational 
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reforms which are now circulating globally. The identification of the epistemology as 
'constructivist' is accurate and useful and I have adopted that rubric on other occasions (see 
Chapters 4 and 10). It strikes me here, though, that constructivist epistemology is but one 
part of a broader disciplinary constellation that looks not only at the formative dimensions of 
the form of knowledge, but looks principally at the form of acquisition or pedagogy that 
embraces it. This distinction is important to the argument here, since I want to suggest that 
there are at least two distinct pedagogical forms being proposed in the documents of the new 
curriculum and that, in their pure fonn, these are in fact incompatible. 
The discussion that follows draws on two different treatments of the problem given by 
Bernstein: Bernstein (1996) discussc::s models of pedagogic acquisition, with a principal focus 
on transmission and acquisition, in terms of models of competence and performance, he casts a 
broader net in Bernstein (1990) and includes under his distinction between visible and invisible 
pedagogies a discussion of the class agents or sponsors of these pedagogies and a discussion 
of the related division oflabour. I shall risk running these together for present purposes. 
Bernstein (1996) begins by suggesting that in the 1960s a 'remarkable convergence' in all the 
major social and human sciences o;ccurred around the concept of competence, embracing 
linguistic competence (Chomsky), cognitive competence (piaget), cultural competence (Levi-
Strauss), member competence (Garfinkle) and communicative competence (Dell Hymes). 
Where some writers may have stnessed its biological provenance, some its acquisitional 
provenance and some an interaction between the two, all agree that competence refers to a 
capacity tacitly possessed by all members, capable of generating creative variety. 
A number of features follow: compc~ence announces 'a universal democracy of acquisition'; 
the presumed subject of competence is 'active and creative' and self-regulating; pedagogues 
are consequently suspect as meddlers in a natural process; this naturalness of learning as 
unfolding has an 'emancipatory flavour', whether of a liberal-individual, radical or populist 
sort (all distinct pedagogic submodc~s); and learning happens 'now' in whatever activity is 
being engaged in. 
Although competence theorists referred to above have not written directly about education, 
their ideas have had a constitutive impact on pedagogies of cognitive empowerment such as 
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the child~centred movement of the 1970s, but also on cultural empowerment and radical 
empowerment movements. They were dominant in the Plowden Report of 1967 (Central 
Advisory Council for Education [England], 1967) and became orthodoxy in primary education 
in Europe and the UK and in literacy and adult education movements in various parts of the 
developing world during that period. 
This all occurred against a broader backdrop of socio-cultural movement in Europe and the 
USA, earlier referred to as reflexive modernisation, which has seen an inexorable drift away 
from competence modes of schooling and towards a particular type of model, one which is far 
more dependent upon external economic 'market-oriented' determinants of desired 
educational outcomes. Since the two models distribute roles and specialise discourses 
differently, they will be briefly discussed in ideal~typical terms (see Table 1). 
The different models have, in other words, different specifications for acquisition, transmission 
and evaluation, and they specialise the roles of acquirers and transmitters in different ways. 
The discussion that follows will pick out some of the implications, necessarily selectively. 
TABLE 1. Pedagogic models 
Learner 
Teacher 
Pedagogic text 
Assessment 
Learning sites 
Class sponsors 
Costs 
Competence 
(acquisition competence) 
Control over selection, sequence and pace of 
learning 
Personal control 
Transmission not pedagogically regulated 
Rules implicit 
Ungraded and unstratified perfonnance 
Competence read through the perfonnance 
General competence criteria 
'Presences' in tenns of difference 
Anywhere 
Professional and educational middle class 
Higher teacher training costs 
Hidden time-based costs 
Less efficient with large classes 
Perfonnance 
(transmission perfonnance) 
Little control over selection, sequence 
and pace of learning 
Positional control 
Pedagogically regulated 
Rules explicit 
Graded and stratified perfonnance 
The perfonnance itself 
Specific perfonnance criteria 
'Absences' in terms of deficit 
Clearly marked learning sites 
Economic sector and entrepreneurial 
middle class 
Lower teacher training costs 
Economies of external control 
Can deal with large numbers 
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The first thing to note is that compet1ence models stress regulative discourse. This means that 
the authority relations of transmissio n and acquisition are their particular concern. This puts 
the spotlight on 'process', virtually a code word for competence models. In all cases, a 
democracl of relations is favoured. This entails that the transmitter or pedagogue must be 
seen to direct the pedagogic proces8 as undirectively as possible. There are no rules to be 
followed. Classroom relations are p(~rsonalised, not position dependent. The ideal, personal, 
individual communication between the learner and the pedagogue is complex and multilayered, 
so that the learners are able to extemalise their feelings, fantasies, fears and aspirations the 
better to actualise their competence. As Popkewitz (1995) remarked above, the net effect of 
this is to put far more of the learner's private world on display, which intensifies pedagogical 
surveillance. Mostly, this is firmly out of view behind the rhetoric of emancipation, 
actualisation and learning freedom: it is freedom not privacy that is valued here. 
The competence pedagogue deals with learner performances as variants or differences, not as 
deficits. They are not judged as indicative of the learner's potential, since, in competence 
thinking, if everyone is in principle able to fulfil their competence, then inadequate 
performance is the fault of extraneous (personal, cultural or political) circumstances6. 
Achieving competent display is just a matter of time. Competence pedagogies are, thus, 
generally speaking, seriously opposed to graded assessment, on two counts. First, low grades 
may give an unfair picture of a persDn's competence (the fairness argument), and, second, 
grades do not predict future perf om lance and are, hence, potentially misleading indicators 
particularly in crafts and professions (the predictive inference argument; see Eraut, 1994, p. 
216). In short, what is assessed in the competence model is the competence itself read 
through the performance. The potential of the learner rather than their accomplishment is the 
primary object of the competence pedagogue's gaze. 
The teacher training costs will be high, comparatively speaking. First, to get teachers to 
internalise the implicit rules of this person-oriented, highly particularistic, 'invisible pedagogy' 
will entail in-depth craft training not easily conveyed by short-courses or by non-
apprenticeship modes like distance education. Secondly, there will necessarily have to be 
selectivity, since not all aspirant teachers will absorb the moral universe of hyperpersonalised 
pastoralism, or rather, they may absorb the rhetoric but not the practice (Ensor, 1999). There 
will also have to be greater numbers of teachers here, since large class numbers make 
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personalistic pedagogy difficult if not impossible. In addition, the hidden time costs of 
competence assessment portfolios, continuous assessment and so on - will emburden the 
teacher corps. The discussion above should begin to show that the pedagogue, although 
'invisible' or 'vanishing' (see Davis, 1996) is, if anything, more critical under a competence 
regime than under a performance one. 
Competence pedagogies, especially of the radical or populist variety, are driven by an 
egalitarian project, and are not geared to specialised futures. Performance pedagogies, on the 
other hand, are. These latter models move the focus from the learner to the learning course 
and to the learning outcome. The learner here may still be active, but their activity is more 
goal directed rather than driven from within. The emphasis, in other words, is here more upon 
the instructional than upon the moral order; more upon the order of objects in the discourse 
acquired than upon the authority and autonomy relations of the process of transmission and 
acquisition. Performance models consequently offer learners well-stipulated curricula with 
explicit rules of acquisition, little control over the learning course and definite criteria for the 
judgement of right and wrong and adequate or inadequate. Pedagogues in this pedagogy 
exercise a good deal of control over the process in a visible way and evaluate performances on 
graded scales. 
Performance models are geared to be accountable to something outside of the learner. We 
must distinguish between two rather different forms of performance model: the autonomous 
and the market oriented. The former is the traditional ( elite) secondary and tertiary model, 
Young's (1999) 'curriculum of the past', where learners are subjected to the regime of 
disciplinary subjects; the latter is skilling tailored to specific needs, tasks and slots in the 
increasingly labile occupational hierarchy. We are witnessing two kinds of shift as we enter 
reflexive modernity, then. The first is the tendential shift in tertiary education from the 
curriculum of disciplinary singulars to market-responsive curricula, which are 'targeted' and 
'niched' to capture some or other 'market segment' and to respond to some real or perceived 
market need (see Chapter 3). This will always be a partial shift and will always be contested. 
Nevertheless, higher education is also feeling the effect of a second tendential shift, towards 
greater stakeholder accountability (see Chapters 9 and 10). Higher education therefore faces 
the twin imperatives of accountability and market relevance, and is responding, enthusiastically 
or reluctantly, as the case may be. 
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Unlike the rest of higher education, which is moving between an autonomous performance 
model and a market-oriented one, school curriculum reform in South Africa, via agencies like 
the NQF, at least in terms of stipulated outcomes, is being asked to move towards a model 
where both competence and perfomlance assumptions are jostling for dominance in the same 
reform. This entails a conflict not only between pedagogical ideologies and practices, between 
two different technologies of govemance but between two different fractions of the middle 
class. At stake is the form of symbolic control appropriate to education. The class sponsors 
of competence are the professional agents and agencies of symbolic control the educational 
professionals whose struggle is over the conditions of their own reproduction and expansion. 
The class sponsors of market-based pedagogies are, by and large, the economic and new 
information middle class. The educational professionals want an extended co-ordinative role 
for the state and an increased growth of public expenditure; the new information class wants a 
reduced role for the state, greater decentralisation and greater local institution or sector-
specific autonomy. 
The position of this chapter is now coming into view: the sponsors of the NQF are an 
uncomfortable alliance of fractions (If the economic and professional middle classes and the 
resultant model beginning to emerge is a mixed or hybrid one. The degree to which the 
competence sponsors prevail, therefore, is the degree to which the role of the pedagogue will 
be 'deregulated' and assessment ungraded. The degree to which the performance sponsors 
prevail will reflect the degree to which unit standards, at least in the form successful in 
vocational systems, prevails. The question that now arises is: can such a hybrid model exist 
or work, and what kind of learners will it produce? 
On Mode-Mixing 
It would seem that the NQF is trying, as so many technologies in reflexive modernity are, to 
respond to conflicting tendencies, requirements and imperatives. The first is the project of 
social justice, egalitarianism, redre:;s and empowerment. Scrupulous attention to this 
imperative prescribes the 'similar to' relations of the radical or populist submodes of the 
competence model with its attendant techniques of ungraded assessment. The second is the 
instrumental discourse of flexibility, mobility and retrainability that comes from the employer 
sector as well as from some post-Fordist and post-modern theorists. In the South African 
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case, the sponsors of the latter discourse declared common cause in the NTB. The new 
government officials have been systematically lobbied by the sponsors of the former discourse, 
the educational professionals particularly in the educational projects, from whose ranks many 
of the new government officials have come. The conjoint social agenda was carried forward 
into national education policy discourse and into policy. The semantics of the case have 
helped to obscure the differences: 'lifelong learning' is, after all, loose enough a concept to 
inhabit comfortably enough both discursive realms. It is only in the nitty gritty of writing the 
unit standards that the scales will tip and in the debate around gradable assessment, which has 
so far not occurred. It is certain that some of the industry board projects are writing their 
outcomes in performance terms, while others, in the adult literacy field for example, will be 
trying to write them in competence terms. The stage of development of the policy is such that 
the difference has not so far come to the fore, but surely must in time. Meanwhile, in the 
grades where Curriculum 2005 has been introduced, the confusion is taking its toll on the 
quality oflearning (see Chapter 7). 
If we take seriously Bernstein's (1996) speculation at the end of the previous section, that 
competence motifs may be running into a performance wave on the rebound, then we have to 
take seriously the possibility of competence practices in a performance regime. Bernstein 
(1996) was here referring to what are sometimes called 'generic competences', which he 
discerned as a modular subtype of the performance mode. They belong to this mode 
principally because they are regulated from without, via an analysis of the skills necessary for a 
particular task, practice or job. This is education deduced from supposed functional or 
instrumental requirements, not from personal, cultural or political ends. Confusion occurs 
because the term' competence' is regularly used in connection with this performance submode, 
thereby 'appropriat[ing] resonances of an opposing model' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 67). Jones 
and Moore (1993), for example, mount a critjque of competency assumptions embedded in the 
'new vocationalism' in the UK in just these terms. It is clear that they were concerned about 
the instrumental dimensions of competency which this analysis has located with performance 
pedagogy, following Bernstein (1996)7, Boldly stated, competence and competency are quite 
different objects of pedagogic discourse. There is little doubt that this confusion is an integral 
part of the confusion of the policy field in South Africa. 
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It is worth exploring further the extent to which there is or has to be modular incompatibility 
between the competence assumption of 'competence realisation' (where the competence is 
already possessed and the latent capacity must simply be made manifest) and the 'trainability' 
assumption of the 'generic competency' performance submode. In the case of the former, 
acquirers are already competent, merely unactualised, while in the latter they are endlessly 
trainable depending on opportunity. In the former case, the spotlight falls on maximising 
opportunities for access to assessment and continuous assessment; while in the latter it falls on 
maximising opportunities for access to new skill training. If the former dominates, state 
spending goes toward complex and expensive assessment technologies, support and repair 
services and standards-monitoring ag1encies as well as on prohibitively expensive teacher (or 
ETDP) pre- and in-service education. If the latter dominates, state and private spending goes 
on educational provision, curriculum and materials development, and technologies of delivery. 
Market-based (for profit) provision will also proliferate. 
The common auspices of equality, olr 'similar to' relations (Bernstein, 1996, p. 69) makes 
them compatible in social aim and purpose, but what is 'similar' will differ: similarity of 
citizenly qualities, broadly speaking, for the former and similarity of general shared skills 
underlying a range of specific performances for the latter. As we saw in Chapter 3, it is by no 
means obvious which would best serve, the millennial citizen. However, as I suggested above, 
the organisation of symbolic control will also differ and here lies the rub. It is certainly the 
case that 'mixed modes' are conceivable: 'The models and modes may give rise to what could 
be called a pedagogic pallet where mines can take place' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 70). However, 
the fundamental mode is the one which will foreground the importance of either instructional 
(performance) or regulative ( competence) discourse. 
In response to weakened institutional boundaries, to increased calls for public accountability in 
the new reflexiveness of risk society (Beck, 1992), and in response especially to market calls 
for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, the pendulum in all national systems conscious of 
their competitive position in the global economy swings towards performance models, towards 
a concern with the universal entrepreneurial seller of infinitely modifiable labour power and 
away from the pastorally individuali~led citizenry of the competence utopia. It may be 
surmised that in such a global climate, competence proper, as distinct from generic 
competences, has a long-term future only in early (primary) education, in adult literacy and 
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repair agencies of academic support and development. It is only in unusual cases where the 
sponsors of this latter mode have disproportionate influence on government policy, as they do 
in South Africa, that serious confusion and conflict must arise. 
It is not so much that the social goals of equality and empowerment are in tension with those 
of efficiency, accountability and competitiveness, although that too is partly the case. The 
point being made here is rather that the different pedagogic regimes are arranged to produce 
different pedagogic subjects. Competence regimes need highly trained individualising teacher-
facilitators whose pedagogic success depends on their invisibility or, more accurately, whose 
success depends upon maintaining a fiction of invisibility (Davis, 1996). They accordingly 
produce learners who actively proceed up a learning pathway, at an individualised self-
determined pace, actively integrating insights as they develop their expertise by realising their 
potential. When this mode malfunctions, through inefficiency or teacher incapacity, then 
conceptual learning of any kind is the first victim (Taylor and Vinjevold, 1999). 
The instrumental skill shoppers, the modal learners of 'universalised reflexivity' (Zizek, 1999) 
on the other hand, are externally not internally oriented. They monitor the skill requirements 
of changing skill niches and 'skill up' accordingly. This is self-regulation of an altogether 
different order. There can be no general sense of integrative progression here, since there is 
and must be in principle infinite variability of skill bundles that can and even may be acquired. 
The apocryphal story of the average Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development worker who is completely retrained six times during their working career is 
illustrative here. The entrepreneurial skill shopper is not maximising their potential, as is the 
empowered realiser of the competence regime; they are maximising their skill value, their skill 
capital, in a competitive and ever-changing labour market. The ambiguity at the root of the 
union slogan 'from sweeper to engineer' is here made plain. The intent behind the slogan is 
without any doubt one of equality and egalitarianism. However, it is more likely to happen, if 
at all, in a performance regime where the sweeper grimly acquires bundle after bundle of 
instrumental skills until they reach the engineer's plateau. This pedagogical optimism has an 
unintended ironic resonance with other currents of the marketplace, ~s in the story of the 
worker sweepstake winner related under the heading 'From Factory Worker to Millionaire' 
(The Saturday Argus, 28 September 1996). Neither have very much to do with actual ising an 
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intrinsic capacity, with a realistic 'crossing of borders' (see Chapters 1 and 4), or with social 
justice either for that matter. 
The difference between the pedagogic models can easily be overstated. Both models aim for 
generic skills: both models mean thereby transferability of competent performance across 
performance settings. However, where that ability is an integrative skill in the former model, it 
is an adaptable purely instrumental skill in the latter. Skills are synoptic in the former, flexible 
in the latter. And, in the end, which obtains will depend directly upon where the state decides 
to place its investment - with the pastoral professionals, or with materials and delivery. 
arrangements. 
Conclusion: Beyond Pan or Sisypbus 
It is tempting but misleading to 4~onc1ude that advanced industrial societies are on a 
preordained track that takes' them from an autonomous, introverted, elite performance 
pedagogic submode (curriculum of the past), via a brief detour through a leamer-centred 
competence regime, to a market-regulated, extroverted performance submode (curriculum of 
the future?). The analysis above suggests that South Africa, for one, has not followed this 
course at all. The moral of the story is, rather, that recontextualising fields, both official and 
pedagogic, are fields of contest with various social fractions with different degrees of social 
power sponsoring pedagogic regime:; which, despite some similarities of rhetoric, will have 
quite different policy implications and, more to the point here, will construct quite different 
teachers and learners. 
Analyses of the 'risk society' oflate modernity, together with the struggles for recognition and 
autonomy of groups and movements to be found in such societies, all point inevitably to the 
autonomous self-regulated leamer-citizen as a presumptive civic ideal. Self-regulation has 
become a widely prescribed pedagogi,c, civic and social goal. 
However, this is by no means the whole of the story. Struggles in the recontextualising fields 
will lead to different self-regulative modes. Strong or pure competence modes will erect as 
the overarching ideal an emancipated" pastorally individuated citizenry, and as the emblematic 
successful learner, a New Age Pan or nature's child, who has succeeded in throwing off the 
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shackles inhibiting an authentic interiority, who has realised their full untrammelled capacities 
and competence. 'Transdisciplinary competencies' will be the pedagogic watchword and 
preferred outcome of this 'green' or panic pedagogy. 
A market-based performance pedagogy will, on the other hand, work to construct a recurrent, 
self-directed learner, or skill-shopper, whose principal virtue is patience, strategy and 
persistence, not the quest for an integrative, untrammelled subjectivity. Where the realisation 
of potential is the end of panic pedagogy, for this Sisyphean learner, a potentially endless vista 
of learning modules to be mastered stretches out to the horizon. Whether we should regard 
this as the pedagogic equivalent of social justice and infinite opportunity or, on the other hand, 
as a life sentence, death by learning, is an open question. 
The possibility of a generic mode might offer some relief from the harsh extremes, but it might 
also produce confusion and sub-optimal learning (see the next chapter). This chapter has 
shown how the technology of a pedagogy has wide-ranging effects not only on learners and 
their learning, but also on the shape of the citizens they are being educated to be. 
In the next chapter I return to the theme of the relationship between everyday and disciplinary 
knowledge introduced in Chapter 4. Progressivism, especially radical progressivism, has long 
advocated a more 'relevant', more everyday life-friendly curriculum. I examine this curricular 
form in general, and also in relation to South Africa's progressive Curriculum 2005, and show 
that what is lost in the integrated curriculum of radical progressivism is precisely any sense of 
conceptual progression. 
Notes 
1 'Individualisation means, first, the disembedding and, second, the re-embedding of 
industrial society ways of life by new ones, in which the individuals must produce, stage 
and cobble together their biographies themselves' (Beck, 1994, p. 13). 
2 In more didactic vein: 'The perception of teachers as dispensers of knowledge will also 
have to change to one where learners are valued as equal and active participants in 
learning and development processes' (National Curriculum Development Committee, 
1996, p. 14). Critics may well leap to the conclusion that the NQF is a scheme to 
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empower learners by deskilling teachers. The enquiry here is rather into whether 
learners are indeed to be empowered. 
3 This is the title of Latour's (1991) paper in 1. Law (Ed.) A Sociology of Monsters, 
London, Routledge & Kegan PauL 
4 'The psychological constructivism, in its irony, obscures the social constructions and 
power relations embedded in knowledge' (Popkewitz, 1995, p. 65). 
5 ' ... the apparent democracy of the pedagogic regime' (Bernstein, 1990, p. 82). 
6 This is the standard alibi in competence writing: 'Thus, a student's competence might 
not be validly revealed in either classroom performance or test performance because of 
personal or circumstantial factors that affect behaviour' (Messick, quoted in Eraut, 
1994,p.178). 
7 It must be pointed out that Jone:s and Moore do acknowledge the difference: 'Indeed, it 
can be argued, using the alternative, Chomskian view of' competence' as an underlying, 
generative capacity, that it is really focussing upon performance and not competence at 
all' (Jones and Moore, op. cit., p. 390). 
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Chapter 7 
PROGRESSIVISM REDUX: ETHOS, POLICY, PATHOS 
Introduction 
Any dispassionate review of schooling policy reform across the globe cannot but fail to notice 
the surprisingly uniform direction it is taking. I do not claim comprehensiveness, but have in 
mind the USA, the UK, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the African countries 
represented by the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). The 
educational hold-all name against which all this reform (or reaction, as some would have it) is 
happening is increasingly given as progressivism, the first and only comprehensive ideology of 
schooling of what Ulrich Beck (2000) calls the first age of modernity. There is something 
richly ironic about this. As David Tyack (1974) has made clear, 'traditional' pedagogy had 
never bothered to name itself, because it never considered that there was any alternative - it 
was 'the one best system', an essentially unreformed model in a world where the model and 
the world were reassuringly linked. When the reformers did arrive, first in central Europe in 
the late nineteenth century and then with rather more furore in the early twentieth century in 
the US with Dewey, they did so with understandable revolutionary - or romantic - zeal, the 
two often meshed together. What has to be kept in mind here is that the powerful impulsion 
behind progressivism as an educational movement was social justice, since it was at this stage 
becoming clear that industrialism and mass schooling were together producing an uneducated 
and unskilled working class. Most of progressivism~ s social zeal was thus concerned to 
produce equitable educational outcomes for the children of the working class who were, it was 
now quite plain, not being helped, and often being hindered by public schooling. 
As progressivism began to develop both as a theory and as a practice, it spread out over the 
ideological spectrum, and Tyack distinguishes four important sub-variants: the pragmatic 
administrative progressives, who sought redress in the direction of scientifically driven 
administrative efficiency. Ball's (1999) contemporary performative zealots are arguably the 
ancestors of this progressive strand; the equally pragmatic pedagogical progressives or 
reconstructionists, who were the Deweyans proper, including both John and Evelyn Dewey 
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and William Kilpatrick, Dewey's 'best student', and tireless advocate of the 'project method', 
the avatar of problem-solving learning, curricular integration and service learning, among 
others; to the left of these came the libertarian educational progressives, radical child-centred 
activists, who surfaced mostly in alternative schools, most notably perhaps A.S. Neill's 
Summerhill; to the left of them yet came the social reconstructionists like Teachers College's 
Coutts, who attempted to marry Deweyan progressivism with socialism. 
While different in both politics and pedagogy, 'All competence modes, [as Bernstein would 
call these different varieties of progrt~ssivism] despite their differences, share a preoccupation 
with the development [liberaVprogressive], the recognition [populist] and change [radical] of 
consciousness' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 68). Or to put that another way, progressivism was first 
and foremost about radical progress. The driving assumption, progressivism's 'most 
scandalous notion' was, as Charles Simic (2000, p. 9) has said about modernism, 'that it is 
possible to begin from scratch and be: entirely original ... ' This is manifested in the pervasive 
chiliasm of progressivism: traditionalism, the original 'one best system' was, in 
progressivism's founding gesture, exposed as a fraud, and the heralded progressive future 
depended now upon a complete and ltotal replacement of the old in all its manifestations, with 
the new, the authentic 'one best system'. Pedagogical redemption depended upon a 
guillotine-like severance with the pastl. To this day, this 'paradigm' shift is advocated by 
progressives in these either/or terms in ways that would make both Kuhn, and Lenin for that 
matter wince at its romantic nalvet(~? 
There is some merit in the view that progressivism as an educational movement was an 
exclusively, sometimes even parochially, American phenomenon. Certainly the English did not 
have anything called by that name. But their child-centred movement is grown from the same 
stock, as were many other reforms in Europe at the time, like the Gentile reforms discussed 
further below. There may be earlier references to it in South Africa, but in 1934 the New 
Education Fellowship (NEF), an intemational advocacy group for progressivism (see Jenkins, 
1990) hosted an enormous internati()nal conference with sessions in both Johannesburg and 
Cape Town. Four thousand people attended; there were three hundred formal addresses, and 
twenty five overseas speakers, prominent amongst whom was John Dewey who addressed the 
conference three times. The conference was opened by South African Minister of Education 
Hofineyr and Deputy Prime Minister Smuts, who praised the 'new education's' individualism, 
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which he saw as a vital bulwark against 'the creation of a sort of standardised human being of 
a uniform type' (in Malherbe, 1937, p. 4). 
The NEF was clearly a catholic church: Graf von Durckheim-Montmartin extolled the virtues 
of the 'Hitler Jugend' for 'disciplined group-education' (Malherbe, op. cit., p. 41), Eiselen and 
Verwoerd both addressed the conference3. But so too did Malinowski, Hoernle, and Monica 
Wilson. The tenor of progressivism was clearly evident in the framing of the conference, as 
were some of the faultlines in the broad front. Significantly, Dewey went out of his way to 
distance his protocols from those of 'some would-be progressive schools and teachers' 
(Malherbe, op. cit., p. 25). For Dewey, as for both Gramsci and Gee as we will see below, the 
new educational stress on 'development' did not mean a completely learner or activity-centred 
curriculum. 'Direction', even in these early debates, was the issue, as Dewey was at pains to 
point out: 'Under the alleged sanction of not violating freedom and individuality the 
responsibility for providing development conditions is overlooked' (ibid.). More plainly still: 
'But development involves a point of direction as well as a starting point with constant 
movement in that direction ... ' (ibid.). Gee develops this point exemplarily below. 
At this early celebration of progressivism in South Africa we have to remember that universal 
mass education, and thus the possible flaws of progressivism, was still some way off Mass 
schooling, when it did come in the form of Bantu education, was not so much a traditional as a 
counter-reformative policy. No wonder then that the liberation movement wanted precisely 
that which had been denied - progressive education. This is plain in all the 'from - to' 
manifestos of education in the 1990s policy (see Kraak, 1998), all displaying the characteristic 
chiliastic certainty that everything in the 'from' column was politically and educationally 
bankrupt, everything in the 'to' column the inauguration of redressive social justice 4• 
But the global tide has turned, and progressivism is undeniably now on the defensive: 
'educational progressivism, in practice and in theory, is fast losing ground' (Eberstadt, 1999). 
Theoretically (some would say ideologically) the conceptual basis of progressivism has been 
directly attacked in a range of recent writing. The recent work of Hirsch (2000) and Ravitch 
(2000) has been particularly critical5. Hirsch has been at pains to show that the naturalism of 
progressivism, from which stems the idea of the creative active learner and the teacher as 
facilitator, is rooted less in Dewey's pragmatism than it is in eighteenth century romanticism. 
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As McDonald (2000) says bitingly, 'If the child was, in Wordworth's words, a "Mighty 
Prophet! Seer blest!" then who needs teachers?', and she goes on derisively, 'But the Mighty 
Prophet emerged from student-centred schools ever more ignorant and incurious as the 
schools became more vacuous'. But who cares, says McDonald, when 'Anything But 
Knowledge' is the proud anti-intellectual creed of progressivism. 
But people increasingly do care. Not only national but international testing comparisons have 
shown up some striking results, with South Africa a dismal last on the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TI~ISS). The most charitable conclusion to be drawn is that, 
on orthodox measures of achievement, progressivism's predictions are not borne out. Even 
within the liberal progressive consensus, (see Taylor and Vinjevold, 1999) it is increasingly 
being conceded that: 
• Effective active instruction, classically proscribed by progressivism as the pnmary 
hindrance to authentic learning, makes a major difference to learning; 
• The teacher thus returns, not as a facilitator or manager, but as an instructional specialist; 
• This means too a return of the importance of content knowledge, both in curriculum 
stipulation and in instructional guidance: as Dewey said in Cape Town, 'The New 
Education needs more attention, not less, to subject matter' (Malherbe, 1937, p. 25). 
Why the volte face? And does the change of direction sufficiently address the case? These are 
the questions to be explored below. 
The Trouble with Progressivism 
The acknowledgement of the role of instruction in successful learning, and thus of the 
importance of the teacher and of teac~her knowledge, is, as I have said, increasingly conceded 
by some of the leaders of progressivilim, like Darling-Hammond (Muller, 2000b). 
In a recent communique (Spencer De:ans, 2000t, the Deans often Schools of Education in the 
US have made a plea for 'moving beyond ideological divides' and have listed what they feel 30 
years of research into school reform in the US has established does actually work: 
• high expectations and high stand~lrds; 
• curricula based on high standards; 
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• standards-based assessment; 
• strong principals; 
• stable school environment; 
• parental involvement; 
• teachers with content and pedagogical knowledge; 
• on-going inset; 
• micro and macro-accountability. 
This is a pretty orthodox list, and mirrors the conclusions above (Muller 2000b). The Deans 
are evidently trying to move the debate onto a plane where research and not ideology is the 
decisive factor. But it will not be so easy. They themselves allocate positions in terms of 
'liberal' and 'conservative', a bifurcatory progressivist reflex that is obdurately die-hard. 
Furthermore, in many quarters, they themselves are seen as the problem rather than its 
solution. The sustained 'education school bashing', as it has come to be called, has not been 
on the basis of their supposed ineptitude, but on the basis of their ideology. As Hirsch (2000) 
has said, by an 'all-too-ept advocacy of Romantic ideas, not by incompetence but by an all too 
competent rhetoric in the service of the notion that specific subject-matter knowledge has only 
secondary importance'. In short, schools and departments of education are themselves seen 
by their critics as the ideological home of progressivism. 
That is almost certainly too sweeping a generalisation, and the Spencer Deans are clearly 
distancing themselves from that pigeonhole. But the disputatiousness in the field is often 
remarked on: 
You might think progressive and traditional educational theories represent 
competing programs to achieve an agreed-upon goal, and that scholars would 
welcome signs of achievement in the same way that medical researchers 
welcome evidence that one cure works better than another. But you would be 
wrong. Inside the educational world, these two streams of thought are viewed 
more as alternative moral and philosophical systems, as fighting faiths. What is 
mere evidence in the face of such iron certitudes? 
Traub, 2000. 
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To summarise: the 'one best system' of progressivism is under unprecedented attack. The 
progressives have laid claim to the moral and political high ground of social justice, but their 
critics say this is just what progressivism does not deliver. The terrain is fatally politicised, 
and the sides, almost without fail, give political or ideological labels to one another. The 
opposition is not unified by any coherent paradigm, and it is certainly misleading to call them 
'traditionalists', or 'conservatives'; Hirsch (2000) prefers the label' classicist', which, accurate 
as it may be in terms of the literary c:anon, to my mind confuses the issue further. In the 
meantime, though, a steadily growing base of empirical research is pointing mostly in one 
direction: 
... education looks more and more like a real social SCIence, specific 
instructional practices have been isolated as never before. And the outcome is 
pretty clear: One study after another has shown that traditional instructional 
methods, which Chall calls "te:acher centred", produce better academic results 
than progressive, "student-centred" ones ... 
Traub, 2000; see also Chall, 2000. 
The messy public scrap in the US, and elsewhere, edging reluctantly towards rational public 
debate bolstered by research results is not particularly edifYing, and the limits to furthering the 
debate on the basis of political position-taking have clearly been reached. What is needed is a 
way to recontextualise the issues that will lift discussion out of the rancours of political one-
upmanship. The section that follows 'will examine the way that one particularly perspicacious 
progressive, James Gee, has currently dealt with some of the critiques of progressivism. 
Immersion 
A well-known criticism has it that progressive theories 'actually work against the new 
orthodoxy's supposed social justice goals of emancipation and empowerment' and that 
educational progressivism is 'a sure means of preserving the social status quo' (Hirsch quoted 
in Saxe, 1996). In the US this point is particularly associated with the black feminist writer 
Lisa Delpit and has also been made for South African progressivism (Muller, 2000b). The 
question is how this could be so. According to Gee (1999), it is because progressive 
pedagogy effectively hides the 'rules of the game' from disadvantaged learners, leaving them 
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without visible scaffolding to advance with. Gee pairs the first criticism with a second allied 
one, namely, that progressive pedagogy causes learners to put their inner life on display, and 
therefore amenable to surveillance and discipline (a point made by Popkewitz (1995) as we 
saw in Chapter 6). This Foucauldian criticism is familiar too from the work of Walkerdine 
(1988), Gore (1997) and, in South Africa, Ensor (1995). Thus, progressivism blocks the 
induction of disadvantaged learners into the knowledge structure, but submits them to middle 
class moral regulation. On the one hand, it promotes permissiveness that generates failure; on 
the other, it promotes 'soft coercion' that generates social control. Taken together these two 
criticisms cast progressivism in the role of Machiavellian instrument of class control. 
Where most progressives would deny this picture flatly, Gee (1999 passim) interestingly partly 
concedes the case by contending that the critique identifies the dark mirror side of 
progressivism, but that progressivism (or any reform for that matter) is double-edged and 
requires a particular kind of supplement in order to keep the virtuous side, which he claims is 
still viable, to the fore. To show how this might work, Gee first considers how we learn things 
in everyday life. We start with pattern recognition, and follow our noses analogically. 
However, our noses on their own will not lead us to the culturally determined pattern clusters 
of our community. Since pattern clusters ('situated meanings') are potentially infinite, our 
experience requires guidance to reach the appropriate patterns; hence, 'experience and 
guidance (constraint, direction) are inextricably yoked' (Gee, op. cit.). Dewey would concur. 
Learning at school is no different. Say we need to learn about 'light'. The situated meanings 
and pattern clusters of light in everyday experience differ from those in physics. We need 
therefore to be immersed in the physics pattern clusters, but there is also an 'absolute need for 
guidance (constraint, direction) as a supplement to being situated in experience' (Gee, op. 
cit.). Of course this does not necessarily entail explicit guidance: most scaffolding Gee says is 
ostensive and tacit. Nevertheless, guidance is what it is, and for schooling, it is the teacher 
who must do it. 
So far the concessions to critique are modest; progressive pedagogues, it has been argued, 
have always had to flout their rule of invisibility to achieve positive learning (Davis, 1996). 
But in the last part of the paper Gee goes beyond acknowledging that the teacher is just 
another part of the scaffolding furniture. Drawing on the Vygotskyan distinction between 
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spontaneous (everyday) and non-spontimeous ( scientific) concepts, Gee argues that one on1y 
grasps non-spontaneous concepts through 'overt instruction' that focuses on a) putting things 
into words b) conscious and intentioml~ use of new concepts, and c) the relationship among 
forms and meanings' (Gee, 1999). Here the teacher breaks free from the scaffolding furniture, 
and becomes indispensable to direct guidance. The implication is that this is what is needed to 
paralyse the dark side and allow virtuolls progression to flourish. 
Gee presents us here with three scenalios for concept learning. The first two are essentially 
similar, and the teacher in the second scenario (school) simply provides what the semiotic 
agencies of the community do in everyday life. In the third, however, something is to be learnt 
(non-spontaneous concepts) which requires active intervention of a sort not found in everyday 
life. 'Instruction' here becomes a form of direction qualitatively different to that provided by 
the community because 'everyday language, in creating patterns and associations, is less 
careful about differences and underlying systematic relations, although these are crucial to 
science' (Gee, op. cit.). Although Gee does not say it, it should be clear that this requires that 
the teacher: 
• knows more than the learner (has adequate content knowledge), but more critically; 
• knows the conceptual destination of the learning, and therefore; 
• purposefully steers the learner towards a pre-set goal. 
With this, a number of key tenets of k:arner-centredness are breached, and we begin to move 
towards a more teacher-centred model, away from weak framing of the curriculum (Bernstein, 
1990, pp. 36-39) to far stronger framing - and thereby somewhat away from progressive 
pedagogy towards the more expert, purposive teacher that the empirical school reform 
research is pointing to. 
I have made Gee concede more here than he might want to, which was merely to shore up a 
less radical but more defensible progressivism. My argument here is that this 'strengthened' 
progressivism is not quite enough, as the third example given above makes clear. The 
argument for this third kind of instruction does mortal damage to the progressive emphasis on 
breaking down the boundaries between school and life. It is my contention that progressivism, 
in its stress on schooling as practice, on pedagogy seen narrowly as teaching, loses sight of 
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knowledge and its acquisition, which is the primary aim of learning. Put more bluntly, 
progressivism does not have an explicit theory of knowledge, and therefore does not have an 
explicit theory of curriculum or acquisition. Without it, we cannot construct a post-
progressive pedagogy. 
Chinese Complexities 
The same cannot be said for that enduring source of inspiration for the left, Antonio Gramsci. 
Gramsci's (1986) starting point was that the education system, if it was to serve the cause of 
the new society, and as the state began to assume responsibility for public schooling, had to 
move away from the 'old school' towards a 'common school'. The common school was to 
serve the working-class and through them the whole society. At the same time, Gramsci was 
perturbed by the reform proposals of the Gentile Reform of 1923, as well as by Montessori 
ideas, and the 'Dalton method' (enthusiastically promoted in Cape Town by Harold Rugg's 
wife, Louise Kruger), all species of an emerging progressivism. He found the reaction against 
the 'old school' altogether too extreme: 'The active school [his euphemism for progressivism] 
is still in its romantic phase, in which the elements of struggle against the mechanical and 
Jesuitical school have become unhealthily exaggerated' (Gramsci, 1986, pp. 32-33). This is a 
surprising judgement, to say the least. Let us see how this revolutionary arrives at his 
pedagogical position. 
The job of school is to 'accustom them [the students] to reason, to think abstractly and 
schematically while remaining able to plunge back from abstraction into real and immediate 
life, to see in each fact or datum what is general and what is particular, to distinguish the 
concept from the particular instance' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 38). The 'old school' did this by 
weaning the pupils from folklore, which encompassed both a magical and pre-scientific view 
and a pre-civic view. The condition for this weaning was theoretical and practical activity (or 
work) on the part of the pupils. But this understanding has been elevated by the new 
pedagogues into an absolute, resulting in a stress on activity, or 'educativity', at the expense 
of instruction. First of all, the difference between school (science and civics) and everyday life 
(folklore) does not disappear in the industrial era, and it remains the teachers' pre-eminent 
'obligation to accelerate and regulate the child's formation in conformity with the former and 
. , 
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in conflict with the latter' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 36). To labour the point, 'in conflict with the 
latter' signals a strong discontinuity between life and school. 
In a judgement whose harshness is matched only by that of the contemporary critics of 
progressivism, Gramsci goes on to say, 
If the teaching body is not adequate and the nexus between instruction and 
education is dissolved, while the problem of teaching is conjured away by 
cardboard schemata exalting educativity, the teachers work will as a result 
become yet more inadequate 
ibid. 
This can be paraphrased to say: if the teachers have inadequate subject knowledge, and 
progressivism sidelines them still further by marginalising their role and exalting that of the 
learners, then learning is jeopardised, exactly the conclusion of the Curriculum 2005 Review 
Committee (DoE, 2000)7. 
But what is it that the teacher must do? What kind of 'instruction'? The answer comes in two 
parts. The first has to do with 'facts'. Just like our modern progressives, Gentile railed 
against teaching facts. Quite wrong, says Gramsci (op. cit., p. 41): 'It is noticeable that the 
new pedagogy has concentrated its Hre on "dogmatism" in the field of instruction and the 
learning of concrete facts - i.e. precist:lly in the field in which a certain dogmatism is practically 
indispensable ... ' How so? What we learn at school, says Gramsci, is how to order facts and 
objects in the world. Where do the: pupils get these to-be-ordered facts from? From the 
teacher. The good teacher informs thle pupils (gives them facts) and shows them how to order 
them. The 'mediocre' teacher in the: 'old school' at least imparted a 'baggage' of concrete 
facts which the active pupil may learn to order by herself Now however, 'With the new 
curricula, which coincide with a gene!rallowering of the level of the teaching profession, there 
will no longer be any "baggage" to put in order' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 36). Gramsci would 
have been completely scornful of Get::'s view that we acquire the facts of, say, mathematics by 
'immersing' the pupils in mathematies problems in the same way as we get facts about the 
world through our immersion in it, hecause, to repeat, 'There is no unity between school and 
life' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 35). 
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Teachers must impart facts, therefore, but more importantly still, they must impart a 
disciplined comportment to life. How is this done? In the 'old school', teachers taught Greek 
and Latin, not because they wanted pupils to be able to speak those languages but 'because 
the real interest was the interior development of personality ... to inculcate certain habits of 
diligence, precision, poise (even physical poise) ... ' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 37), in other words, 
the mental and physical habits, 'a second - nearly spontaneous nature' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 
38), habits of thought each person needs to become what Gramsci called a 'philosopher', the 
democratic civic ideal of communism, properly considered. We teach the facts of history, not 
because we want pupils to imbibe facts, but so that they can imbibe, almost unconsciously, 'a 
historicising understanding of the world and of life' (Gramsci, op. cit., p. 39). It is the almost 
inadvertent learning of the important comportments, 'Logical, artistic, psychological 
experience (was) gained unawares, without a continual self-consciousness' (ibid.), that is the 
true pedagogical school task of the teacher. This is similar in certain respects to Gee's third 
kind of learning. The difference, though, remains striking: for Gramsci, the comportments, 
albeit the main purpose of education, are only to be approached 'unawares' and by indirection, 
through the teaching of 'facts'; for the progressives, the facts must fall away, and the 
comportments become the entry point for each lesson, as we will see with Gardner below. 
Progressive curriculum refonn, in Gramsci's view, tackles the wrong object. It tackles the 
fonn of the curriculum instead of its content. To be blunt, Gramsci means we must throw out 
Latin and Greek and bring in science, mathematics, language and civics, but they need to be 
used in the same way as were Latin and Greek. These are the carriers of the all-important 
mental skills in today's world. The idea that education is about the inculcation of these skills 
and comportments is not, should not be, the focus of education. When it does so become, 
then we fall foul of , relevance' in the curriculum, and vocational education, a diversification of 
the common school, its mission and its products. The result, and this is the crux of this whole 
analysis, will be a hardening and widening of class distinctions. And that is precisely what the 
empirical studies of the effects of contemporary progressivism persistently find. This most 
durable of critiques of progressivism was first made by Gramsci, and no-one has made it more 
eloquently: 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
- ._-------------
The most paradoxical aspect of it all is that this new type of school appears and 
is advocated as being democratic, while in fact it is destined not merely to 
perpetuate social differences but to crystallise them in Chinese complexities 
Gramsci, op. cit., p. 40. 
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To summarise: Gramsci would conculr with Gee that the role of the teacher, devalued in 
progressivism, should be brought more to the fore. But where for Gee this role has to do 
mostly with shaping ('directing') the: flux of experience gained through 'immersion', for 
Gramsci, it should crucially provide the 'baggage', the facts, the raw material to be shaped and 
ordered. In other words, even Gee, ill his bold retrieval of the teacher's role, conceives it in 
terms of skills and procedures only, not in terms of knowledge, as Gramsci does. The result is 
the characteristic, flawed, progressive curriculum. 
Anything but Knowledge 
Schools are about many things, teacher educators say ... self-actualisation, 
following one's joy, social adjustment, or multicultural sensitivity - but the one 
thing they are not about is knowledge ... educators will occasionally allow the 
word to pass their lips, but it is always in a compromised position, as in 
"constructing one's own knowledge", or "contextualised knowledge". Plain 
old knowledge, the kind passed down in books, the kind for which Faust sold 
his soul, that is out ... That dogma may be summed up in the phrase: Anything 
But Knowledge. 
MacDonald, 2000. 
As we saw above, Gee lands himself in something of a pickle because, for his first two forms 
of induction he can retain the orthodox progressive postulate that life and school, relevant 
everyday knowledge and school knowledge, are in principle isomorphic; whereas for learning 
'non-spontaneous' concepts, this assumption has to be partly abandoned. Let us look more 
closely at how this key progressive postulate shapes the progressive curriculum. 
The 'school subject' is the selector al!1d orderer of knowledge in the traditional curriculum. It 
is an ensemble that suggests what is to be learnt when. For progressivism this is a misleading 
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description since it over-emphasises facts. Rather, for progressivism 'A subject is a collection 
of similar skills, cases, and facts that have been grouped together as an object of study' 
(Engines, 2000). There are two things to note with this definition. First, it prioritises skills, 
that, from the traditional animus against 'facts' noted already by Gramsci, we have by now 
come to expect. So much so, in fact, that the definition proceeds to define physics exclusively 
in skill terms: "'Doing physics" involves a set of skills which range from timing the swing of a 
pendulum to constructing particle accelerators' (ibid.). 
It turns out, secondly, that this 'subject' organisation of school experience is almost exactly 
the same as that of the' domain', its equivalent in everyday life: 'A domain is, like a subject, a 
collection of skills, cases, and facts' (ibid.). Its key advantage over the subject is that it will be 
more interesting for pupils. 'Some examples are politics, trucks, and animals' (ibid.). And, it 
continues, 'Any of the above domains can be used as a vehicle to teach the subjects of physics, 
biology, or history' (ibid.). So, there is nothing special about the organisation of school 
knowledge that cannot be improved by organising it as everyday knowledge is organised: this 
is the core belief of curriculum progressives. It happens to be wrong, as I shall show below. 
First though, let us examine what a radical domainal approach looks like. The most famous 
exemplar is that of Howard Gardner. All we need to teach our children, says he, is about 
truth, beauty, and morality; since 'depth' is preferable to 'breadth', we can teach the first 
through evolution, the second through Mozart's The Marriage of Figaro, the third through 
the Holocaust (see Eberstadt, 1999). We can enter these domains via a variety of entry points 
derived from his theory of multiple intelligences - narrative, aesthetic, numerical, existential-
foundational, interpersonal or hands-on. No surprise that hands-on is a privileged mode, 
although Gardner does solemnly warn, 'Hands-on involvement with the Holocaust must be 
approached carefully, especially with children' (quoted in Eberstadt, 1999). 
Gardner assures us he is a 'demon' for high standards. But how would we know? With no 
content stipulations, how would we know what the pupils had learnt, or at what level? The 
truth of the matter is, the content and coverage are tacitly assumed to be in place. That is, a 
success can be made of such an under-stipulated curriculum, but only if the teacher has a well-
articulated mental script of what should be covered, and if the pupils come from homes where 
they have been well prepared to respond to such putative freedom, in other words, only in 
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schools by and for the middle class: 'It appears then that progressive educational ideology has 
come full circle. Born near the tum of the century in hopes of raising the downtrodden up, it 
survives now as the ideology of choice: of, by, and for the educational elite' (Nathan Glazer, 
quoted by Eberstadt, 1999). 
Putting Progression back in Progresdve 
We are back then to the question whic:h originally gave rise to progressivism, which is: what 
kind of curriculum and pedagogy will optimise the learning chances of the disadvantaged? So 
far, the empirical evidence as well as the discussions on Gee and Gramsci have stressed that a 
more directive teacher is certainly one place to start. But is it enough? My answer is no. The 
discussion in the preceding section ha.s shown how an overriding emphasis on learning and 
teaching as practical activities puts thE~ focus on what both pupils and teachers should do, at 
the expense of what they should know. If we are not to fall back into the trap of 'facts', the 
question of what pupils should know translates into the following: how should the knowledge 
in the curriculum be organised to optimise learning? 
One answer is provided by the rec(mt Review Committee Report into Curriculum 2005 
(C200S) (DoE, 2000). The Report bc~gins by distinguishing between two different ways that 
knowledge can be demarcated and ordered: lateral demarcation and vertical demarcation. 
Lateral demarcation, demarcates whic:h knowledge clusters belong together, and which don't. 
The curriculum design challenge here is that of connective coherence ('integration'), how to 
ensure coherent linkage between clusters. The guiding principles are contiguity, worldly 
relevance, and interest. The designer's job is to devise mechanisms that promote these. As 
we saw above, 'domains' are issue -organisers that select knowledge units purely on the basis 
of interest and relevance. In C200S these are called programme organisers. Gardner's' entry 
points', similarly, function to select knowledge units on the basis of their relevance to a 
particular kind of cognitive activity, or skill. In C200S these are called phase organisers. As 
we saw from the critiques above, as pupils traverse these relevant knowledge clusters, there is 
no guarantee that key conceptual way-stations are arrived at. The progressive concession, as 
we saw from both the empirical research and the concession by Gee, is to bring back teacher 
direction. But the question then arisles: how does the teacher know what the key conceptual 
way-stations are, or what kind of knowledge might be relevant to understanding them? 
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In vertical demarcation a different notion of relevance comes to the fore, namely, 'relevant to 
conceptual development'. Vertical demarcation establishes which knowledge, within each 
knowledge cluster, must be learnt, in what sequence, at what level of competence. The 
curriculum design challenge here is that of conceptual coherence, how to ensure coherent 
conceptual learning progression. The guiding principle is conceptual relevance, which 
determines sequence, progression and pacing. Apart from allocating directive responsibility to 
the teacher, progressive pedagogy is silent on the conceptual direction to be taken. The 
Report found that, while the mechanisms of assessment criteria, range statements, 
performance indicators and expected levels of performance were intended to establish 
sequence, progression and pacing, they were defined largely in thematic, that is, lateral terms, 
and did not provide the necessary guidance to either teacher or pupil. Put bluntly, there was 
no conceptual road map in C2005. Nor is this a simple omission; it derives from core 
postulates of progressivism. The preliminary evidence shows that it is the children of the 
poor, not the middle class, that are disadvantaged (Taylor and Vinjevold, 1999). 
The Review goes on to say that different knowledge areas may have different requirements 
with respect to connective and conceptual coherence, and that part of the trick of curriculum 
design has to do with making sure that one set of mechanisms does not block the achievement 
of other requirements, as was the case with C2005; 'When learning areas with distinctive 
conceptual coherence requirements (like mathematics, science, and language) are driven 
mainly by integration requirements, then the potential for conceptual progression is retarded' 
(DoE, 2000, p. 42). I will not take this further. My main purpose here has been to put my 
finger on that field in which, as Gramsci said above, ... ' a certain dogmatism is practically 
indispensable' (Gramsci, 1986, p. 41). 
This is just what most contemporary curriculum reform has found: to quote a recent review of 
curriculum reform in Norway (no name/date): 'The curriculum content is (now) precisely 
prescribed for each year, and with special attention to the progression-matters'. The picture is 
similar in Australia (Clements, no date), and New Zealand (Education Review Office, 2000), 
two of our closest models for C2005. This raises the question of the criminal culpability of 
educational carpetbaggers who purvey for gain ideas in the developing world at the very 
moment that they are being discredited at home, but this too cannot be pursued here. 
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Summing up the argument made in this paper, one could say that what is missing from 
progressivism is progression. The reasons for this have been variously suggested. Hirsch 
(2000) thinks that the Rousseauian 'natural self in the forefront of progressive pedagogy 
makes progressivism recoil from any notion of progress that is not self-constructed (Stone, 
1996). And if Gramsci somehow failed to persuade the left, the school effectiveness research 
and the TIMSS results have surely brought home the costs, personal as well as national, of 
keeping the self pristinely natural (recall Dowling's similar point in Chapter 4). A secondary 
reason for the omission suggested above is that there is a distinct limit to what we can say 
about learning and teaching without having to refer to knowledge, or its boundaries. The 
progressive inclination to define all knowledge events as skills, competencies and practices 
precludes talking about knowledge as knowledge. Taking knowledge seriously does not solve 
the problem of access for the disadvantaged, but correctly identifying the issue is a positive 
step in the right direction, as we will se:e in the chapter which follows. 
The focus in the final three chapters shifts from curriculum and pedagogy, to research for 
policy. Who should do the research? How should the research, and debates around policy, 
best be conducted? The issues at stake turn out to be surprisingly similar to those at stake in 
curriculum and pedagogy. 
Notes 
1 In this sense, People's Education, the grassroots popular alternative to Bantu education 
in the 1980s, as classically progressivist, as Andre Kraak: (1998, pp. 2-4) has shown. 
2 Take, for example, Spira (998), who distinguishes between progressive and 
'essentialist' education, where the student is 'passive', 'individual facts are taught' and 
learnt through 'memorisation'. This descriptive travesty is surprisingly common. 
3 Eiselen was the anthropologist whose eponymous commission, the Eiselen Commission, 
is commonly held to have launched Bantu education; Verwoerd was of course the 
nationalist leader who implemented it. 
4 'For the real chiliast, the present becomes the breach through which what was previously 
inward bursts out suddenly, takc~s hold of the outer world and transforms it' (Mannheim, 
1936; 1991, p. 193). 
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5 The intention here is clearly neither to give a comprehensive analysis of the history of 
progressivism, nor to be uncritically supportive of Ravitch and Hirsch. For a recent, 
measured and scholarly response to Ravitch, see for example Wraga, 2001. 
6. The Spencer Deans are a group of deans of Schools of Education at prestigious US 
universities, all funded by the Spencer Foundation. 
7 The Curriculum 2005 Review Committee was commissioned by the Minister of 
Education to investigate why the radically progressive and self-styled constructivist 
Curriculum 2005 for Grades 1 to 9 (discussed briefly in Chapter 6 and further below) 
seemed to be working so badly in the schools. 
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CRITICS AND RECONSTRUCTORS: ON THE EMERGENCE OF 
EDUCATIONAL EXPERTISE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Are intellectuals prophets and sages; or are they scientists, specialised 
researchers, or technical innovators? Are they critics of power or expert 
advisers to politicians, direct or indirect moulders of public opinion? ... 
Positions on these questions, and on a host of related ones, are rarely held in 
full consciousness; they are implicit orientations ... a permanent substratum of 
thought, a part of the cultural preconscious, a vital source of the cognitive 
dispositions at work in the intellectual field. 
Ringer, 1992, pp. 6-7. 
Introduction 
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Stephen Appel (1993) has argued that educators schooled in theory and reflection are not 
automatically qualified thereby to offer policy prescriptions. Appel's point is that mastery in 
the discourse of critique does not necessarily transfer to mastery in the discourse of positive 
reconstruction1. Appel is here valuably reminding us that each discourse has its own grammar, 
its own language game2. His polemic is against a certain group of educators who seem to feel 
entitled to provide policy for the new democratic state in South Africa on the basis of critical 
credentials and liberation movement membership rather than demonstrated expertise in the 
protocols of the policy game. 
The question pursued in this chapter is not so much whether theorists (or, in the idiom of this 
chapter, critics) are or are not suited to reconstructive work. Neither is it to establish the 
epistemological distinctiveness of the two domains of activity [see Appel's (1994) distinction 
between 'theoretical' and 'political' social practice]; and nor is it to advocate one above the 
other, as Dale (1993) does when distinguishing between 'critical theory' and 'problem-
solving'. Obviously the concerns are related. The question is rather into the conditions under 
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which intellectuals will position themselves in one or other camp, and how this positioning 
takes place in a concrete instance. 
All is Activism 
Civil society as a social-interpretive construction of equality and universality shares with 
nationalism, in all its varieties, including national liberation, the virtue and vice of suppressing 
the potentially divisive interests that lie at the heart of the social division of complex modern 
societies (Lefort, 1986). To put that another way, civil society allows for the construction of a 
wider community and commonality, a shared horizon of striving which goes beyond personal, 
ethnic or occupational self-interest, and this allows in turn for a canopy of common-sense that 
highlights common aspirations, while de-emphasising local and particular goals and 
preoccupations (Tester, 1992). One might note that this way of talking about social-
interpretive constructions does not assume that these form a Parsonian 'action-frame' in any 
strong sense. In other words, this does not imply that people actually set aside their particular 
interests for common ones in a civil society imaginary, although this may well happen. It 
merely asserts that they are predisposed to understand and intervene in the field of social 
representations in these terms. 
In the period up to 1990, intellectuals within the South African national liberation movement, 
an aspirant civil society and a national-popular imaginary of great power, understood 
themselves to be waging the struggle in ways that were different only in degree if at all from 
that of mainstream political activists. Of course many intellectuals were themselves 
mainstream activists and so their activism and their intellectual work could only have seemed 
to them all of a piece. At the height of the struggle in the mid- and late 1980s, intellectual 
work was seen by intellectuals and activists alike as waging the struggle by other means only 
(see also Chapter 1). 
There were a number of entailments to this view. First of all, intellectuals had a sense of 
belonging to a larger endeavour. This was its greatest advantage and certainly not to be taken 
lightly in an era of global intellectual fragmentation. But it fudged the distinction between 
analytical knowledge and strategic knowledge, and obscured the occupational boundary 
between intellectual workers (like academics) and that of other workers: they were all 'in the 
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struggle' in the same way at the same time, as it were. It also blurred the boundary between 
political and social power: 'the peopl€,' as a bloc, so it was tacitly assumed, would come to 
rule one day. The possibility that a political elite might come to political power and that a 
social elite might continue to be privileged could not be voiced in the rhetoric of the national-
popular imaginary. It obscured the fact that national liberation, if not invented by intellectuals 
(because real popular struggles did construct real histories of reference) was at least shaped 
and narrativised by intellectuals, for instance by historians both in and out of the Communist 
Party, and by sociologists of work who had declared themselves for the working class. It is 
self-evident now, but was not so then, that the strong narrative of 'people's power' as a 
political driving force was a construction set out by intellectuals and propagated by leadership 
elites. They were, after all, the ones 1Nith access to the tools of narrativisation. To be sure, 
the best intellectuals were well aWafii:l of this. But in the day-to-day construction of the 
struggle, the difference between intellectual work and activism proper was blurred, so that to 
all intents and purposes, all was activism. Insofar as these activities continued to separate out 
in practice since intellectual conC~lms were not always necessarily strategic popular 
wisdom had it that intellectual work should be subordinate to the strategic needs of the 
struggle, always and absolutely. It is not too much to say that intellectuals were all but 
invisible as a separate category within the national-democratic movement at this time, except 
as they obdurately kept surfacing as aspirants to leadership3. 
In writing about these things in the mid-1980s, Nico Cloete and I (Muller and Cloete, 1987) 
were inclined to share the ambivalenc~, of George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi (1979) about the 
social effect of intellectuals who we:re, as they put it, 'on the road to class power', of 
intellectuals who did not acknowledge their social base and social project within a broader 
national social movement. At that time, we were somewhat more optimistic than I am now 
about the prospect for democratising the process of knowledge production, for minimising the 
impact of exclusion through methodological means - through participatory research and other 
supposedly democratic methodologies (see Chapter 9). 
It is not the place here to embark on Ii critique of intellectuals in the struggle in South Africa, 
but rather to look more specifically at what happens to a loose community of intellectuals in a 
particular area, namely education, when the social movement for national liberation that they, 
in different ways perhaps, felt part of changes gear as it did in South Africa in February 1990 
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when the minority white government agreed to negotiations, thus ending minority rule. This is 
an account of how such a fledgling community, embedded deep within the bosom of the 
struggle, is winkled out and repositioned by changing social forces and conditions, and how its 
own strategy in response has, in addition to a host of other things, become a part of the 
ascendance of the informational middle class in the post-liberation period (see also Chapter 6). 
Nor, in retrospect, could it be otherwise 
The account will inevitably overhomogenise this group of educational intellectuals. The 
intention of the present account is merely to establish the contours of the broad trajectory 
within which subsequent subtrajectories fell. The methodological concern here is to establish 
how the interpretive interventions of the intellectuals can usefully be analysed as actions in a 
determinate social field, and how they can be analysed in their shifts as part of the forces at 
play in the field and in the wider society. 
World-Historical Context 
Intellectual fields and subfields of particular countries are increasingly shaped by, and help 
shape, the world-historical context. Within the globalising forces at work today, two major 
and somewhat contradictory dynamics can be discerned which seem to tug the intellectual task 
in one or other direction: in practice, in both directions at once, albeit unevenly. The first is 
an epistemological challenge to 'strong thought', including: 
• antipositivism and a serious vogue for qualitative participatory methods (discussed further 
in Chapters 9 and 10); 
• a strong assertion of the critical role of intellectuals - for example, Adorno's negative 
dialectics and Foucault's anti-prophetic stance4; 
• metaphysical critiques of 'strong' thought and of master-narratives in post-modernist 
writings and pragmatic organisational analysis alike (for example, Vattimo, 1988, and 
Mulgan, 1989). 
Yet today, despite the development theory critiques of the 1970s, the current global discourse 
around development is arguably stronger than it ever has been. Development has, in other 
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words, become a polysemic glob ali sed master-narrative in an era resolutely inimical to master-
narratives (see Pieterse, 1991). 
The second is a political challenge to occupational experts, notably an increasing popular 
suspicion of 'expertise' in general and of 'policy' in particular, which is particularly marked in 
Eastern Europe, but elsewhere too, especially where International Monetary Fund 
conditionalities are causing hardship (sEle for example Amsterdamski and Rhodes, 1993). 
This is undoubtedly fuelled by the collapse of planned socialism in Eastern Europe, but also by 
the unexpected economic successes of the Pacific Rim countries among others. Nevertheless, 
in all of this, although contested, economism - the priority of economic growth remams 
dominant. Indeed, despite the critiques, it seems to have grown in influence (see Chapter 2). 
The third is increasing discussion arouIlld the changing role of intellectuals. This is said to be 
from 'legislators' to 'interpreters', in Bauman's (1987) terms5, or described as an increasing 
disconnection or cultural desynchroniza.tion between elites and masses. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of global problems with effects stretching far beyond national 
borders acts against this localising trend. For example, global warming and other ecological 
threats, the terrorist threat and the AI[[)S epidemic, have all contributed to the rise of the 
international expert, the international (Mode 2) development consultant (see Chapter 3), and 
have established the indispensability of the expert and of expertise in thinking through policy 
dilemmas that are increasingly unthinkable for the ordinary person. I return to this in the final 
Chapter 10. 
As Ringer (1992) has shown, the way in which intellectuals have situated themselves with 
respect to these two opposing dynamicH, which in the chapter I call respectively 'critique' and 
'reconstruction', depends upon the structure of the intellectual field and its relation to the field 
of power in any historical conjunction. The particular intellectual community I want to focus 
on here is a group of self-styled progressive educational intellectuals in South Africa, many of 
them but certainly not all academics~ to examine how they responded to the social forces 
surrounding them; and to look at how they came to change their role as well as their view as 
those forces came to change. 
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I will look at the evolution of this community in three phases which straddle the momentous 
political transition in South Africa: 
• mid-1980s to 1990; 
• 1990 to 1992; 
• 1992 to April 1994 (the first democratic election). 
In each of these phases, I will examine how the tension between 'critique' and 'reconstruction' 
was configured. In each case, I will suggest, this was dealt with on the symbolic level by 
means of a debate, and it is the shifting terms of this debate that is the main focus of this 
chapter. 
Phase One: Mid-1980s to 1990 
Until quite recently, formal state education, ever since it was taken over by the state in the 
nineteenth century, has featured in the discourses of the Western New Left largely by way of a 
critique of its social control function. That is to say, the New Left has overwhelmingly dealt 
with education in terms of critique. Secondly, the overriding tenor of progressive educational 
politics in South Africa has been that of oppositional politics since at least Soweto 1976, for 
entirely understandable reasons. This has recently only begun to change. Together, these two 
contextual features, against the background of those above, had a number of distinct effects on 
the way that progressive educators came to see their task in the early and mid-1980s, at the 
nadir of the apartheid state. 
At this time, two sets of distinctions which were to emerge later could not be made, such was 
the homogenising suction pulling everyone into a central binary vortex, into singular 
identification with either the 'people' or the' state' . 
These distinctions were: 
• the distinction between political work and civic work; 
• the distinction between activism and intellectual work. 
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In other words intellectual work was conflated with activism, and civic work conflated with , 
political work. As we shall see later, t.he tenns of the first conflation begin to separate out in 
phase two, whereas the second conflati:on begins to separate out only in phase three. 
Among the many implications of these conflations, I will mention only two, by way of 
example: 
• In the liberal universities where progressive academics taught, those learning to be 
teachers were given, from the early 1980s at least, an astringent diet of Marxist 
reproduction theory. The guiding theorist was of course Althusser, who with his famous 
theory of ideology was, in his own context in Paris, trying to theorise the conditions for 
political action in the wake of the failed revolution of 1968. In South Africa, militant 
action in the streets was to continue sporadically from 1976 up to 1990, and the students 
who had become acquainted with Althusser beat the plough-shares of his theories into 
militant slogans that fuelled their implacable activism and lent it coherence and 
justification. Althusser might have been flattered, but he surely also would have been 
astonished (Muller and Tomaselli, 1998). 
For both intellectuals and activists at this time, the 'road to the state was closed' 
(Morphet, 1986). That is to say, there was no room for reasoned persuasion in the 
polarised politics of the time. Th{! left-wing academics with their borrowed reproduction 
theory were as a consequence practising, on the level of theory, what the activists were 
doing in the streets, that is, writing the implacability of the state and the need for absolute 
resistance. The effect was a totali,3ing stand-off between the 'people' and the 'state', what 
later was to be called a 'violent and unstable equilibrium' (for example Wolpe, 1991). 
• The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was fonned to intercede in the 
educational stalemate because schooling had virtually ground to a halt in large parts of the 
country. In 1985, a grouping of sleasoned political activists, notably Eric Molobi and Vusi 
Khanyile, organised an umbrella group of parent, teacher and student organisations with 
the aim of taking the stalemated struggle out of education, and getting the youth back to 
school. This strategy was never really successful, but the founding of the NECC did lead 
to the establishment of a distinctIon between political work on the one hand, and civic 
activities on the other. At a national NECC workshop at St Luke's near Johannesburg in 
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August 1989, the distinction was publicly made between political and programme work, 
the latter meaning bursary programmes and policy research, amongst other things. It was 
said at the time that the strategic needs of the NECC's political agenda should not hinder 
the on-going work of the programme. This prised apart a distinction, albeit hotly 
contested at the time, of two different forms of struggle. This distinction was later to 
mature into the political/civil society distinction. Nevertheless, the distinction would take 
time to filter down into the interstices of political and civil life. 
As the 1980s wore on, the NECC leadership had become persuaded of the need for 
'intellectual assistance' in the struggle, and, in partnership with some liberal universities, set up 
first two, and later a third, Education Policy Unit (EPU) to do this. Because the issue was 
never properly clarified, it was completely understandable that the NECC would have one 
conception and the universities another of what the EPUs were supposed to be doing. 
The NECC had an activist definition of service to the struggle, one where the EPU's role was 
to provide intellectual ammunition to undergird the strategic needs of political struggle. The 
universities on the other hand had a conventional definition of scientific work, one where the 
EPU's role was that of research and development. The first view was a short-term one; the 
second a long-term one. In addition, the NECC was distinguishing only between the first 
distinction (political and civic work), and the universities implicitly also between the second 
(activism and intellectual work). This unacknowledged difference in orientation led to 
numerous arguments and, all too often, to an impasse. 
What did academics and activists working in the EPUs think? They were confused and tom 
by conflicting loyalties. And since they could not choose, were not permitted to adopt 
wholeheartedly one or the other role, they shuttled unsatisfactorily back and forth between 
them (Muller and Vinjevold, 1991). 
The EPUs were effectively paralysed by this dual and incompatible expectation. They were 
never able to provide intellectual ammunition effectively, mostly because by the time they had 
written their reports the strategic moment had passed, nor were they ever able to do 
development work efficiently, for a reason I will discuss further below. 
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Although civic activities were now separated from political work proper, it is fair to conclude 
that to make any distinction between critical work and reconstructive work was virtually 
impossible in the political crucible at this time. Those who did try, on a theoretical level 
distinguishing between Habermas' cognitive and strategic interests for example, were ignored 
(Muller and Cloete, 1987); or on a practical level, like those in the Urban Foundation, were 
suspected of being complicit with the state. The specificity of reconstruction for the struggle 
was a concept completely unthinkable to the ordinary educational activist, and indeed, for 
most education intellectuals too, although its time was almost come. 
Phase Two: 1990 to 1992 
When President de Klerk liberalised th~~ political climate on February 2, 1990, he unlocked a 
series of chain reactions that he could never have foreseen. The major one, undoubtedly, was 
that the bipolar social logic of 'people' -' state' began to unravel and fragment. The 'people' 
began to split into multiple interest groups, some closer to, some further away from the state. 
Another was that groups like the NECC, or at least their national leadership, who had thought 
of themselves as being in opposition for perpetuity, were suddenly confronted with the 
possibility of being in government. Indeed, within weeks, they were talking to the state 
departments, and were being asked to submit plans for emergency budgets. Where would they 
get these plans from? They turned to the EPUs. But the EPUs, it will be recalled, were 
discursively hamstrung; they had at best done some short term activist analysis and a little 
orthodox academic work, so were enltirely unpractised in this new kind of reconstructive 
activity, which they soon realised. 
So quickly did events move in that intoxicating time that by the middle of the year, the slogan 
from critique to reconstruction was already a cliche. Everywhere, from every side, not only 
policy think tanks but NGOs and academics were being enjoined to leave aside critique and to 
embrace 'reconstruction' (Chisholm, 1992). One should not underestimate with what stunned 
apprehension this was met by the educeltion intellectuals, both in and out of the EPUs. How 
were they to do this? It went against their whole training, their social-epistemological view of 
knowledge, and their view of their own role in society. In addition, there was practically no 
indigenous left education tradition of reconstruction to draw from, except perhaps in the field 
of literacy work (paulo Freire) and PatIick van Rensburg's Education with Production. And 
they soon became aware that the field of comparative policy work had become rather technical 
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with the rapid influx of international consultants in the shape of the Harvard Institute of 
International Development, the Paris-based International Institute of Education Policy, the 
World Bank, and other global development agencies. 
From within the EPUs and in protracted discussion with the NECC national leadership, the 
idea was born of a fixed duration national effort at mapping the policy terrain for the 
progressive movement. By 1991, a full-scale national investigation, the National Education 
Policy Investigation (NEPI), was set in motion involving some three hundred educators and 
activists organised into twelve research groups. (A fuller description of the genesis of the 
NEPI and its stance on research is given in Chapter 9). By the end of 1992 the reports were 
published (The National Education Policy Investigation, 1993). 
Because of its heritage, the NEPI was not in any position to execute a neat leap from critique 
to reconstruction, from activist theorising to technical planning, despite certain strong 
expectations from some quarters that it would. Indeed, quite the contrary. The policy 
development enterprise, from the guiding committees to the research groups, was set up with 
the explicit brief to balance intellectual and political inputs, to achieve a balance in the policy 
discourse itself between strategic and analytical demands. There were activists as well as 
academics in each work group, at least such was the intention, setting the stage for an explicit 
confrontation between two purposes of intellectual work that had up to now been latent. And, 
more important for this account, the intellectuals began to differ amongst themselves as to 
which, intellectual or strategic considerations, should play the steering role. 
The debate was variously figured: between an 'ends-based' discourse versus a 'means-based' 
discourse; between a state versus civil society-centred discourse; between equity and efficiency 
(parker, 1993). But by far the bitterest contest occurred around the concepts of 'equity' (or 
sometimes 'equality') and 'development,6. 'Equity' came to stand for people's needs, 
aspirations and struggles, for a composite conception of social justice: 'development' came to 
stand for macroeconomic requirements and macroefficiency, for the imperatives of a 
transforming state system whose needs superseded this or that group which may, as a 
consequence, be expected to defer their group-specific needs for those of the greater good. In 
other words, the debate between people-oriented or knowledge-led innovation at the macro 
level discussed in Chapter 2 is mirrored on the discursive micro level here, and for the same 
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reason: they both rest, albeit at different removes, on the same global faultline, namely, the 
emerging new global division of labour and the dilemmas it presents. 
For those groups or intellectuals leaning toward the activist side, equity considerations were 
incontestably paramount, and the 'discourse of development' was rejected as an excuse for not 
satisfYing the needs of the people. 'JEquity', it was asserted, was the primary goal of the 
education struggle. For those leaning towards 'development', to insist on 'equity' before all 
else was simply populist ignorance. With the conviction of those who know that the state 
requires reconstruction more than critique, academics of this persuasion sailed without further 
ado into development and reconstruction. Where, we may ask with Appel (1993), did they 
learn it? Largely from the economists who came to sit in quite a few of the research groups, 
and from those allied to the movement, who had found themselves in homeland government 
before. The rest invented it as they went along. 
The Editorial Group of the NEPf had been given the impossible job of ensuring that each 
research group balanced both 'equity' :and 'development' considerations in their final reports8, 
although quite what 'balance' might IDI~an no-one clearly knew beforehand. By and large, and 
with greater or lesser reluctance, the groups took up the challenge, and a NEPI-wide debate 
ensued about how the 'balance' should best be effected. This debate can crudely be 
represented in terms of two opposing positions: 
• Proponents of position one, 'development' <--> 'equity', construed the two policy 
goals as irrevocably in tension. They evinced a certain cynicism about the automatic 
benevolence of 'development' - after all, as long-time theorists, the proponents of this 
position were steeped in underdevelopment theory and in other critiques of development 
(see for example Wolpe, 1980), but they nevertheless recognised that some or other view 
of development was essential in order to locate national priorities (Wolpe, 1992). 
Proponents of the view realised too that 'equity' of every kind demanded is not realisable 
(Gerwel, 1992) and that policy pos,es the question of how to choose. 
• Proponents of position two, 'development 'I'equity', assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that 
it is in principle possible to balance or reconcile 'developmental' criteria with 'equity' 
demands. Indeed, some argued that it was essential to make this assumption in order to 
pursue reconstruction whilst retaining legitimacy in this period (Kraak, 1992). It is this 
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view too that is reflected in the African National Congress' Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (ANC, 1993a) and their Policy Framework for Education and 
Training (ANC, 1993b). 
Both positions thus implicitly recognised the need to keep 'development' and 'equity' in some 
or other relation, spurred on as they were by the Editorial Group at the behest of their 
Executive Committee. But proponents of position one wished to retain the tension between 
the two as a constitutive tension at the heart of the intellectual enterprise of doing policy, 
while proponents of position two wished to move beyond the uncomfortable tension into some 
or other relation of accommodation as soon as possible. While such an accommodation was 
sometimes advocated in order to keep as many constituencies within a broad consensus as 
possible, an accommodation was also necessary for policy to be amenable to technical 
solutions. Without it, policy debate stalls in a stand-off over divergent ends, as Weber so 
clearly foresaw. It was inevitable then that the debate, while having political and ideological 
overtones, was in the end not a debate about political ideology so much as it was a debate 
about the politics of intellectual work. Discernible in position one is a particular embryonic 
version of what I call 'critics'; in position two, a particular version of 'reconstructors'. 
The tussle in the NEPI was surprisingly heated at times, but in the end, the stake was far larger 
than the NEPI: it had to do not only with how policy should best be done, but also about the 
political and professional forms that policy work should take. But these material co-ordinates 
were only to emerge clearly in phase three: in phase two, the initial jockeying for position in 
the intellectual field was conducted largely as a debate around equity and development, and 
this form of jockeying was conditioned largely by the early stage of interest-differentiation 
characterising this phase (Badat, Wolpe and Barends, 1994). In other words, because the 
emergent interest-contests had yet to take on mature institutional and material forms, because 
the 'struggle' continued to provide a unifYing, if diminishingly so, definition of the terrain, the 
emergent conflict of interests amongst the intellectuals could best be fought out in symbolic 
ways only. And yet, the terms of the discursive conflict, albeit locally inflected, are the terms 
of distinction that divide the terrain of intellectual work in all complex modern societies in 
glob ali sing times, as I have remarked above. For that reason, the 'equity-development' debate 
in the NEPI provides a revealing case study of the emergence of educational policy expertise, 
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of the emergence of 'reconstructors' in South African educational policy discourse, and of the 
re-positioning of critique and reconstruction. 
There were, of course, in the NEPI ranks those who propounded an 'equity only' position. 
These tended to be either politicians expressing, so they said, the demands and needs of their 
constituents, or NGOs who had been founded to deal directly with those expressed needs. On 
the other hand, there were also those who propounded a 'development only' position. These 
were mainly economists and human rf~sources experts, admittedly in a small minority in the 
NEPI. But with hindsight, it is remarkable that the debate was, by and large, joined in tenns 
of some or other necessary relation between them. The engagement between the two 
positions is the nearest that the national educational debate had so far got to balancing the 
intellectual roles of critique and reconstruction. History may well judge that the NEPI's 
greatest success was, for a brief period, to succeed in juggling, in the same discursive space, 
equity and development, politics and expertise, critique and reconstruction, without allowing 
them to become either conflated or split. 
If phase one was a phase of fission and phase three was to be a phase of severance as we shall 
see, phase two was a phase of teeth-gritting accommodation. To this extent, the NEPI was an 
exemplary anti-technicist policy endeavour, one both reflecting and deflecting the time of 
fledgling emergent interest group activity within which it was embedded. 
Phase Three: 1992 to 27 April 1994 
The third phase places these emergent features of post-liberalisation civil society the 
fragmentation of unified front constitutmcies and the emergence and consolidation of specific 
institutions taking either 'critical' or 'reconstruction' positions - into clearer focus. 
By 1992, 'reconstruction' had become serious business in South Africa, spearheaded not least 
by the two major founding activists of the NECC, Eric Molobi (Kagiso Trust) and Vusi 
Khanyile (Thebe Investments). Especially Molobi, by 1993, was co-ordinating and directing 
European Community (now Union) f111nding to 'reconstruction and development' projects 
only, and many donor-funded projects were either adapting from an 'equity only' position or 
going to the wall. 
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What Molobi and Khanyile as the NECC's pre-eminent activists had learnt was the self-
defeating effect of collapsing strategic and analytic activities, equality and development 
considerations. They came thus to pursue development for equity of a certain sort, and in so 
doing, they came to emphasise the technical task of reconstruction. In so doing too, they 
came to embody the view, if only implicitly, that only by splitting the two could reconstruction 
be promoted. In the event, neither Molobi nor Khanyile supported the NEPI to the end, since 
both became impatient with the way that the balancing enterprise slowed everything down. 
They were unimpressed too with the NEPI decision to present policy options rather than a 
coherent policy model, a decision perhaps more in keeping with the exigencies of the second 
phase than the needs of the third. 
Some academics felt obscurely betrayed when the NEPI consciously closed down at the end of 
1992. It had, after all, been a national rallying and organising initiative, and provided a forum 
for many local and individual voices that might not otherwise have found a national resonance. 
But any brake on the forward surge of progressive educators by the NEPI's demise was more 
apparent than real. In truth, the field was in more ferment than ever. The discussion below 
can give only a small flavour of it, and here only in terms of certain broad tendencies. I would 
certainly not want to claim that all educators now came to define themselves as either 'critics' 
or 'reconstructors', but I would suggest that all of them came to define themselves, if only 
implicitly, with respect to the two tendential roles of academic work, and thereby came to 
position themselves in a specific relation to both state and civil society. 
Numbers of erstwhile NEPI academics returned quite happily to their 'critical' colleagues in 
academia who had been morally marginalised by the first wave of policy work in phase two. 
From these quarters has emerged a new wave of critique, critical sometimes of prevailing 
concepts of 'development' (Chisholm, 1992), and sometimes of the idea of policy itself: 
Appel's (1993) paper is a scholarly version of a more widespread 'critical' received wisdom9. 
A related feature of this 'critical' regrouping is the beginning of professionalisation of critical 
academia. The Southern African Comparative and History Education Society was founded in 
1992 and the annual Kenton Conference, long holding out as a 'family' rather than an ' 
organisation, succumbed in 1993 to become Kenton Educational Association: so too the 
South African Association of Academic Development, and others. This more formalised 
organisational format emerges, it is surmised here, as civil society fragments and the need for 
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some kind of social base is more k(~enly felt. It is certainly too early to say how this 
professionalisation will tum out, but it may be surmised that educators taking this route will 
seek common cause (because of common material interest) with similar professional 
associations who, for reasons of political affiliation, they would previously have avoided like 
the plague: the conservative Pedago!~cal Society has, for example, approached the Kenton 
Educational Association for a possible merger. Both the sociological and psychological 
national communities, previously split into pro- and anti-apartheid organisations, have already 
re-merged. This is what the 'post-id!eological' period, in Offe's (1990) sense, will mean in 
practice. 
Two other developments also deserve mention here. The first is the regrouping amongst the 
education projects that were previOl:c&ly 'equity' -driven. These have now begun to form 
themselves into national proto-professional networks. While many of these may be seen, and 
may indeed see themselves, as 'reconstructors', their position is undergirded by a resolute 
polarisation between state provision lmd civil society provision. Indeed, many projects see 
themselves as the champions of 'th(: people' ('development is about people') against an 
uncaring state. The second development is the proliferation of donor-driven 'programme 
evaluations', formal assessments of project work in education, commissioned from either 
academia or from market-based educ,ational consultancies, giving rise to centres of virtually 
instant educational expertise that sprouted rapidly in this period (Taylor, 1995). 
A second group of erstwhile NEPI a.~ademics, together with others perhaps disappointed to 
have missed out on the NEPI, bitten by the bug of policy and keen to pursue it further, have 
looked for and found spaces to pursue these interests in the proliferation of education policy 
agencies, commissions and think tankH. Others, keen to have a more direct impact on policy, 
allied themselves to working groups of forums like the National Education Training Forum 
and the National Training Board. Thi:!; work has not emerged as abashedly technical as that in 
related sectors like housing, trade policy and health, although that will undoubtedly still come, 
especially as quantitative indicators of schooling quality become the policy fashion of the 
moment. Nevertheless, this work is demonstrably 'development oriented', engaged in macro 
systemic concerns, and is nationally relconstructive in focus. To that extent, it has reached out 
to power, so to speak, and has cut itself quite adrift from the localist, particularist, needs-
oriented discursive currents that wen~ far more centrally evident in the mainstream of policy 
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work in phase two. To that extent too, this work has forged multiple links with international 
policy and planning operations like the World Bank and other global educational consultants 
who visit now with increasing frequency. Willy-nilly, this branch of policy work is becoming 
part of the global mainstream concern with 'development' and 'reconstruction', terms 
popularised, operationalised and quantified by successive World Bank reports (see World 
Bank, 1991). 
The EPUs survived the transition to the third phase with mixed fortunes, continuing to shuttle 
rather unsatisfactorily between political and civil society, accepting commissions from both, 
but continuing to worry about their appropriate role. 
At the point of transition in April 1994, the groups of education academics, briefly and 
disorganisedly cobbled together under the NEPI mantle and forced to accommodate each 
other, had drifted apart, had differentially organised themselves and their relative reference 
groups, and had affirmed the split between the two roles, or comportments, of intellectual 
work once again (Hunter 1993/4). 
There are those who will claim that, in their persons, they have resolved the tension between 
critique and reconstruction, and that they are now integrated 'critical reconstructors'. The 
point being argued in this chapter is not that these individuals are not doing both critique and 
reconstruction work, but that in their critiques and reconstruction respectively, the tension 
between the two modes is not held in dynamic balance, except perhaps where the policy work 
is of a very general nature, or in exceptional cases. The more that policy work drives towards 
planning and implementation, the less can it entertain doubts about its constitutive grounds. In 
Weberian terms, ends have to be accepted for means to be technically elaborated (Weber, 
1949). And yet, just as planning must be practical and strategic, so critique is only coherent 
when it undertakes a systematic interrogation of those constitutive grounds. This argument is 
not about conceptual incompatibility so much as it is one about the social conditions that 
enable or constrain specific forms of intellectual work. When the agencies of collective 
association define 'good practice' as a dazzling display and deployment of 'high critique', as 
the annual Kenton Conference did for example (see Christian, 1989 for a critique of such 
critiques), and when the outside commissioning development bodies and donors will pay only 
for 'hard-nosed' reconstructive policy, then a balancing act like that accomplished in phase 
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two, however desirable it mayor may not be, simply cannot be sustained. Critics and 
reconstructors can then only comport themselves in separate and separated fields of 
endeavour, meeting occasionally (and uncomfortably) on one or the other's turf, but never in 
some discursive space where the game of either critique or reconstruction has not been 
predecided. 
Reprise: 'Scoundrel Time' Again? 
This chapter has tried to capture the flavour of the social movement of a very particular subset 
of intellectuals, the progressive educational academics in South Africa, over a relatively short 
period of time, in terms of a set of fralning concepts which, it is claimed here, effectively set 
the terms of operation for the field at th'e time. 
In the first phase, there was a collapse of the distinction between cognitive/analytical activities 
and strategic activities, between long term intellectual work and short term strategic work. 
The result was that both kinds of activity were hamstrung, and neither was particularly 
productively pursued in this period, with some individual exceptions of course. 
In the second phase, social justice concerns were separated out from development concerns, 
with the ensuing debate, cast most often in terms of 'equity' and 'development', by and large 
keeping the issues in some kind of dynalnic tension or suspension. 
In the third phase, with the momentolLs political events beginning to shape the re-forming 
state-civil society relationship, the tem:ion between 'critique' and 'reconstruction' to some 
extent snaps, and agents of the two domains of activity busy themselves consolidating their 
organisational life and their relative bases of social power. In so doing, South Africa comes 
into line with other democratic polities, on the intellectual as well as on the political plane. 
The intention has not been to depict a simple movement from social homogeneity to 
heterogeneity, which would be a seductive but fatal trap. Nor is it to represent, cynically, 
political liberation as a triumph for unrestrained self-interest jostling in the market place. The 
concern has been to show that intellectual work and argument is not only historically variable, 
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but that neither the debating tenns, nor the values attached to them, are easy to predict as the 
continuum of intellectual roles is reconfigured within changing historical circumstances, some 
of which are entirely local, others quite global. For some, following in the critical theory 
footsteps of Adorno, our world is fatally fallen, and to pretend to be able to give a positive 
reconstructive account of the conditions for equality and social justice is but another round of 
blind idealism that will trigger mass violence once the masses realise that it is simply another 
round of 'false promises' (Aronowitz, 1973), and they look for a scapegoat upon which to 
visit their fury: 'To try to abstractly portray the conditions of redemption, to give fonn to the 
hope of reconciliation as if it existed now, only promotes accommodation to a fallen world' 
(Cornell, 1992, p. 181). For the unreconstructed critics therefore, from Adorno to Foucault, 
to pursue positive knowledge of any kind in the world we find ourselves in is to become 
sucked into the power machine. Here is Breyten Breytenbach (1994, p. 5), articulating this 
definitive critical position in his commentary on the April election and its aftennath: 'How can 
those of us who fought against the power corruption of the previous regime now shirk the 
responsibility and the sheer joy of opposing without let-up our dear comrades snared in the 
putrefaction of power under the new rule?' The same sentiment is heard every day in the 
education project networks. This is war-talk, the battle-lines drawn, the perennial critical task 
of the intellectual re-invented for a new free South Africa. The honeymoon transition is over, 
says this view, the state is again the state, and civil society must again gird its loins to oppose 
it. 
Others draw different conclusions from the loss of certainty in late modernity. If 
transcendental truth is gone, then all knowledge, including policy knowledge, becomes worldly 
and pragmatic, and it falls to intellectuals to find the best possible set, through research, 
discussion and political debate (Taylor, 1992). This is classic Weberianism re-invented for a 
post-apartheid South Africa. The reconstructors thus become public intellectuals at the same 
moment that their critical colleagues retire to the semi-private spheres of academic 
conversation. By and large, the split is not mourned by the reconstructors and they are 
relieved to have the carping critics out of their hair. There is serious work to be done, they 
seem to be saying, people's well-being depends upon it, and the doubters must keep out of the 
way. We have had enough of the 'schooling of power': it is time to reassert the 'power of 
schooling'. The reconstructors in this phase go from analysis, to policy, to power. 
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No-one can win this argument. We: are now in what ZiZek (1991, p. 188) calls a new 
'scoundrel time', when the social basis for a mediatory position able to balance the two has all 
but disappeared. To say this is by no means to end by siding with the pessimists. Quite the 
contrary. Anyway, one intellectual task will always be to look for dialectical play, for 
redemptive openings precisely at the point of aporia or stalemate (Wexler, 1994). Critics, 
after all, speaking in the name of an unattained utopia, help to keep 'open the "beyond" of 
currently unimaginable transformative possibilities precisely in the name of Justice' (Cornell, 
1992, p. 182). Critics may feel that this is their most appropriate contribution to 
reconstruction, although it is one that is perennially appreciated neither by reconstructors, 
donors, nor erstwhile comrades in government. This is just one more demonstration that the 
sentiments of actors are at best a partial guide to the actual state of play in a given social field. 
Chapter 9 continues the discussion of the relationship between education and politics. Where 
this chapter has been concerned to examine how the line between the two is historically drawn 
and how roles and intellectual engagement become variably available, Chapter 9 explores the 
political possibilities of educational research itself, the degree to which research can itself 
become democratic. As I shall show, the limit occurs, as one might by now expect, at the 
boundary discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, that is, at the boundary between commonsense and 
specialised knowledge. 
Notes 
1 'We have no distinctive capacity in this regard - it is bogus to pretend that we do' 
(Appel, 1993, p. 232). 
2 'Our colleagues have given up science for social programmes ... these academics have ... 
changed their tune because they are playing a different game' (Appel, 1993, p. 236). 
3 . .. 'the priest, the Church, the apparatchik of every country substitutes his own vision of 
the world (a vision deformed by his own libido dominandi) for that of the group of 
which he is supposedly the expression. The 'people' is used these days just as in other 
times God was used - to settle accounts between clerics' (Bourdieu , 1992, p. 214). 
4 'Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is 
reconstruction, mere technique' (Adorno, 1978, p. 247). 
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'I absolutely will not play the part of one who prescribes solutions. I hold that the role 
of the intellectual today is not that of establishing laws or proposing solutions or 
prophesying, since by doing that one can only contribute to the functioning of a 
determinate situation of power that to my mind must be criticised' (Foucault, 1991, p. 
157). 
5 Related distinctions are potentates and travellers (Said, 1991), fools and knaves (Zizek, 
1997), and with a slightly different emphasis, vagabonds and tourists (Bauman, 1997) 
and natives and settlers (Mamdani, 1998). In each case, the second term denotes the 
new cosmopolitans of global society. 
6 See Gilmour and Soudien (1994) for an argument for the difference between 'equality' 
and 'equity'. Again, such an argument could not easily be taken on at this time. 
7 I chaired the NEPI Editorial Group. 
8 A list of the research groups and their publications is given in Chapter 9, th. 1. 
9 Tony Holiday (1993, p. 178) concludes a thoughtful paper by writing that such (critical) 
writings 'are not calls to action but curbs on activism, geared to still enthusiasm and not 
to stimulate it' . 
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Chapter 9 
BEYOND UNKEPT PROMIS]~S: THE MICRO-METHODOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGE IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH 
Introduction: On Parachutists and Truffle-Hunters 
Since the inception of social science thlere has been a debate between those favouring structure 
and those favouring agency; system and actor; the collective and the individual; the particular 
and the universal; the micro and the macro; the large and the small. It is simultaneously a 
debate about the proper object of social investigation, and the most appropriate method for 
studying it. The sociological study of education is no exception. 
It is not simply a tug of war between two opposed and mutually exclusive positions. Each 
side must make an explicit or implicit accommodation of the other's viewpoint, raising the 
problem of linkage and the problem of level or scope (Archer, 1987). Positions can be 
distinguished as to whether they are monistic and unitarian, or whether they are dualistic 
(Wacquant, 1992; Archer, 1982, 1987). Many contemporary dualists assert the distinctiveness 
of the two objects and levels of analY8is, but then go on to concentrate largely on either the 
micro (for example ethnography) or the macro (for example large scale survey research), 
ignoring the other and therefore deferring the crucial questions of scope and linkage. 
Traditional monists or unitarians assert the ontological pnmacy of either the tnlcro 
(methodological individualists, like the rational choice theorists) or the macro (methodological 
holists, like some forms of structuralism and systems theory). Here the question of linkage 
does not arise because, in the case of the former, the macro is collapsed into the micro; and in 
the case of the latter, the micro is dissolved into the macro. The problems of scope and 
linkage are thereby conjured away. This holds too for the situational individualism (or 
methodological situationalism) ofKnorr-Cetina (1981) which, by considering macro structures 
as endogenous to micro situations, does not permit the assessment of possibly differential 
weight that different kinds of structure and different kinds of agent might have in a particular 
case (Archer, 1987, p. 97). 
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These problems are directly addressed in a number of recent contributions. All of them might 
be said to be pursuing a kind of methodological relationalism where the relations between 
various parts of the social field are considered to be more important than either structure or 
agency taken alone. Notable amongst these are the 'duality of structure' structuration theory 
of Giddens (1979, 1983); the habitus/field structuralist constructivism (or constructivist 
structuralism) of Bourdieu (1989); and the 'analytically dualist' morphogenetic approach of 
Archer (1982). All three of them accept the 'double reality' of the social world, but while 
Giddens seems unwilling to address the methodological implications of his ontological 
position, (Muller, 1987a), Bourdieu and Archer in different ways make provision for different 
methodological moments of analysis within a broader investigation. 
These disputes are not likely to be easily settled, and a broad methodological pluralism, albeit 
constantly contested, will remain the order of the day. These disputes are however not only 
disputes about theory and method. Some writers have divined the emergence of a set of 
related changes in late modem society itself, which are beginning to destabilise the relationship 
of the universal to the particular arrived at in modernity. In late modernity, say these writers, 
we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of globalism and universalism - especially in 
the global economy, information networks and the media and at the same time, new forms of 
particularism, localism and active assertions of cultural and social difference - seen especially 
in the burgeoning youth sub-cultures, in the new social movements, and in the assertions of 
ethnic particularity in the West, East and Africa alike (see for example Giddens, 1990; 
Robertson, 1991; Seligman, 1990). Bauman (1998) deploys the term 'glocalisation' to 
describe this complex phenomenon (see also Chapters 1 and 2). 
No longer afforded easy recourse to linear and evolutionary models of social development, 
social scientific theory and methodology have struggled to come to terms with this confusing 
emergent configuration which, says Robertson (1991, p. 73), is 'a massive, twofold process 
involving the interpenetration of the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation 
of universalism ... '. On the one hand, the sociological poles have been asserted again with 
renewed vigour, and we are seeing simultaneously the return of 'grand theorizing' (see for 
example Alexander, 1988) and innovations in historical macro-sociology; and on the other, the 
triumph of the 'micro-sociological revolution' (Collins, 1985), without any successful or 
sustained attempts to unite the two traditions. Whether we have moved beyond Mills' two 
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bete noirs, 'grand theory' and 'abstracted empiricism', is indeed a moot question. But on the 
other hand, in the emergent late modem global condition of openness, confusion, rupture and 
contingency, a number of writers of widely differing persuasions are detecting new modes of 
personal and collective action, new forms of reflexive self-monitoring and self-interpretation 
(Giddens, 1991), new modes of 'historicity' and 'auto-creativity' in the new social movements 
(Touraine, 1977; Hegedus, 1990), and an aetheticisation and culturalisation - that is, a greater 
choice-governedness - of politics and €lveryday life (Featherstone, 1991). 
Writers following this line of analysis have, in other words, displaced the question of structure 
and agency from a methodological to Ii socio-historical issue. They mean, in plain terms, that 
the scope of agency vastly increases in late modernity, and that by implication, methodology 
should follow suit. As Lash (1993, p. 19) says, with only a trace of irony, 'Given these 
transformed social conditions, even the hardened structuralist is forced to be an action 
theorist' . 
Whether or not these changing social configurations can be demonstrated to be so is beside the 
point. After all, as Bourdieu (1992, p. 179) wryly points out, the 'return of the subject' has 
been heralded with monotonous regularity since the time of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. 
Whether the present 'resurrection' differs qualitatively is hard to say. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that, commensurate with this contemporary trend, a new aggressive 
methodological direction, especially in education, is most distinctly discernible: enter what 
Laermans (1993, p. 153) calls the 'new existentialists', a new breed of Le Roy Ladurie's 
'truffle-hunters', separated from his macro-methodological 'parachutists' not so much now by 
epistemology and methodology as by politics, espousing the value of grassroots participation 
above all else. It is a style that is: avowedly and unrepentantly partisan, pro-advocacy, 
constructivist, anti-positivist and, above all, radically democratic and empowering in process 
and goal (see for example Lather, 1991, pp. 52-56 for a programmatic statement of this 
position). It is a style of research that sets itself sharply against other forms of research, most 
scathingly against a variety of empirical methodologies that are usually rejected as 'positivist', 
but also at times against earlier emancipatory methodologies like action research, dismissed by 
Lather (1991, p. 56) as operating from 'an ahistorical, apolitical value system'. What Lather 
has in mind is far more than mere consultation, participation and involvement, but a research 
process and a resulting theory that is, 'an expression and elaboration of progressive popular 
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feelings rather than abstract frameworks imposed by intellectuals on the messy complexity of 
lived experience' (Lather, op. cit., p. 62). 
There are many social scientists that would view this trend with some alarm, and there are 
probably some who would dismiss it out of hand. After all, as Bernstein (1991) points out, 
there is in such radical gestures of opposition and negation, in such heady rejections of the 
methodological status quo, no necessary change in the terms and parameters of method but 
the possibility of a curious preservation if not affirmation of the status quo, only now reversed 
or stood on its head. In this way, such gestures of radical negation can easily end up 
'complicit with, and parasitic upon what they are presumably rejecting' (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 
308). That is, however, by no means to say that we can simply ignore them. If there is any 
basis at all for accepting Lash's diagnosis that we are heading for a world where the scope of 
agency is indeed increased, then this form of research is also likely to increase in scope, 
popularity and insistence. I suspect it is a form we will have to take very seriously indeed. 
The particular form of 'new truflle-hunting' that I will explore in this chapter is that of 
participatory policy research (PPR). I will hinge my analysis by reflecting upon a concrete 
context of research, the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), discussed in Chapter 
8, and more particularly, upon a specific attempt to pursue participatory policy research in one 
of the NEPI research groups (The National Education Policy Investigation, 1992, 1993). By 
interrogating this experience and a written reflection on it, I will address the following 
questions: 
• What kind of 'usable knowledge' (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) can be got from ordinary 
people by 'just asking them' (Harre, 1979) when the object of the investigation is to devise 
policy-linked knowledge? 
• Who gets 'empowered' in PPR, if anybody, and how? 
• What are some of the possibilities and limits ofPPR? 
Democratic Research and Politics 
As I have said before, the liberalising reforms of February 2 1990 changed the political ground 
in South Africa decisively. In the first place, the longed-for deliverance from apartheid and 
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other forms of oppression zoomed in from the distant future to within palpable reach. This 
meant that political contenders became rapidly obliged to spell out the details of their desired 
future for this or that sector of government or administration. In similar vein, groups like the 
National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC), a national umbrella structure bringing 
together teacher, student and parent groups mainly from educationally disadvantaged black 
communities for the purpose of orchestrating opposition to apartheid education, found itself 
being consulted from all directions on its position with regard to future education policy (see 
the previous chapter). The NECC had, in the latter 1980s, sponsored the establishment of a 
number of Education Policy Units at sympathetic liberal universities, but these Units had by no 
means generated a comprehensive view of the education system, nor had they systematically 
explored concrete policy alternatives. This had now become an urgent necessity. 
In December 1990 the NECC commissioned a national investigation, to be known as the 
National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), charged with providing comprehensive and 
systematic policy options for a future education dispensation from the value perspective of the 
'broad democratic movement', and within the programmatic framework of 'People's 
Education' (Muller, 1987b). In December 1992 NEPI published twelve sectoral report 
booklets and a Framework ReportI . This was, without question, one of the largest policy 
investigations in size, scope and scale to have taken place in South Africa outside the aegis of 
the state or the parastatal organisations. 
Because of its provenance in the NECC and the democratic movement, it was expected of the 
NEPI to be accountable, participatory, democratic, and egalitarian. The NEPI was to analyse 
policy options for and with 'the people'. This meant inter alia the following: that community 
representatives would sit on all the guiding committees; that the NEPI should make 
extraordinary efforts to involve and 'empower' disadvantaged social sectors (blacks, women 
and rural persons being considered the most important); that practitioners and, in some cases, 
interested members of the community should participate in the research groups; that the 
NECC constituencies should express a~ popular opinion about the viability of policy options 
before publication; that the NEPI should popularise and disseminate its findings as widely as 
possible via 'consultative forums' . 
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The ethos and values of 'People's Education' runs strongly through all of these expectations, 
and in particular, through what may be called the republican (as opposed to liberal) view of 
equality and participatory (rather than representative) view of democracy (Hindess, 1990). In 
this tradition, equality means above all the right, the ability, and the duty to participate in the 
political life of the community: the good of the individual as well as of the community 
depends upon it. Given the definitively exclusionary nature of apartheid education, it is small 
wonder that 'People's Education' as a normative ideal set itself against apartheid education by 
insisting on maximising participation not only in the educational process itself, but in the policy 
making process and, indeed, in some formulations, in the determination of the curriculum and 
of knowledge itself (Mashamba, 1990). 
The NEPI research groups responded unevenly to these injunctions, particularly with regard to 
participatory involvement. It was said at the time that the pressing time limits precluded 
comprehensive participatory involvement; no-one denies that proper participatory methods are 
time-consuming. On the other hand, there were some serious attempts at participatory 
involvement. Before I go on to examine one of these attempts further, it may be worthwhile 
examining some of the issues at stake in doing empowering participatory research. The 
question hovering in the background is - was it feasible, or even desirable, for the NEPI to 
have entertained a more thorough-going participatoriness? 
Some Limits to Full Participation 
There is an obvious sense in which policy research without some form of popular engagement 
is self-defeating: for if research results, and policies based upon them, run directly counter to 
popular commonsense, then the likelihood is great that grassroots resistance will defeat the 
aims of the policy. The clash between birth control policies and fertility mores in many Third 
World countries, like the Middle East for instance, is a case in point. Similarly, the 
progressive multilingual language of instruction policy of the new South African government 
in the late 1990s has made little impact on the beliefs of most black parents who want their 
children schooled in English (Taylor and Vinjevold, 1999). As Grossberg (1993, p. 13) says, 
we can never afford to forget the 'fundamental lesson: that people cannot be successfully 
changed or moved politically if one begins by telling them that their deepest beliefs and 
investments are mistaken'. On the other hand, that this resistance stands a chance of 
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disadvantaging the resisters rather than advantaging them is an ironic twist unfortunately all 
too familiar in the literature at least since Willis (1977) and his self-confirming 'lads'. 
Nevertheless, the imperative to articulate with 'the people' has become distilled as the central 
methodological issue for certain researchers with a progressive bent and has become, for 
some, reason enough to forsake any attempt to do effective policy research without extensive 
use of participatory methods (Shaeffer, 1992). 
The problem is compounded in the field of education by the fact that there are great numbers 
of ordinary persons around who have some first-hand experience and knowledge of the 
system. After all, there is no literate person who has not been a direct witness to the 
operations of the system. It seems but a small step to go on to say therefore that those who 
do participate, and have participated, in the system have a right to participate in the generation 
of knowledge about its change. 
The strong form of this claim from the 'new truffle-hunters' is, as we have seen, for 'full 
reciprocity in research' (Lather, 1991, p. 60). This claim, as we have also seen, is exemplified 
in the ethos of People's Education as it enjoins people to 'think through and actively 
participate in creating a new education system' (Kruss, 1988, p. 18), to 'participate in 
generating knowledge' and to 'participate in the very definition of what reality is' (McKay and 
Romm, 1992, p. 101). It is also a guiding ideal of Curriculum 2005, discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
The 'full reciprocity' programme comists principally in rejecting the claims of a critical theory, 
or indeed of any metanarrative, scientific or otherwise, to provide a 'better' account of social 
life than that provided by common:sense accounts. Indeed, in another but related idiom, 
Ellsworth (1979) refers to such emancipatory theories as 'repressive myths' which, against 
their empowering intents, have themselves become 'vehicles of repression' (Ellsworth, op. cit., 
p. 298) based on chauvinistic enlightenment rationality and its progenitors' (sometimes 
unconscious) desire to dominate the symbolic universe. The 'expert' in this view has access to 
no superior method to gain a 'high~~r' view of social life, and her expertise has no superior 
epistemic warrant (Lynch, 1998). H~r role in social investigation becomes one of 'facilitating' 
the participative and democratic gem:ration of social knowledge. 
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The 'new trufi1e-hunters', in their efforts to evade the impositions of an alien and oppressive 
theory, in their striving for a radically democratic research and knowledge generation process, 
in their desire to go 'well beyond' more traditional forms of action research (Lather, 1991, p. 
56), run the risk of parting company with critical theory, traditionally conceived, which lies at 
the heart of democratic emancipatory forms of research to date. Central to all forms of critical 
theory, including that of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, is what Bourdieu (1992, p. 8 n.14) calls 
the 'principle of non-consciousness' or non-transparency. This refers to the doxic nature of 
all first-hand knowledge, and to the need for an analytical narrative of the social world to 
account for the constitution and limits of doxa (the theoretical basis for this argument is 
presented in Chapter 10). 
It does not much matter whether this doxa is said to be located in false consciousness, 
ideology, habitus, commonsense, or even accounted for in neo-Freudian terms of repression 
and self-deception. The point is that doxa is not transparent to itself or, as chapter 1 puts it, 
is not self-reflexive. Foucault has named the problem with precision: 'People know what they 
do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what they do 
does' (cited by Dowling, 1992, p. 1). To dispense in the interests of equality and democracy 
with the distinction between analytical narrative and doxa, between analyst and layperson, is, 
from the view point of critical theory, to risk recycling commonsense as good sense, and to 
forego the possibility of generating emancipatory or empowering insight (Deacon and Parker, 
1991). In its democratic intents, therefore, it risks leaving the participatory approach without 
critical resources for empowerment. 
These cognitive resources have themselves, however, come under increasingly critical 
scrutiny. Traditional action and participatory research, as Shaeffer (1992, p. 10) says, is 'a 
process fraught with difficulties, disappointments, and unkept promises'. The source of that 
disappointment can be traced back in part to simplistic assumptions about the nature of doxa 
and what keeps it in place. The most established versions assume that it is grounded in 
epistemological error and that the critical theorist would act as some kind of benign educator, 
conceiving this process of 'social therapy' on the model, as Bauman (1983, p. 115) has rather 
unkindly put it, of a "'learn in" or "teach in" session'. 
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There are three things briefly to addl here. First, to use Bourdieu's language, dispositions 
cannot realistically be expected to change if the positions that they depend upon have no hope 
of changing. Dispositions, in other words, have material implications and consequences which 
the educative mode generally cannot deal with, nor realistically empower people in the short 
term to deal with. Secondly, dispositions and habitus are, after all, more or less comfortable 
and congenial bodily modes of accommodation to one's position in the world. It would be 
strange indeed if people did not feel some kind of attachment to these modes of being and 
therefore some reluctance to take on the new orientation. As Eder (1999, p. 209) 
provocatively puts it: 'Why is it so hard to change the world? The answer would be: because 
societies don't like to learn. They would rather stick to what they know and to the rules that 
stabilise what they know.' And thirdly, it may well be, as the neo-Freudians suggest, that the 
active resistance that critical theory has so often encountered in the past (for example, Willis, 
1977) rests upon evasion of uncomfo11able realities. If one accepts all or only some of these 
views, then a direct epistemological assault of the Habermasian variety, a critical theory that 
aims to empower by creating enlightenment (Fay, 1977, p. 104), is open to question, and risks 
making promises that it cannot keep. The 'new truflle-hunters' do not need to share any of 
these reservations to share the sceptidsm about the emancipatory and empowering possibilities 
of critical theory. But, as we have seen, in rejecting the pretensions of critical theory on 
political grounds they reject for that mason also the doxalanalysis distinction, and in rejecting 
it risk another kind of simplification. Above all, they dispense with the only relational tool 
they might have had which could relate agency and structure in their research practice: they 
lose thus the relationality discus:>ed above, and regress theoretically as well as 
methodologically in the process. 
If the 'new truflle-hunters' have become cynical about the emancipatory claims of traditional 
theory, some of them have in similar vein come to be sceptical about the claims of 
participatory research to deal with the contributions of all participants in the research process 
on the basis of equality, Not everyone has the same contribution to make, not everyone has 
the same set of skills. Both of these ane a product of each person's past history of opportunity 
and experience, and both of them are deeply marked by relations of power. Research 
relations, like all social relations, are also relations of power. The reality of power differentials 
cannot be wished away by egalitarianism, nor is the latter well-served by assuming that all 
participants are equal negotiators in thl~ research. Yet certain forms of participatory or action 
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research assume the equality of contribution that an older critical theory saw as its goal. The 
result is paradoxically likely to benefit the ones already relatively privileged in the situation by 
a process of what Bourdieu (1992, p. 143) calls 'symbolic de-negation', (Freud's Verneining): 
that is, 'the fictitious bracketing of the relation of power (which) exploits this relation of 
power in order to produce the recognition of the relation of power that abdication elicits'. 
When this 'fictitious bracketing' and 'denial' leads to the reproduction of privilege and 
disprivilege, the result of this can only be disillusionment and anger on the part of those who 
had hoped for, and had been promised, more. 
This section has examined some of the limits to the programme of 'full participation', namely, 
the impossibility of doxic self-transparency and therefore the indispensability of analytical (or 
reflexive) discourse; and the ubiquity of unequal social relations in the research process. This 
sets the stage for examining the vicissitudes of a concrete attempt to empower less 
experienced participants in a participatory process in one of the research groups of the NEPI 
project. 
Once Bitten ... 
The Support Services Research Group of the NEPI was a group with three main sub-groups: 
Guidance and Counselling; Special Education; and School Health. The Guidance and 
Counselling sub-group was in tum composed of academics, guidance teachers and students, 
and people from the guidance non-governmental sector. A decision was taken early on in the 
life of the group to pursue collective decision-making and a collective research process 'where 
responsibility for the process and product of the research is a collaborative one' (Lazarus, 
1990, p. 1). 
This group took up in good faith the NEPI injunctions to try to train less experienced (mostly 
black) researchers, and such people formed part of the team. They took up too the NEPI 
values of democracy and equality. 
There was a pervaSIve expectation that collective participation would, in itself, be 
empowering, and that the more experienced researchers would (somehow) create the 
conditions conducive for this to happen. What precise role they would play in this was never 
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clearly developed, probably due in part to the desire not to highlight formal differences of skill 
and capacity in a context where democracy and equality of participation were the primary 
virtues, and possibly too because the group found itself working to fairly tight deadlines. 
The allocation of tasks was the resullt of collective decision-making, and it may not be too 
surprising that the more experienced (white) researchers were allocated the relatively more 
complex researching and writing tasks while the less experienced (black) researchers 
volunteered for the less complex tasks that utilised the skills they felt more confident in 
performing (Ganie and Prinsloo, 1993). The result was that the more experienced researchers 
gained invaluable practice in research and writing, while the less experienced researchers did 
not. It is not hard to imagine who was empowered in the process. 
On the face of things, the cynic may well feel that this was bound to happen. Why it happened 
may easily be surmised from the pressure of deadlines, and from the findings of research 
training efforts that have discovered that, to impart methodological skills in a less than 
superficial way, is an onerous and time-consuming business (Motala, 1991). How it happened, 
or rather, how it was allowed to happen, embedded as it was in a context where empowerment 
of the less experienced was an explicit aim, is the more interesting question. 
The first thing to note is that, at the time, the participants were by and large unaware of what 
was happening: that is, they inhabited their own self-description of the situation which was in 
terms of' equality of participation', 'democracy' , and 'empowerment' of the less experienced 
black researchers. After completion of the project, a number of the participants got together 
with the aim of reflecting on their experiences of participatory research. A first draft produced 
what they later came to consider a bland and superficial paper from within their received self-
understanding, leaving them frustnl~ted and dissatisfied. Upon further slow and painful 
reflection it began to dawn on them that they had not really developed their skills in the 
process, and they began to reconstmct the dynamics within the research group with growing 
anger. 
The paper that resulted (Ganie and Prinsloo, 1993) does not simply blame the more 
experienced white researchers. On 1the one hand, they were certainly partly culpable for not 
challenging the less experienced rese:archers more persistently to take greater responsibility for 
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developing their skills. On the other hand, the less experienced researchers, with 'lack of 
confidence' as an alibi, consciously ('democratically') chose the 'less complex tasks', thereby 
actively colluding in their lot. In other words, neither the more nor the less experienced 
researchers took responsibility for taking the decisions that could produce the empowerment 
that was to be both process and aim of the research. The real culprit, the writers came to see, 
was the collectively produced and maintained 'situation of false equality' in the group. It was 
this false equality which, whilst remaining unaddressed, acted as an effective block to the 
group's dealing with the heart of the problem. 
It is important to recognise what had happened here. The participants came to see that, by 
enacting the democratic and equalitarian ethos of a certain form of participatory research, they 
had actively if unwittingly duped themselves, producing in the process the opposite result to 
that intended. But this is not the end of the tale. In reconstructing the process, not only in 
discussion and reflection but in writing - the very task they had declined to assume in the 
NEPI - in reconstructing the construction of their disappointment and the failure of the 
empowerment process, the participants have come, through recognising their own resistance 
and their own failure to take responsibility, to assume the responsibility they declined in the 
NEPI. In taking responsibility for their own resistance in a systematic way, the participants 
have written themselves through their own disempowerment: and in so doing they did what 
they could not do in the NEPI - they began to empower themselves. 
It would be wrong to overstate the case. On the one hand, the participants have been 
empowered by means of emotional purgation as well as useful practice in the very skills they 
felt excluded from. But for them to become skilled researchers and writers will yet require 
arduous and disciplined practice. They have only taken the first enabling step, they have not 
magically been catapulted into full mastery. But the step they have taken is arguably the most 
important one to take for anyone wishing to adopt an analytical stance towards the social 
world. For they have come to see at first hand, in terms of their own case, what Bourdieu 
(1992, p. 136) laconically calls the 'complicity between position and dispositions', the way in 
which, by making use of the only rules that our habitus makes available to hand, we habitually 
'play the game', and thereby collude (from ludus, the game) as a matter of ordinary social 
existence. This is the insight which certain forms of participatory research, in their 
'spontaneist populism' (Bourdieu 1992, p. 82), actively block. 
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Conclusion: Beyond Sour Grapes 
It may be the case that empowerment, like love, is essentially an artifactual state, a by-product 
of another process altogether. As Elster (1982) says, we do not and cannot say to ourselves, 
'now I will fall in love'. At a certain moment, I find myself in love. Perhaps empowerment is 
such a state, something we have to find ourselves in rather than actively pursue in and of itself 
One may even say that empowemlent is the dispositional counterpart to the concrete 
acquisition of valued social capital, like research skills for example. If that is so, then it is the 
skills that must be pursued for the state to be realised. 
This could be expressed another way. Pursuing the democratic generation of knowledge may 
not directly engender empowerment. What it may produce, as in the case here, is frustration 
at its non-production, and it may be this very frustration (or something like it) which may 
provide the conditions, which the original innocent intention could not, for the kind of effort 
of which empowerment is the by-product. As ZiZek, 1991, says, the paradigmatic by-product 
state is Freud's transference, and it is arguably this that is arrived at when people, like our 
participants, work through the truth of their own resistance. 
This does not of course imply that we should forsake the aim of empowerment, or forego 
democratic contexts of knowledge production. But it does mean that we should be far more 
sanguine about their achievement, andl that we should be far more mindful about the complex 
personal and social dynamics involved when we embark on social missions like 
'empowerment' in unequal societies and social contexts. 
This chapter has been a somewhat circuitous attempt to address Lather's (1991) question: 
how can we have an emancipatory critical theory in a post-foundationalist age? My response 
has been, first, to acknowledge that critical theory may, in some of its manifestations, function 
in repressive and counter-productive ways, but that to dispense with a critical theory or an 
analytical narrative altogether is to di8pense with tools for understanding the constitution and 
limits of our habitual ways of thinking. To forego this kind of moderate realism for a 'hot 
relativism' (Turner, 1998) of the kind espoused by the 'new truffle hunters' is both an 
epistemological and political mistake, an argument I address directly in Chapter 10. Secondly, 
I have tried to show, by means of a case study, that 'equality' and 'empowerment', as desired 
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social ends, will be fatally stymied if we do not have a way of understanding how our vety 
social arrangements (here, a particular form of participatoty research) collude with the status 
quo in ways that are not immediately evident to commonsense. 
And so to return to my introductoty remarks. Our social existence in late modernity may well 
be placing greater onus on us as decision-making and self-monitoring beings than heretofore. 
But that does not mean that our thoughts and actions thereby become transparent to us. 
Arguably, the issue of analytical reflectiveness, of a reflexive social science, becomes even 
more important in such a context. The 'new truffle-hunters' are clearly responding to real 
social trends and tendencies as they perceive them. It would be a great pity if they lost their 
balance into micro-actionist perspectivalism and 'hot relativism' altogether. That would be of 
dubious value to the collective enterprise of educational reform, a topic directly addressed in 
Chapter 10. 
Notes 
1 The following booklets are in the NEPI series: 
• The Framework Report and Final Report Summaries. 
• Adult Basic Education 
• Adult Education 
• Curriculum 
• Early Childhood Educare 
• Education Planning, Systems and Structure 
• Governance and Administration 
• Human Resources Development 
• Language 
• Libraty and Information Services 
• Post-secondaty Education 
• Teacher Education 
They have all been published jointly by Oxford University Press and the NECC. 
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REASON, REALITY AND PUBLIC TRUST: EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH FOR POLICY 
Introduction: Science, Politics, Relativism 
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This chapter returns us to a theme with which I began in Chapter 2, namely, increasing 
uncertainty and its impact on the production of new knowledge for social ends. We live at a 
time when faith in the viability of politics based on science and objective knowledge as an 
antidote to poverty, race, unemployment and social insecurity has all but disappeared. Such 
old-fashioned notions as objective knowledge have, it seems, lost their purchase on popular 
imagination and national striving. 
Is this to overstate the case? TherE: are those who say that all we really need is a strong 
national movement of restoration, an ethical or cultural 'back-to-basics' that involves a stout 
defence of the modem project and the state's leading role in it, a quick but devastating attack 
on post-modem cynicism, and a clear re-dedication of faith and resources to the enterprise of 
the research of useful knowledge fer politics. But perhaps it is too late. Perhaps, as the 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 has suggested, the nature of the institution of science really has 
changed, that its relation to the worldly spheres of politics and the economy really has been re-
aligned, that the debates around the objectivity, neutrality and relativism of knowledge really 
have changed the nature of knowledge and the practice of its construction, research. 
The greatest pitfall in considering these issues is to imagine that it is all one, or all the other, an 
apocalyptic style of thought which marks out particular positions in the debate rather than 
depicts the debate itself. As I hope to show below, this 'all or nothing' style of thought can be 
found on both sides of the debate - from those who say that the enterprise of science hasn't 
changed fundamentally at all and that the doubters must be repelled at all costs; to those who 
believe we have left one paradigm behind for ever, and now inhabit some or other post-
. 
scientific brave new world. 
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The position to be defended in this chapter is the following: the institution of science has 
changed; notions of 'useful knowledge' have left us in little doubt that ideas of absolute 
certainty, objectivity and neutrality can no longer be supported. For all that, and accepting 
most of it, it is still possible, and more important than ever, to maintain that there is a real 
social world relatively independent from our ways of viewing it, about which we can make 
assertions whose veracity we can reliably judge. Just because there are no universal rational 
values or nonns does not spell the end of the enterprise of rational knowledge and research. 
The naked truth might no longer be attainable, but a modestly clothed one surely is, and to be 
prized all the more highly. 
The two sub-sections which follow attempt to layout the grounds for this position. First, the 
question of the changing social role of science will be investigated; second, some 
contemporary debates around the nature of knowledge, truth and reality will be reviewed. The 
argument made here is that some of these positions exceed their philosophical warrant, that 
they conclude far beyond the remit of their propositional base: that they are, in good old-
fashioned language, wrong. This will then set the stage for the next section, which examines 
the emergence of this style of 'over-reach' in educational thinking. Finally, this part of the 
chapter will reflect on the unfortunate and quite unproductive polarisation that has resulted, a 
veritable 'dance of the strawmen', and will explore some routes to its supercession. 
SciencelPolitics 
The grand era of technocracy in world politics is over, its founding ideals completely 
discredited. When Vannevar Bush in 1945 announced in his report 'Science: The Endless 
Frontier' that the USA would embark on a glorious path of scientific eradication of poverty 
and all other social ills, he could not know that he was putting a capstone on a tradition that, 
from Francis Bacon to Max Weber, conceived of politics as the 'world of values' which 
created problems for the 'world of science' to solve (Sclove, 1998). Politics was the realm of 
interests; science was the realm of disinterested knowledge that produced knowledge for 
policy dilemmas based on those interests. The two realms were, and had to be kept, quite 
separate. The scientists would produce knowledge, but not decisions. They would speak 
truth to power, but just as the political problems originated with politics, so the decisions 
based on the truth would also reside there. The researcher-as-technocrat was thus conceived 
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as a neutral truth-relay between political problem-setting and political decision-making. This 
tradition has come to an end. 
It broke down at both ends of the relay. Most spectacularly, it broke down when important, 
public and visible scientifically-based decisions turned out to be wrong, as in the disasters with 
nuclear reactors, with pharmaceuticaJls, and in a rapidly proliferating set of ecological areas 
where scientifically-based interventions produced unanticipated outcomes - the destruction of 
the ozone layer, for example, and global warming. Or is it in fact, 'really', getting warmer? 
Here lies the second rub: scientists don't necessarily agree on these matters. In this and in 
countless other matters from cholestieTol to exercise, it came as a shattering blow to public 
confidence in science that science could be plural - that not all scientists necessarily agreed, or 
that Science with a big S didn't always deliver Truth in the singular and with a big T. 
And why did these scientists disagree" Was it merely that the truth had not yet been finalised, 
like some kind of engine prototype that was rough around the edges but correct in 'the 
essentials'? Or was it, as some in the public sphere began to suspect, because scientists too 
had interests, and these different results were quite simply explicable in terms of the different 
interests, agendas and ideologies that scientists held or served? Was science, in fact, simply 
'politics pursued by other means' as Latour (1993, p. 111) has famously claimed? 
The reality is rather more mundane, although no more reassuring to an anxious public. There 
had in fact always been dispute and difference of opinion among scientists, in Aristotle's time 
as well as Bacon's and Weber's. TwCl factors served to shield it from the public's gaze, which 
has been quite uncurious until recently. The first was the inwardness of science, its relative 
insulation from the outside world. Tins insulation kept most of the workings of science from 
public view, showing only its products, and then selectively. The second was the relatively 
small numbers in the scientific community. The massification of higher education in the 
developed countries had by the 1960s, and 1970s extruded an exponentially greater number of 
competent, knowledgeable scientists and potential researchers than the traditional take-up 
capacity in the higher education institutions, traditional think-tanks and research and 
development laboratories could absorb (see the discussion in Chapter 3). New forms of 
research-based bodies sprang up, in the private sector, in NGOs, and in civic advocacy forums. 
These were all increasingly numerous competitors for increasingly finite and, by the early 
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1990s, globally dwindling resources for research. Consequently, the internal disputes of 
science could no longer easily be contained, especially when scientists began to align 
themselves with worldly civic interest groups which they increasingly did as the instrument of 
uncertainty-reduction par excellence, science itself, began to contribute to the very uncertainty 
it was supposed to contain. And so as uncertainty became lodged as a political factor in the 
consciousness of the public in the developed, and to a lesser extent developing, world, so 
science, which was now a prime producer of the new 'riskiness', was also and increasingly 
looked to in order to assuage or arbitrate the burgeoning uncertainty and complexity of 
everyday life. 
The interlinked or close-coupled (Weingart, 1997) nature of the phenomenon should be clear. 
As society has more and more recourse to research or knowledge-mediated products, so 
uncertainties proliferate. As uncertainties proliferate, so people turn to science for uncertainty 
reduction. The increase in uncertainty is partly a product of the increased visibility of 
disputation, as discussed above. But the proliferation of science-generated errors and, 
sometimes, disasters must also be explained. The increased use of expertise and knowledge in 
political and economic decision-making drives experts to go beyond the scope of their 
knowledge, 'beyond the evidence' as it were. The pressure of politics and competitiveness 
drives scientists to produce judgements on real world problems that go beyond the current 
level of consensus in the expert community. They stray, in other words, out of their scientific 
zone into the sphere of prescription and advocacy. Mistakes are made, and disagreement is 
aired. When that happens, science begins to leak legitimacy. This leads in turn to a greater, 
not a lesser, desire for expertise. Thus we can see that even attempts at control of expertise 
will proliferate its social need and function. 
This is only paradoxical if one imagines that close-coupling entails an erosion of the functional 
differentiation between the science system and the politics system, leading to a convergence in 
kind between science and politics. On the contrary, even as the systems become more closely 
coupled, so at the same time and by the same logic, the systems, or at least the science system, 
is spurred to greater internal differentiation. Closer coupling thus accompanies, and causes, 
differentiation; it does not occur instead of differentiation. Yet it is this latter conclusion that 
the post-moderns persistently derive from the phenomenon of systemic close-coupling. And it 
is this derivation that leads to particular consequences in the practice of educational research. 
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The post-modem interpretation, whieh has become relatively common, has a further social 
impact: it signals to the public not only that scientists cannot be trusted, that in the execution 
of their scientific work they have interests which cannot be expunged from the process. It 
takes the further step which portrays scientists and researchers as merely another interest 
group, with no special claim to arbitrate the veracity of warrantable assertions. As Couzzens 
and Woodhouse (1995, p. 533) say: 'From guardians of the common good producing 
objective knowledge, scientists are now perceived as hired brains of special interests and 
lobbyists for their own'. Alexander (1995, p. 3) has called this the 'sociological fallacy', 
namely, that because ideas have social sources, they can be adequately explained by reference 
to the social source alone. This form of reductionism entails a kind of dumbing-down of 
expertise. It is a view which scientists and academics, for understandable reasons, have begun 
vigorously and often aggressively to n~but: 
The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that 
everything boils down to subje:ctive interests and perspectives is second only to 
American political campaigns - the most prominent and pernicious 
manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. 
Laudan, 1990, p.x; quoted also on the Sokal Affair homepage. 
The debate to be discussed below, characterised as it is by misunderstandings, misattributions, 
and not least, misnomers, arises as we shall see directly from this retaliation of 'working 
scientists' against what they perceive as an intellectual undennining of their professional 
practice. The debate is thus frequently high-flown, but it is always also about professional and 
political standing. 
There is at least one undisputable social benefit that accrues from the sceptical gaze that 
society now casts on the scientists. In the past, scientists could safely assume that society 
regarded science and the products of their expertise as inherently worthwhile. This is no 
longer the case. As disputes arise, and as politicians and the public wonder increasingly who 
they should believe, the scientific community will increasingly be expected to demonstrate the 
worth of its endeavours to a bemused public - whether this worth is economic (does it lead to 
technological advance?) or political (does it help us make better decisions?). This new 
demand for social utility and for public accountability is a direct outcome of the repositioned 
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status of the scientific community m a closer-coupled social complex (Couzzens and 
Woodhouse, 1995). Although scientists will chafe under the new restrictions which 
accompany these demands for utility and accountability, and although it could lead to abuses 
of power and corruption (as in the global jockeying around a cure for AIDS), close-coupling 
in the end makes visible links that have in various ways always been present, and allows 
society therefore to build democratic safeguards. What this new public scepticism does not 
need is artificial amplification by a reductive post-modernism that reduces all expertise to 
power and interest. 
Constructivists and Realists 
Almost without anyone quite noticing its approach, social science research in general and 
educational research in particular finds itself in the middle of a fully-fledged methodological 
war. Who is winning the war cannot easily be gleaned from the writings of the protagonists, 
since both sides claim dominance by the others and underdog status for themselves. For Guba 
and Lincoln (1994), for example, it is 'positivism' (or perhaps 'post-positivism') that has 
supplanted what they call 'Aristotelian' approaches to research. It is not easy to tell whether 
they mean anything more by this than that quantitative methods seem to enjoy precedence over 
qualitative ones in the high status publishing forums. For Martin and Sugerman (1993), on the 
other hand, it is the 'Aristotelian' approaches themselves that have overrun the research 
terrain, and they call for a tum to 'Galilean' social science instead. What they seem to mean is 
that the qualitative approaches prized by Guba and Lincoln are, in their frequent invocation of 
'grounded theory' (which is mostly used as an alibi for no theory at all) are in fact atheoretical 
and naively empiricist: 'Without truly explanatory theory that can act as map to assist 
navigation through such empirical labyrinths, researchers are left without sufficient theoretical 
guidance, and the research effort inevitably becomes "hit and miss"'(Martin and Sugerman, 
1993, p. 21). 
This is, at the very least, confusing. The onslaught by the' Aristotelians' resembles something 
like a holy war against 'positivism' as the 'dominant discourse of science' (Usher and 
Edwards, 1994) which somehow 'imprisons difference'. The 'Galileans' respond with charges 
of a-or anti-theoreticism, and a critique of the empiricism that results when the researchers 
attempt to release the 'imprisoned voices', an empiricism that, paradox upon paradox, seems 
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suspiciously positivist! 'Is a radical qualitative empiricist not perhaps a masked positivistT 
asks Henning (1995, p. 31). 
It is certainly clear that being a positivist is not a good thing to be. Why that is, is the proper 
place to start. As we shall see, the protagonists in this contest do not so much disagree about 
what is wrong with positivism: when: they differ, and differ radically, is in understanding what 
the implications are for conducting research. 
What is positivism and what is wrong with it? Just what, as Taylor (1995, p. 2) asks, is one 
wanting to deny? The Aristotelialll view, against which positivism is cast, makes the 
assumption that the observing mindl does not merely depict the objects in the world, it 
participates in their constitution. For positivism, the scientific gaze must be separate from the 
world it observes, in order to create nn objective, true representation of reality. Truth then is 
the degree of correspondence betwflen the representation and the reality. The degree of 
correspondence is measured by evidence, by which certainty about the correspondence is 
generated. This operation depends in turn upon a certain self-reflexivity, a certain 'self-
transparence', enabling the scientist to interrogate the representation methodically. 
This view of knowledge and truth depends pre-eminently upon the idea of the disengaged 
observer as well as upon a notion of truth as representation. The most profound critiques of 
this view therefore all attempt to demonstrate that observers are always also agents, and that 
as such, are always also engaged in the world they seek to depict as objectively as possible, 
'that the condition of our forming disengaged representations of reality is that we must be 
already engaged in coping with our world, dealing with the things in it, at grips with them' 
(Taylor, op. cit., p. 11). 
This critique of positivism is thus perhaps the most important source of the now commonplace 
notion of humankind as active, producing, fabricating agent of her or his destiny, an 
'implicatedness in the world' which can never be completely suspended, even when doing 
science: 'Even in our theoretical stance to the world, we are agents' (ibid.). 
It may seem surprising to enthusiastic anti-positivists, but there is very little in this critique that 
is controversial. Every serious contemporary philosophical current accepts this as a starting 
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point The issue is: what are its implications for the pursuit of truth, or science, or even more 
practically, for the conduct of research? 
To say that we actively construct our world is not controversial, as I have said, nor is it 
controversial to say that all assertions are paradigmatic, or theory-laden, or community or 
language game-specific. It only becomes so when the conclusion is drawn that therefore there 
can be no objectivity, truth, evidence, or warrant simply because, by not being able to step 
outside worldly implicatedness, all talk of truth is for ever after fatally compromised. In other 
words, the constructivist thesis is not relativist as it stands, and is in fact embraced by every 
serious contemporary social theory: the thesis only becomes so when it is applied to social 
research itself (Hammersley, 1995, p. 16). When that happens, then the possibility of making 
epistemic distinctions between assertions is lost Manning (1998) for example distinguishes 
between 'procedural' and 'reflexive' constructionists; the latter, applying their thesis about the 
constitution of society to themselves, become in Manning's sly phrase 'literary critics with 
empirical ambitions' (Manning, 1998, p. 166), or in Osborne's even more provocative phrase, 
'macho' constructivists (Osborne, 1998, p. 232). For the radical or 'macho' reflexivists, then, 
reflexivity cannot be artificially terminated at the researcher's door but goes 'all the way 
down', (see for example Ashmore, 1989). Those who don't follow are routinely accused of a 
'failure of nerve' (for example, Grint and Woolgar, 1995). Henceforth when I refer to 
'constructivists' below, it is this radical variety I mean. 
It is on this point then that the social theory universe splits into two. Taylor speaks of the 
'neo-Nietzschians' on the one hand and the 'defenders of critical reason' on the other. The 
former group, by one account, includes, 'constructionists, constructivists, deconstructionists, 
pragmatists, post-modernists, epistemological relativists, subjectivists, sceptics, interpretivists, 
and reflexivists'. What do they all have in common? 'The family resemblance is a determined 
(or stubborn) anti-realism' (Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995, p. 43). What 'anti-realism' 
means here is simply the claim that there is no reality beyond constructive description, that 
there is nothing' outside of the text' (nothing that is not a product of representation: recall the 
discussion of Woolgar (1988) in Chapter 4), and therefore science takes its place as a human 
activity next to all other activities. Science is in this gesture 'dethroned' as a producer of 
privileged statements about the world. The knowledge it produces becomes one kind of 
knowledge among other knowledges that are all worthy in their own way. By denying that 
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there can be better statements about the world, and believing that the world is made not 
discovered, the constructivists end up denying that there is any such thing as 'the' world. It is 
in this sense that they are 'anti-realist'. 
This barefaced denial of the existence of reality regularly enrages realists whose ripostes are 
often grimly humorous (as in the realist joke, 'show me a relativist at 30,000 feet and I'll show 
you a hypocrite'). Indeed these ripostes typically fall into two sorts of bottom-line argument 
against relativism, 'death' arguments and 'furniture' arguments. The joke above is implicitly a 
'furniture' argument; so is Samuel Johnson's kicking the table to prove its existence. 
'Furniture' arguments point at the materiality of the world and imagine that nothing more 
needs to be said. They are arguments of 'no argument', of unvarnished reality. Such 
arguments frequently too include a claim that relativists 'must' also believe in the world's 
materiality, or be either mad or duplk~itous. 'Death' arguments point at the irrefutably real 
fact of suffering and death, and challenge the relativists to deny them, which they are at times 
quite happy to do: Baudrillard (1995) has provocatively claimed that the Gulf War was a 
media event and thus did not actually bappen. 
'Death' and 'furniture' arguments seem compelling, but they miss the philosophical point that, 
formally speaking, scientific argument8 are no different from non-scientific arguments. Rorty 
(1991, p. 53) makes the point: 'My own, strictly amateurish, guess would be that any 
"inferential principle" (or any other principle, I would add) which is "central to scientific 
explanation" is going to tum out to be central to practically every other area of culture'. True, 
and anthropologists have been demonl,trating the point now for many years (Worsley, 1997). 
But that is not the crux of the matN~r either. Inferences may be formally the same, but, 
especially insofar as they are intended as guides to action, as research for policy surely is, they 
are not all equally commendable. They differ in terms of their 'super-empirical virtues' 
consistency, explanatory power, fecundity, comprehensiveness, and simplicity. They differ, in 
other words, in terms of their coherence or 'epistemic gain' (Taylor, 1995, p. 17; see also 
Haack, 1993, and Farrell, 1996). 
'Epistemic gain' is just what the Gonstructivists don't want to concede: 'the social 
constructionist arguments have shown that scientific knowledge has no privileged claims to 
truth and has thus placed all knowle<ilges, in theory, on a common epistemological footing' 
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(Couzzens and Woodhouse, 1995, pp. 545-546). But that can never mean that inferences and 
assertion cannot be epistemically distinguished. The activity of research depends upon it. The 
critique of positivism may have displaced views of absolute truth, and thereby of absolute 
epistemic privilege (views which had, after all, more to do with scientific self-image then 
anything else), but it does not displace the notion that we can discern epistemic gain: 
... what is special about science is not that it has a unique method for getting at 
the truth, but that it has done rather well, by and large, at meeting the criteria 
experiential anchoring and explanatory integration - by which we appraise the 
well-foundedness of any empirical beliefs. Science, in my view, is not 
privileged epistemically; it is only rather distinguished from an epistemic point 
of view. 
Haack, 1992, p. 10. 
Put like that, it is surely hard to disagree. 
Assessing the positions soberly, it is somewhat surprising that the dispute has generated, and 
continues to generate, so much heat. In large part, it is a dance of straw men, with each side 
exaggerating and caricaturing the other. For the constructivists, any claim to 'epistemic gain' 
is obdurate positivism. For the realists, the relativists are malicious and scientifically ignorant 
trouble-makers, and fair game for hoaxes like Sokal's (see Sokal Affair homepage) and other 
forms of brisk retaliation. The relativists have at times seemed hurt that the realists take their 
deconstructions so seriously (for example, see Fuller, 1995a; 1995b), but, as we shall see later, 
the implications for social governance are somewhat more serious than the relativists usually 
concede. 
In the end, the difference between realists and constructivists comes down to the following: 
realists want to distinguish clearly between two different levels of observation: first order 
observation (ordinary observation) and second order observation (researchers observing 
people observing). Because everyday observation is constructivist (first order) does not mean 
that second order observation is therefore the same as first order observation (Fuchs, 1995). 
To equate them is to take an existential or psychological claim (that knowledge of the world is 
mediated) as an epistemological claim (Schwandt, 1994, p. 131; see also Moore and Muller, 
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1999). Because scientific and non-scitentific statements are formally equivalent does not mean 
that they are substantively equivalent. In other words, because statements have the same 
logical structure does not make them all equally valid. 
Constructivists and relativists thus collapse and conflate distinctions that realists regard as 
essential to the very enterprise of science and research. These conflations are regarded as 
consequent on the critique of positivism for the constructivists, but not for the realists, who 
agree in most essential respects with the critique of positivism. I will end this section with a 
brief discussion of two implications of the constructivist position for the professional conduct 
of research. 
'Yes, science is indeed politics pursu'ed by other means' ... 
(Latour, 1993, p. 111) 
As we saw above, constructivists take the dictum of world-implicatedness to refer also to 
researchers. This is sometimes take:n to mean that researchers represent a constituency of 
interests, or that the knowledge produced favours one or other set of interests. Some versions 
of the 'knowledge/interests' view, like Marxism for example, retain a belief in the distinction 
between good and bad assertions (here, between ideology and critique) so that even though 
knowledge may be interested, the aspect of interest can be isolated and relatively objectively 
commented on. 
Other versions of the 'knowledge/interests' view adopt a strong or radical constructivist 
position which denies that we can distinguish ideology from non-ideology. In this version, one 
is ineluctably 'in' one's interest-constituency - most often an ethnic or gender one - and one 
speaks the 'truth' of one's situatedness even though this 'truth' is admittedly partial. 
In this tradition, the 'voice' of the members of the group in question is what research should 
articulate, a 'voice' that the 'voice' of dominant science (male reason) is said to suppress. If 
given the chance, the dominated 'voice' will 'speak for itself. The vocation of research is to 
give it this chance. Partisanship here is presented as a virtue: since we are always 'world-
implicated' - which is to say, since we are condemned to the inevitability of politics 
everywhere - the way to beat a partisan-dominant science is to be partisan and engaged in 
return. In some versions of this tradition, like standpoint epistemology, the claim is made that, 
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while the validity of all knowledge is relative to social location, one particular social location 
has a unique access to the truth (see for example, Harding, 1991). 
A science and research practice of this sort surrenders any possibility of making knowledge 
claims that can be arbitrated between traditions on intellectual grounds. Here, truly, 'all is 
politics', a view shared incidentally by Nazism, Stalinism and Maoism, rather inconveniently, 
because standpoint theory and other relativist approaches generally present themselves as 
progressive and emancipatory, indeed, as a form of 'radical chic' (pels, 1996). The feminist 
realist Patai puts the case forcefully: 
Feminism, today, as it conflates politics and education and effaces any 
distinction between political agendas and the protocols of research, is in danger 
of suppressing - it already dismisses - any calm, reflective stance that sees 
some strengths in the effort (however difficult to achieve) to set biases aside 
and that still regards research as a valuable and satisfying endeavour not in 
need of quite so much post-modernist angst ... By its refusal to recognise the 
distinct boundaries that do, and, in my view, should demarcate the realms of 
politics and education, and politics and scholarship, feminism threatens to 
entirely delegitimise any research effort not hopelessly mired in collective 
ideological conformity or in individualistic self-reflexive shenanigans. 
Patai, 1994, p. 62. 
Patai makes evident here the particularly self-crippling effects of an 'all is politics' research 
strategy. In a climate of increasing public apprehension about the equivocal virtues of 
expertise, about the fallibility of experts and expertise, a methodological strategy that openly 
announces its partisanship to a sceptical public in need of reassurance is, as Patai puts it, a 
strategy of 'extraordinary blindness' (ibid.). It is a strategy that will also probably jeopardise 
not only the constructivist cause, but that of educational research in general. 
It is for this reason that social scientists like Bourdieu (1998), noting with alarm the signs of 
mounting public impatience with a 'frivolous' research community, calls for a 'real politics of 
reason', a concerted international campaign to defend the probity and integrity of the 
'scholastic attitude' which, despite all the modifications made to it in the light of the positivist 
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critique, still remains the only path of 'access to the universal' (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 137) and 
out of the particularisms ofpost-modt;:ffi research practices. 
'Who believes in naked truths?' 
(O'Neill, 1995, p. 104) 
Radical constructivists hold to a construal of the research world as one where a small number 
of enlightened but beleaguered souls keep the faith against a mass of unreflective positivists, 
who care about only what they can see, replicate, prove, and generalise. In other words, those 
resisting the constructivist tum are widely believed to be crude empiricists. This is curious for 
a number of reasons. 
First, most realists, far from being empiricists, are as interested in unobservable as in 
observable entities. Many, if not most of them, believe that the most important organising 
entities of social life - class, status or trust, for example - are unobservable. Theories 
hypothesise about the way unobserva~ble entities connect to, and organise, observables, and 
empirical research is the means to see whether these connections indeed function as the theory 
expects them to. This means that the world, for realists, cannot be 'incorrigibly known': it is 
always a hypothetical order that is under investigation, and as such, can always be refuted by 
the data. 
For example, one of the stable results from the USA, UK and Australia in school choice 
studies shows that social class predicts patterns of choice. That is to say, the idea of 
monitoring indices of school quality, and exercising a 'rational' choice on the basis of them, is 
a feature of the habitus of middle class, not of working class parents. While the theory may be 
quite complicated in that it assumes links between socio-economic position, class culture, 
consciousness and choice, the empirical test of the hypothesis is quite simple: are there or are 
there not class-based regularities in patterns of school choice? As it happens, some evidence is 
beginning to emerge that suggests that South African working class parents and students are 
exercising forms of rational choice of school (Hoadley, 1998). This goes against the theory, 
and the next step would be to ask why that is. This would lead to a new hypothesised set of 
(unobservable) relations which can then again be tested. 
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In this example, two things are apparent. The first is that assertions in realist research are 
fundamentally open to refutation. For constructivists, who deny the truth-value of assertions, 
assertions are as unrefutable as they are unverifiable. This leads on to the second point. 
Constructivists deal with the flux of construction most usually by means of methods - like 
interviews and questionnaires - that allow the constructors to 'speak' about their construction. 
In this approach there are rarely unobservables: the account is regarded as the presented 
'reality' . To use an old formulation, the data is expected 'to speak for itself: categories for 
analysis must not be suggested from without, they are to be discovered 'emically'. This is the 
principal supposition of and rationale for 'grounded theory'. But there is a central fallacy at 
work here, that consists in expecting interviewees, for example, necessarily to have access to 
the grounds for their actions. Bourdieu calls it the 'scholastic fallacy' which consists in 
'asking interviewees to be their own sociologists' (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 132), a practice which 
he also refers. to as 'the most serious epistemological mistake in the human sciences, namely, 
. .. putting a "scholar inside the machine" ... to place the models that the scientist must 
construct to account for practices into the consciousness of agents .. .' (Bourdieu, op. cit., p. 
133). Or as Fuchs (1995, p. 315) more scathingly puts it, 'ornithologists don't communicate 
with one another through chirps and twitters'. Trying to generate 'theory from the ground', 
is, then, to mistake 'chirps and twitters' for ornithology (see also the discussion on doxa in 
Chapter 9). 
Relativism and realism are, as they stand, not incompatible. Relativism is about warrantability; 
realism is about the ontological status of a discourse. We are all relativists of one kind or 
another: certainly many people would be cultural relativists. It is a particular kind of 
cognitive relativist, combined with an anti-realist ontology, that constitutes the radical pole of 
this kind of research. 
Of course, very few people will admit to being the radical kind of constructivist depicted here. 
Most would admit to being moderate constructivists only. But here too there lies another kind 
of danger, that of inconsistency. One cannot be a selective constructivist: that is, one cannot 
easily believe in 'grounded theory' and then also claim superior truth status for one's research 
assertions. This is what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) call 'ontological gerrymandering', 
trying to have it both ways. The results of such a stance are, in the end, incoherent. 
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Finally, although the constructivist or relativist position often portrays itself as 'progressive' or 
'emancipatory' as in the participatory research school of constructivism as we saw in Chapter 
9, 'Relativism has no ethical and political implications at all' (O'Neill, 1995, p. 103). Nor has 
realism for that matter. For both, what matters is what one does with them, how they are 
deployed in practice. It is to this that ][ now turn. 
What Educational Research Can allld Cannot Do 
In the first part of this chapter I examined the paradox of how an increase in the production 
and circulation of social knowledge leads to an increase in social indeterminacy. 
Indeterminacy is a Janus-faced condition. On the one hand, it may enlarge the sphere of 
human action and thus contribute to the possibilities for human freedom. On the other hand, it 
may lead to an increase in complexity" making decisions more risky, and their outcomes more 
uncertain. Both increased complexity and enlarged freedom contribute to the increased 
fragility of our social world, and contribute to the difficulty of governing it. It is in this 
context that the potential role of educational research in reducing complexity and contributing 
to evidence-driven policy and political decision-making arises in a new way. I say in a new 
way, since the utility or social usefulness of educational research has been debated for decades, 
largely in terms of the distinction between basic ('pure', not immediately useful) and applied 
research, where first the truth is discovered, to be later applied. Debates used to ponder the 
niceties of how to make research more useful, by which was meant how to create applications 
for relatively certain, already-discovered knowledge. 
With the world changing towards an innovation-based economy and an informational society 
(Chapter 2); with the challenges to notions of truth and reality as we have seen, and with the 
increase in social fragility, the expectations directed towards social research have in recent 
times become rather more urgent. The distinction between basic and applied has tended to 
blur (Chapter 3), and, in certain quarters, the idea of basic research is seen as a luxury we can 
no longer afford. Nevertheless, there are some limits to what research can and cannot, should 
and should not, do. It is the changes, but also the continuities, in the social role of research 
that I will examine in greater detail below. 
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Usefulness and Accountability 
Is it reasonable and legitimate for the Minister of Education to expect from policy research 
that it produces useful knowledge - that is to say, knowledge that not only explains why things 
happened the way they did but also predicts how they will happen in future: or, better still, 
how they should happen? Can and should policy research produce reliable guidelines for 
policy decision making, for better practice and performance? 
From the Minister's perspective, the expectation is eminently reasonable. He is all too 
practically aware that success in his job depends on simplifying the complexity discussed 
above in a systematic way. Indeed, this is another way of saying that all governance is the 
systemic practice of complexity reduction. Which systems will produce the desired results -
this is what he is after, and what he will look to research for assistance with. 
It may surprise the Minister to learn that not everyone will agree with him. In fact, the idea of 
forward extrapolation, of prediction, is of rather recent origin, arising, as the constructivists 
point out, in its modem form with the logical positivists. For the first three hundred years of 
productive science in the modem era, the primary aim of scientists, in accordance with the 
Western philosophical project, was to explain events and phenomena 'after the fact': 'an 
explanation told you why the event had to occur given that it already has' (Fuller, 1998, p. 2). 
This was the meaning of Hegel's famous aphorism of the owl of Minerva (goddess of wisdom) 
that always flies only at dusk (at the end of the event to be explained). In this tradition - and it 
is worth remembering that it was the mainstream or dominant tradition - the job of science 
was to remain not only out of politics, but out of the game of functionality altogether. 
Explaining the conditions of possibility for an event to occur constituted the boundaries 
beyond which scientists ought not to go. This view is still current and displayed for example 
by Nobel prize-winning physicist Weinberg in a recent article on Thomas Kuhn: 
If one scientific theory is only better than another in its ability to solve the 
problems that happen to be in our minds today, then why not save ourselves a 
lot of trouble by putting these problems out of our minds? We don't study 
elementary particles because they are intrinsically interesting ... What drives us 
onward in the work of science is precisely the sense that there are truths out 
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of human knowledge. 
Weinberg, 1998, p. 50. 
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We saw above that this view of knowledge was co-opted by the technocratic vision of good 
government, and by and large served it well, from the responsibility-disclaiming 'useful idiots' 
of Lenin and Hitler to the scientists iin the Manhattan Project who exploded the first atom 
bomb. The technocratic promise was that dispassionate knowledge could be wedded to social 
ends. That vision of the relation of knowledge to politics and policy now lies in tatters. What 
seems to be taking its place in the closer-coupled world that we increasingly inhabit is a view 
that researchers and research should exhibit greater public accountability and responsibility to 
society, to the public good, to policy. This is a far harder-edged mandate to satisfY. It will be 
as uncongenial to the contemporary neo-Kantian 'basic' researchers as the technocratic lure of 
co-operation in rational good government was to their forebears. But it will be uncongenial 
too to the post-modem constructivists for a range of reasons that bear closer scrutiny. 
First, I must flesh out a little what it means to say that constructivists refuse to put their 
assertions up for confirmation or disconfirmation, and thus refuse, as it were, to play the 'truth 
game' . When constructivists encounter an assertion about the world, they do not 
automatically treat it as an assertion requiring validation or refutation. They do not treat it as 
referring to states of the world. Rather, they put inverted commas around it, they 'ironize' it, 
and treat it as a piece of language, a textual symptom, signifYing something quite other than its 
assertional purport. Otherwise put, they treat 'uses' of language as 'mentions' - they do not 
recognise the use/mention distinction (O'Neill, 1995). The refusal to treat assertions as 
assertions is the central move in current mainstream relativism. 
An example makes the point. When the De Lange Commission into educational reform in 
South Africa issued its report in 1981, it was received in certain progressive quarters as 
'another brick in the wall', as a prop to shore up the dominant apartheid hegemony. This 
diagnosis was rarely based on taking the De Lange claims as assertions and putting them to 
conceptual or empirical test. Mostly, the denunciations were based on the lack of 
representivity in the research committees, as if the truth content of the assertions were 
determined by the social origin of the oommissioners or researchers, or their social base, or the 
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need to obtain consensus - in other words, as rhetorical symptoms of something else, rather 
than their substantive content (good examples of Alexander's sociological fallacy). 
This refusal to treat assertions as assertions has another crucial effect. Ironism brackets 
decisions about assertions, and in so doing, by refraining from judgement, removes us from the 
possibility of any discourse about action, at least in terms of the assertion. There may be a 
supervening or gerrymandering discourse about action, as there frequently was in 
commentaries on De Lange - namely, that apartheid must be overthrown but this did not 
issue from an analysis of the assertions of the Commission as such. This abstention is not so 
much the high-minded neo-Kantian abstention from prescription that we find, for example, in 
Foucault (1991, p. 157): 'I absolutely will not play the part of one who prescribes solutions'. 
It is, rather, an ironic desist, a refusal to treat language as in any way an extension of action. 
Neither of them, however, are of any help to a complexity-ridden Minister, or to a policy in 
need of systematic investigation. Neither of them, therefore, present themselves as candidates 
for policy research. 
When the constructivist does go into the field, she or he, partly out of an assumption that 
empirical methods would tar her or him with the positivist brush (mistakenly, as we saw 
above), invariably decides to use perspectival methods, methods which take actors' accounts 
as the only reality worth examining. Of course, methods like interviews are not in themselves 
either realist or constructivist: it is the interpretations of the data that are. Because the world 
is constructed by actors, it seems to constructivists that it follows that we should best get data 
about the world through the self-report of those actors. By why does it so follow? As we saw 
in Chapter 9, actors do not have any privileged insight into the way they see or construct their 
world. This merely limits us to the subjectively perceivable, and eliminates from possible 
examination the intransitive unobservables that may well, as grammar does for speech, 
construct the objective possibilities for expression. How helpful will this be for the Minister or 
for policy? It may be perfectly helpful to find out what various constituencies think about this 
or that feature of their lives, or about this or that policy, but this will not tell us much about 
whether the policy actually works or not, or why it does so. In other words, perspectival data 
on its own has a useful but limited role to play in policy research. 
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Finally, in flight from generality, the constructivist going into the field is likely to want to 
concentrate on the study of singularities, or case studies, although the latter term may have 
different connotations: in medicine, for instance, untroubled by doubts about universality, case 
study results are frequently taken to f~stablish the basic parameters of a generalisable finding. 
In educational research, the generalis able case study is rarely found. In education, by and 
large, cases are singulars, especially when prosecuted by constructivists. 
But will this be helpful for the Mini~:ter? Probably not. It is fairly well-established in the 
methodological field that the study of singulars is most likely to be helpful to practitioners, the 
study of generalities to policy makers (see for example Bassey, 1995, p. 108). It may well be 
reasonable to suppose that practitioners in specific concrete localities ought to be the primary 
focus of policy concern, but that is another argument, and the Minister is unlikely to share that 
view, not because he is uncaring or dIsengaged, but because it is the broader systemic effects 
that command his attention. As Ladwig (1996, p. 165) says, 'Politicians, policy makers, and 
managers do not always rely on generalised knowledge simply because of some misguided 
beliefs in objectivity or "neutrality" but because they deal with generalised systems'. It is the 
very existence of systemic effects that the constructivist denies. 
In this section I have reviewed a series of implications that may flow from the theoretical 
commitments of constructivists seeking to do policy research in education. 
These include: 
• an ingrained anti-empiricism; 
• a preference for the study of singulars; 
• a preference for perspectival methods; 
• a reluctance to engage with a discourse of action. 
It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that constructivist research is limited in what it has to 
offer educational research for policy. 
The final section here will review the attendant implications for research and social 
responsibility . 
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Research and Social Responsibility 
Is there no-one left in the Left still prepared to argue that scholarship IS 
valuable in and of itself? 
Patai, 1994, p. 69. 
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There are three issues that are invoked by the word 'responsibility' which must be 
distinguished. The first is the idea of 'engagement'. As I claimed above, by acceding to the 
critique of positivism, one accedes too to the ineluctability of 'engagement'. We are always 
engaged, whether we like it or not, this is the force of the critique. The same, incidentally, 
goes for 'reflexivity': also as a consequence of the critique, reflexivity is a constitutive part of 
being-in-the-world, not something that constructivists do in their research practice and others 
don't. Reflexivity, or 'reflex reflexivity' as Bourdieu (1996, p. 18) calls it, is sometimes 
invoked to indicate the need to 'reduce as much as possible the symbolic violence which is 
exerted' (Bourdieu, op. cit., p. 19) as a consequence of the conceptual framework the 
researcher imports into the lifeworld of the interviewee. 'Engagement' is, in any case, as I 
have said, part of being-in-the-world, and can only be reduced or minimised, not eliminated. 
'Engagement' is, in this sense, an impediment to good research. 
Some constructivists construe 'engagement' not as a hindrance but as a virtue. In this sense, 
researchers ought to be engaged, and the research ought to be politicised. In this form of 
'responsibility', the more the researcher identifies with the group being studied, the better the 
research is thought to be. But even advocates of politicisation recognise the risks involved. 
Black and Solomos (1993, p. 185) warn against the dangers of 'insiderism' and 'radical 
credentialism', where the researchers' main concern is solidarity rather than careful research. 
There are certainly ways to minimise the effects of this kind of commitment, although the most 
effective ways will eventually pit objectivity against commitment. This is because 
commitment, or indeed group membership, often entails that the researcher comes to share the 
same habitus as that of the people she is studying, comes to take the same things for granted, 
with the same things being invisible for both. 'One of the major reasons for these failures is 
the perfect match between interviewer and respondent, which allows the latter to say 
everything ... except that which goes without saying .. .' (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 35). When this 
occurs, it is only solidarity, not understanding or explanation, that is served. 
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The third meaning of social responsibillity implies something rather different to these first two. 
It comes closer to addressing the idea of accountability that, I claimed above, comes to press 
more heavily on researchers in a fragile world. Responsibility in this sense tries to answer the 
question: what ought researchers idea1l1y to be doing in order to 'serve' society in the way that 
accountability seems to expect of them? They must guard at all costs against going 'beyond 
the data', a temptation especially in important policy-related research where the data doesn't 
quite allow the researcher to say what she passionately would like to say. Why must this be 
guarded against? Is a bit of fudging for the right cause not a permissible transgression? No, it 
is not. This interdict has ethical as well as democratic force, and the researcher is triply bound 
to it, first, by the rules of her disciplin,e (of science); secondly, by the implicit public. trust she 
carries by virtue of taking public money; and thirdly, by virtue of the democratic mandate she 
carries as a co-participant and partner in public governance, for that, as I claimed above, is 
what policy research is (see also Radde;r, 1998). 
It may well be argued that we invariably do go beyond the data, and of course, this is true, but 
it behoves the researcher to be as vigilant as possible here, since the quality of public trust and 
believability invested in researchers is a fragile and increasingly vulnerable one. Once lost, this 
trust is not easily regained. 
The responsibility of the researcher must be exercised not only with respect to the state, but 
also in the name of an informed citizenry, indeed in the name of their right to be informed. 
The responsibility works the other way too: researchers have a responsibility to the citizenry 
to do research that holds state policy to account As Brown et al (1997, p. 37) put it: 
When we think about all the claims to empirical 'truth' made by politicians and 
journalists over the last two de,:::ades, the need for independent research which 
subjects such assertions to account is crucial to the future of democracy. 
Brown and his colleagues have explicitly in mind here empirical research which, provocatively, 
they wish to label a 'new political arithmetic'. They are mindful that they will attract the ire of 
the constructivists but have also arrived at the conclusion that 'By rejecting quantitative 
methods, post-modernist researchers ... tum their back on the vital task of holding the state to 
account for its policies' (Brown et al, op. cit., p. 37). So, perceiving the lack, precisely by 
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way of trying to exercise their social responsibility, Brown et al have joined their voice to a 
growing number that see that it is the task of a revitalised left to reclaim the ground vacated by 
both the positivists and now the post-modems. 
Must We Choose? 
The case I have tried to defend in this chapter can be summarised as follows: everybody, 
barring perhaps the odd Rip van Winklish natural scientist, nowadays accepts the critique of 
positivism as definitive. In other words, the constructedness of reality is no longer 
controversial and we all are, to some degree, constructivist. Constructivists on the other hand, 
go further than this, and this extension of the conventional position creates for them, as it does 
for educational and social research in general, dilemmas of relativism, generalisability, 
accountability and social responsibility. To avoid these dilemmas, I have argued, requires 
tempering the idea of the constructedness of the world with a certain moderate socially based 
realism in order to admit the idea of epistemic or cognitive gain. Without this key idea, I have 
argued, educational research loses its central rationale as a socially aware and politically 
responsible practice. 
Given this relatively moderate and modest conclusion, it is sometimes hard to credit, let alone 
account for, the vituperation and bile that characterises the on-going antagonism between the 
realists and the constructivists (see Hammersley and Gomm, 1997 a; 1997b and Romm, 1997 
for a recent exchange around the proper nature of educational research). And while both sides 
decry the dysfunctionality of the polarisation, the mock heroics show no signs of abating. 
Quite the contrary. 
A tolerant pluralism has been suggested in some quarters (for example, Davis, 1997), but this 
really defers the question of reasoned adjudication, and leaves research communities in their 
present polarised state, which is hardly desirable, because it leaves them weak and vulnerable 
to powerful outside interests and forces. Besides, this solution is likely to appeal to liberal 
post-modems only: it will satisfY neither the radical post-modems nor the realists, for whom 
the problem will merely have been exacerbated. 
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Must we then choose? This seems a drastic solution, but the terms of debate seem to admit of 
no other alternative. Yet there are compelling reasons why an either/or choice is also far from 
desirable. To opt for constructivism is to make a claim, implicitly or explicitly, for its 
superiority over realism. But since the inherent relativism of constructivism disallows such a 
claim, the very gesture of choosing constructivism undermines itself, since to claim superiority 
while avowing relativism is unintelligible. To opt for an exclusive realism, on the other hand, 
would mean eliminating constructivism, which can be achieved only by means of an apodictic 
(or foundationalist) argument of tht:: sort that has been discredited with the critique of 
positivism. Death and furniture, th~: two major classes of bottom-line arguments against 
relativism fall prey to just this trap, as I showed earlier. In other words, it is precisely when 
realists try to eliminate the entire constructivist ensemble of premises that they slide back into 
positivism, as constructivists gleefully like to point out (Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995). 
In short, constructivists are unable to eliminate realism without being unresolvably self-
contradictory, and realists are unable to eliminate constructivism without resorting to a form 
of argument that leads straight back to positivism. Hobson's choice indeed. 
If in the present chapter I have spent rather more time in pointing out the shortcomings of 
s0n.te contemporary constructivist rest::arch, it is not from the conviction that constructivism is 
all bad, and realism all good. It is, rather, because constructivism as it stands, and especially a 
radicalised constructivism, does not and cannot on its own yield a defensible research practice 
or a strategy for responsible political ]participation. For this, the constructivist opening salvo 
that helped to bring positivism down must be enriched by a bracing dash of social realism, 'a 
form of realism that avoids the problems affecting foundationalism' (Hammersley and Gomm, 
1997a, p. 8). This means a move beyond relativism. To do this we do not have to make any 
claims about the absolute veracity of assertions. A comparative claim is perfectly adequate: 
'Its message is: whatever else turns out to be true, you can improve your epistemic position 
by moving from x to y; this step is a gain' (Taylor, 1995, p. 54, emphasis added). To concede 
this is to concede no more than that some research findings tell us more than others do. 
Otherwise put, some claims to knowll~dge are less valid than others are: 'We are not free to 
interpret reality just however we lik,e, that is part of the meaning of the word "reality''' 
(Hammersley and Gomm, 1997b, p. 2). 
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With such a move towards a moderate realist research practice, I believe the educational 
research community puts itself in a position to reclaim a responsible, accountable, and perhaps 
indispensable role not only in an increasingly fragile world seen globally, but in the shared 
governance of society committed to rational transformation. 
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Chapter 11 
CONCLUSION 
The chapters that constitute this thesis were produced at different times, for different 
purposes, and with different audiences in mind, as I remarked in the Prolegomenon. There is 
thus a limit to the coherence and sequential argument that they can be brought to display. 
Nevertheless, it would be sad if a thesis on 'splitting hairs', on the primacy of symbolic 
distinction, was not able to generate anything more crisply stated and telling than a clutch of 
split ends. 
The thesis rests on the Durkheimian slLlpposition that the specialisation of symbolic form is a 
function of the specialisation of the social division of labour. In societies with advanced and 
complex divisions of labour we shou;ld expect to find corpora of complex and specialised 
symbolic forms. This does not mean that all symbolic forms will be equally specialised and 
complex; there will quite naturally be forms across the entire gamut from unspecialised and 
generic to highly specialised. If one accepts this, as I do, then it follows that a distinction 
between specialised and unspecialised symbolic forms is crucial to understanding what 
distinguishes one corpus from another. It follows too that such a distinction is crucial to 
understanding the dynamics of inducting learners into socially valued knowledge, as well as to 
producing new knowledge within any given corpus (Moore and Muller, 2002). 
It seems that this conclusion is not universally shared. There is a diverse and broad church of 
educational thinking (following a curmntly influential trend in social thought) that disagrees 
quite profoundly. Rooted in a venerable tradition of scepticism which goes back to the ancient 
Greeks (Burke, 2000), flowered with the Romantics, and currently in vogue under the rubric 
of theory as aesthetics (or representation) (Berlin, 2001), the intellectual constituency I have 
called 'constructivism' (admittedly an imprecise and far from satisfactory label) denies that 
such a distinction is either necessary 01' desirable. This denial takes many forms, but the one 
that interests me in this thesis is that which denies that there is any material difference between 
specialised and unspecialised knowledg,~ forms. The principal question driving this thesis then 
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is the following: are symbolic or knowledge forms isomorphic, as the constructivists claim, or 
is there a duality of structure that generates specialisation, as the Durkheimians claim? 
I am not interested in who is 'right'. My principal aim is not to vindicate one position at the 
expense of the other simply on the grounds of superior rationality. The test that interests me is 
the following: what social effect does each position have when it is institutionalised in public 
education? That is to say, taking my three knowledge sites of pedagogy, curriculum, and 
research for policy, the question becomes: what kind of curriculum and pedagogy is generated 
by each position, and what effect does that have on learners from disadvantaged and working 
class backgrounds? (the induction question); secondly, what kind of research practice and 
product is generated by each position, and which will be most useful for policy? (the 
production question). 
My answer is that constructivist curriculum and pedagogy disadvantages learners it is 
constructed to empower; and constructivist research proguces research that policy is not able 
easily to use. The reason for this failure is conceptual, and is the same in each case: the failure 
to distinguish between knowledge forms. Or to put that another way, attempts to collapse the 
boundary between specialised and unspecialised knowledge forms produces unintended social 
effects. 
To talk about a boundary ;here between two kinds of symbolic form is not to assert that there 
are only two kinds of symbolic form, or that symbolic forms only vary as to their degree of 
social specialisation. As I suggested above, thinking about symbolic forms socially entails 
thinking in terms of specialisation; and specialisation is a gradable property, not a dichotomous 
variable. In order to do justice to this idea requires conceptual work, and the central Chapter 
5 sets out to demonstrate the conceptual gain of moving from a binary schema like 
Durkheim's (sacred - profane), to a set of nested fractal distinctions (see Moore and Muller, 
2002) of the sort that Bernstein makes in his schema of the varieties of knowledge structure in 
vertical discourse. At the end of this conclusion I will make some suggestions as to how this 
conceptual heuristic might be further developed. 
The theme of the social division of labour is broached in this thesis by means of a 
consideration of claims in the economic literature that globalisation means that we are moving 
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into a new economic paradigm where competitiveness depends on innovation and innovation 
depends increasingly on new knowledge. Accompanying this new innovation economy is a 
new division of labour that is most levocatively summed up by Castells' (1998) distinction 
between 'self-programmable' and 'generic' labour: the former drives the innovation or 
knowledge economy; the latter, like the working class in conventional industrial society, is 
controlled by developments shaped elsewhere. If the goal of modernity can be said to be the 
deepening of autonomy (see Chapter 1), then it is clear that generic labour (together with the 
rump of the traditional working class and the unemployed) is short changed by the world of 
work and by the education system to which it is increasingly key. 
Two questions then arise. The first is: what kind of knowledge is required by the innovation 
economy? The second, intimately bound up with it is: what kind of knowledge and skills does 
the average citizen then need to receive from education to participate self-programmably in the 
innovation economy? The answer I give to the second question in this thesis, admittedly at a 
very general level, is: the cognitive ability to manipulate knowledge objects in virtual space 
(Chapter 5). I also call this learnt faculty the faculty of verticality, by which I mean the ability 
to move between subordinate and super ordinate levels of classificatory abstraction. The term 
verticality is deduced from Bernstein from the structural quality by which knowledge 
structures can be classified across the structural spectrum - if one were to say, in a word, how 
discourse forms vary, from the 'pyrarnidical' physics (a hierarchical knowledge structure) to 
the 'flatter' sociology, say, (a horizontal knowledge structure with a weak grammar), then 
verticality seems to me a fair short hand. I should say that Bernstein himself does not use the 
term (a related but not equivalent term he does use is 'grammatical strength', see Bernstein, 
1996). 
But this is jumping the gun. In looking at how the economic literature discusses the 
innovation economy and the knowledge necessary to drive it, I was struck by a rather heated 
difference of opinion, a debate I characterised as 'knowledge-driven' innovation as against 
'practice-driven', or 'learning-by-doing' innovation. The former discusses knowledge in terms 
of a relatively traditional notion of research-impelled conceptual breakthrough, the second as 
an embedded and tacit by-product ofllction. The 'practice' paradigm can be discerned in most 
of the approaches that I characterise here as constructivist - the 'problem-solving' pedagogy 
extrapolated from the Mode 2 account (Chapter 3), the 'literacy practices' of new literacy 
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studies (Chapter 5), the outcomes-based definition of knowledge outcomes in exclusively skill 
terms (Chapter 6), and the skills-dominant occlusion of content knowledge in the progressive 
curriculum (Chapter 7). It is detectable too in the anti-intellectual 'primacy of politics' phase 
in South Africa that denied specificity to intellectual work, and whose legacy is still apparent 
in our educational institutions today (Chapter 8). Latour's collapse of science into politics in 
his mischievous phrase of science as politics pursued by other means (quoted in Chapter 10) is 
compatible with this way of thinking. 
In Chapter 4 I discuss these matters, admittedly all too briefly, in terms of CalIon's socio-
cultural practice model of knowledge production. As CalIon points out, common to all socio-
cultural practice approaches to knowledge is the reduction of knowledge to practice, and the 
denial of formal distinctions between domains of practice (the 'symmetry' principle of the 
Strong Programme, or the opposition to 'great divide' theories by new literacy studies, to give 
two examples of the denial of the specialisation of symbolic form). I comment in the thesis 
that the theory of practices has corne in for some criticism in the sociological literature 
(Turner, 1994), but this line of enquiry will have to be extended to make the link between 
'practices' and the denial of formal symbolic distinctions more explicit. 
If there is something surprising in the fact that there is, in the innovation literature, an 
influential model whose approach to knowledge de-emphasises specialisation and lays stress 
on generic skills (Chapter 2), then it is surely doubly surprising to find in the educational 
literature equally influential models of learning that prioritise generic skills (Chapters 2 and 3), 
the virtues of everyday knowledge (Chapters 4, 5 and 7), the virtues of unspecialised learning 
spaces, times and evaluations (Chapter 6), and the virtues of everyday forms of arrangement 
for curriculum organisation (like 'domains', 'phase and programme organisers'; Chapter 7). 
All of these social organisational forms promote low, rather than high, knowledge 
specialisation 1. Could it be that the guiding idea here is to organise the curriculum towards the 
production of generic labour in an economy dependent on high skills? Sadly, the avowed 
intention seems to be the opposite: policy documents are filled with noble social sentiments of 
'empowerment', 'emancipation', and social upliftment (Chapters 6 and 7). Participatory 
research is likewise intended to be 'empowering' (Chapter 9), as is the de-specialisation of 
validity claims to opinion (or 'voices') (Chapters 9 and 10). 
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One might justifiably wonder how, in a time of accelerating specialisation of the division of 
labour, and hence specialisation of knowledge, we could find an influential form of thought so 
relentlessly pursuing the opposite, albeit with the best of intentions. One might be tempted to 
speculate that the new division of la:Jour creates a new class rift that those with a social 
conscience feel ought to be combated in what Bernstein called the pedagogic recontextualising 
field (Chapter 4) via a strategy borrowed from that other group of activists opposed to 
tumultuous social change, the eponymous Levellers. But such speculations are far beyond the 
brief of these concluding comments. The sociology of knowledge questions that can more 
easily be answered are not 'why', but r,ather 'who' and 'how'. 
In Chapter 6, I follow Bernstein in locating the constructivists in the 'professional and 
educational middle class', that is to say, the professional agents of social control. In South 
Africa, these would be the educational NGOs, educationalists in the universities (including 
those in the 'repair' services of academic support), and the erstwhile members of this stratum 
who are newly in government and who have retained that, dare I say, romantic and populist 
mode of thinking about education. Bernstein locates the class sponsors of 'specialisation of 
knowledge' in the 'new information or knowledge middle class'. The current storm in the US 
around progressivism certainly divides lProponents and opponents more or less along this fault 
line, with the progressives mainly in the liberal schools of education, their critics in the 
corporate world and the think tanks allied to them. In other respects, the class distinction is 
too simple, with some of the fiercer skirmishing going on within the academy, and some of the 
more inane de-specialising 'New Ageism' to be found in schools of engineering and 
management. Nevertheless, it is not too surprising that the professional educators pitch their 
tent near what they perceive their spedal form of social capital to be, namely, pedagogical 
content knowledge rather than disciplina.ry content knowledge. 
"Why' and 'who' questions are in the end less interesting than 'how': how is de-specialisation 
actually effected? The most explicit a,ccount in the thesis is presented in Chapter 5. The 
classic modernist position is given as maintaining a dialectical connection between two equally 
necessary poles; necessity and liberty, :,tructure and freedom, form and fluidity. Innovation 
here depends upon structure (the boundary). The burden of Chapter 4 is to show that learning 
occurs by sequential steps of contr;:>l1ed transgression of the boundary (there called 
'recontextualisation', or 'translation'). Without boundaries, or with the boundary rendered 
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invisible, recontextualisation is either intuitively accomplished or rendered impossible. 
Without boundaries, no learning or innovation, this is the crux of the modernist account. 
As Chapter 5 goes on to explain, in practice-based theories like constructivism, the dialectic is 
severed, the pole of freedom, fluidity and action (or practice) is valorised, and the previous 
dialectical partner converted into an antithesis, and, often, demonised. The difference, and 
debate, that now emerges is one between a dialectical account and a non-dialectical account. 
In the non-dialectical account the debate is given in terms of the now separated poles. 
Consequently, the 'other' of constructivism is frequently given in unflattering, caricatured and 
often misleading terms: 'traditional' pedagogy (rote memorisation, drill, etc), 'positivism', and 
so on. It should be clear that these do not give an accurate reflection of the modernist 
mainstream, which has for some time now tried to balance the tensions. Chapter 9 gives the 
example of various attempts in sociological theory and methodology to reconcile agency and 
structure, and micro and macro, and shows too how participatory research, in abandoning this 
project, produces the opposite of what it intends. 
In order to valorise the active moment, (,Creation is all' in Berlin's [2001, p. 10] pithy 
summary), constructivism must suppress the moment of structural boundedness. This is as 
true for the curriculum ('the curriculum must not prescribe': Chapter 7), and pedagogy ('the 
teacher must be as un directive as possible': Chapters 6 and 7) as it is for research ('theory 
must not be imposed but induced from the lived reality of the participants': Chapter 9). 
Structuring becomes the prerogative of the active subject, here, the learner or the research 
subject. But without any visible framework, the active subject must fall back on the canons of 
the known, which all too often mean the routines of common sense and the standards of 
horizontal discourse (Chapter 5). That is to say, without boundaries or conceptual way 
stations provided by the curriculum or the teacher, vertical progression is unlikely (Chapter 7); 
and without a formal research design, the result can only be weak interpretation or explanation 
(Chapter 10), and therefore of little value to policy. 
Of course there is a special class of cases which contravenes this trend. In schooling certain 
learners do thrive on a progressive curriculum and invisible pedagogy. These are learners 
from middle class or otherwise knowledge-rich backgrounds. The scaffolding absent at school 
is provided by parents, extra lessons, books and software. Such learners have already 
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acquired what Bernstein calls an elaborated orientation, and they understand the game of 
knowledge progression. They can read between the lines and they know what the real 
expectation is. For these learners, the invisible pedagogy is like a cryptic crossword, and they 
have learnt how to read the clues. For the disadvantaged learners, whose principal resource is 
the public or common school, the very invisibility of boundaries becomes a baftling obstacle. 
Constructivism enjoins them to be active and have fun, but towards what they should strive, 
the goal that will provide the satisfaction, these are cruelly hidden from them, as Gramsci 
knew too well (Chapter 7). 
In seeking to extract the clearest possible argument from the temporally disparate essays that 
constitute this thesis it may be that I have used a little too much reconstructive gel in order to 
fashion a text that is both meaningful and coherent. I have given an unequivocally negative 
answer to the question: are symbolic forms all in principle isomorphic? In doing so, I believe I 
have made a relatively coherent case fbr the conceptual and practical travails that follow from 
the 'social-practice' approach to soci(J~1 reality in general and education in particular. I have 
tried to establish that the choice elides knowledge into practice. As a direct consequence, the 
possibility of a distinction between sp(~cialised and unspecialised forms is lost. Nested within 
that elision lie a sub set of entailed (~lisions: school knowledge into everyday knowledge; 
specialised skills into generic skills; specialised learning spaces into unspecialised ones; good 
sense into doxa; valid judgements into perspectives. These elisions, or slippages, are made 
possible by the abolition of the boundary which would have made the distinction possible and 
visible. Quite against its intents, its curricular and pedagogical forms block access for the 
disadvantaged, but allows access for the middle class. The innovation economy is served, the 
new division of labour stabilised. This is the kernel of my argument. 
There are a two related weaknesses that should be admitted. The first is that my account rests 
far too heavily on conceptual argument, and only illustratively on empirical evidence. I have in 
no sense put my main question or its subsidiaries to empirical test. I believe that there is a 
wide spectrum of secondary data which would support my case which I have selectively 
reported on here, but it nevertheless remains true that my general case stands in need of 
empirical confirmation. 
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The second weakness is that I submit the constructivist position to far more rigorous and 
searching interrogation than I do the realist alternative, a point Wraga (2001) has fairly made 
against the US critics of progressivism. In truth, the realist curricular alternative is still 
schematic and notional (see Moore and Young, 2001). Nevertheless, as Wraga (2001) argues, 
it is by no means clear that the notional alternative will always come up trumps, or perform 
any better than the constructivist position has. I believe that a comprehensive case can be 
compiled, one with a fair degree of empirical warrant, but I have to admit that I have not 
compiled it here. My aim has been primarily to assemble the conceptual case. 
There are also three areas where I believe the theory can profitably be further developed. In 
his final paper, Bernstein (2001) comments that he has come to see that pedagogical structure 
is just a special case of the general category of knowledge structure. In his late work 
Bernstein made a magisterial contribution to the sociological study of knowledge structure 
(discussed in Chapter 5), but the theory stands in need of further elaboration. Bernstein's two 
examples are physics and sociology, and the empirical and conceptual analysis of other 
knowledge corpora will help to flesh out both the specific detail and the generalisability of the 
theory. This work will add to a general resurgence in the field of sociology of knowledge (see 
Collins, 1998; Abbott, 2001). Furthermore, the theory should be elaborated to explain not 
only how knowledge corpora are socially organised and distributed, but also how they grow 
and change (see Moore and Muller, 2002, for a start in this direction). 
Secondly, the social theory of practices deserves far more systematic and sustained treatment 
than I have been able to give it here. 
Finally, the main direction for further elaboration as prefigured here would be the development 
of a post-constructivist, theoretically defensible curriculum and pedagogy on the one hand, 
and a socially responsible research practice on the other. This is in my view the premier 
challenge for future work. 
Notes 
1 I do not mean to suggest that specialisation is a learning aim at every level of education. 
It is perfectly reasonable to expect pupils in the middle school to have a basic platform 
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of knowledge and skills in access subjects like mathematics and science. The point is 
that mathematics and science have verticality: and it is important that access to them is 
not unnecessarily retarded by a stress on everyday knowledge, by a lack of progression, 
and a lack of availability of content knowledge. 
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